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with the Internet. By presenting ground-breaking comparative research and intro-
ducing new concepts such as Identity Bubble Reinforcement, it breaks new 
ground both empirically and theoretically.
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Over the past few decades, various types of hate material have caused increasing 
concern. Today, the scope of hate is wider than ever, as easy and often-anonymous 
access to an enormous amount of online content has opened the Internet up to 
both use and abuse. By providing possibilities for inexpensive and instantaneous 
access without ties to geographic location or a user identification system, the 
Internet has permitted hate groups and individuals espousing hate to transmit 
their ideas to a worldwide audience. 
 Online Hate and Harmful Content focuses on the role of potentially harmful 
online content, particularly among young people. This focus is explored through 
two approaches: first, the commonality of online hate through cross-national 
survey statistics. This includes a discussion of the various implications of online 
hate for young people in terms of, for example, subjective wellbeing, trust, self-
image and social relationships. Second, the book examines theoretical frame-
works from the fields of sociology, social psychology and criminology that are 
useful for understanding online behaviour and online victimisation. Limitations 
of past theory are assessed and complemented with a novel theoretical model 
linking past work to the online environment as it exists today. 
 An important and timely volume in this ever-changing digital age, this book 
is suitable for graduates and undergraduates interested in the fields of Internet 
and new media studies, social psychology and criminology.  The analyses and 
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makers working in the areas of Internet regulation, crime prevention, child pro-
tection and social work/youth work.
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1 Evolving social media
1.1 Introduction
“Can you kill yourself already?”
“Fuckin ugly ass hoe.”
“Nobody even cares about you.”
On 9 December 2012 16-year- old Jessica Laney was found hanged in her home 
in Hudson, Florida. For months prior to her suicide, Jessica had been the target 
of extensive cyberbullying through the popular online social media site ASKfm. 
Her story is devastating on its own, yet even more unnerving is that the experi-
ences of Jessica Laney are not unlike those of Amanda Todd, Ryan Halligan, 
David Molak and many others. Each of these young people was bullied exten-
sively on the Internet, eventually taking extreme measures to finally escape their 
tormentors. The Internet continues to foster countless similarly vile interactions 
and outcomes, be it through social media platforms, online discussion forums, 
comment sections of local news sites, or even personal email. Hate has taken up 
residence in the online space on a global scale.
 Although the general consensus tends to stress the benefits of the Internet in 
the sense of its provision of a platform for free expression of opinions and con-
venient interaction, recent years have increasingly brought into view the darker 
aspects of the online world. These include various forms of negative behaviour 
involving cyberbullying, harassment, stalking, slander, manipulation of personal 
information and fraud. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
have helped terrorists and other criminal actors communicate and reinforce their 
activities while also manipulating sentiments with increasing effectiveness. 
Often, even extreme threats are communicated via mainstream channels such as 
Facebook or YouTube. In addition, the Internet is home to potentially disturbing 
and harmful content such as torture or snuff videos showing the actual deaths of 
people. It is also clear that certain material can be more harmful for some users 
and less so for others. In the discussion of potential harm, the primary focus of 
concern is, understandably, on children, teenagers and young adults.
 This book consequently focuses on the darker aspects of the Internet through 
the lens of youth and young adults in particular. It does so by paying particular 
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attention to the core force of harm in today’s online society, namely the commu-
nication of hate. Online hate (i.e. cyberhate), as a global phenomenon, specifi-
cally targets either individuals or groups of people. Notably, it is not a specific 
exception to the rules of interaction but rather is rooted in mainstream experi-
ence. Vile and hateful online interaction is seemingly becoming the new norm 
even in the most socio- economically advanced Western societies. It takes many 
forms, often masking itself as rational opinion or justified expression. Hate, as it 
exists today, is of course nothing new. What is new, however, is the extent to 
which online tools allow global dissemination of content and ease of access to 
targets, and make it difficult to mitigate or prevent negative experience among 
users which spend a great deal of time navigating in that environment.
 The modern tools afforded by these technological developments have become 
central to the ways in which we communicate, explore and connect to the world. 
Immediate access to global news, friends, interests, new contacts and modes of 
expression has become an assumed part of life for owners of enabling mobile 
phones. It could be argued that being online has become a mundane aspect of 
life in most Western societies, where constant connectivity is the norm. We tend 
not to be awestruck by the incredible capabilities afforded to us by technology in 
the way that someone new to this array of enhancing tools would be. Today, 
information, communication and entertainment are all activities that can be 
found in a single device not much bigger than the palm of your hand. Smart-
phones are, however, only a small element of a larger entity of different ICTs. 
Computers, laptops, mobile phones and tablet computers have all been developed 
to provide easy access to the online space. Furthermore, the online space itself 
has taken a constantly growing role in the daily life of most Western societies, 
even to the extent that these are referred to as a homogenous body of informa-
tion societies.
 Although the expanding role of the different ICTs seems relatively rapid, 
large- scale evolution of the new information societies began in the aftermath of 
their transformation into post- industrial societies (Bell, 1973). This transition 
took an even steeper turn roughly two decades ago, and today almost half of the 
world’s population is able to “log in”. This technologisation of Western society 
has introduced great changes in all aspects of everyday life. For many, working 
is no longer tied to a specific time or location, as one’s office can be set up 
almost anywhere. Furthermore, leisure is increasingly spent in front of a screen, 
whether to read the news, watch a movie, or connect with friends. Due to the 
impact that different ICTs have had on both work and leisure, they have become 
central management tools for many of the components of everyday life. 
However, and to put things into a bit more perspective, computers and mobile 
devices are not the first, or even the biggest, wave of technological change that 
has hit Western homes and working life. Television, and particularly the various 
other electronic home appliances that were introduced to the mass market in the 
1940s and 1950s, revolutionised much of society and how it would be operation-
alised from then onwards (Bittman, Rice & Wajcman, 2004; Cowan, 1976). 
However, what the Internet as a connecting mechanism has done is redraw the 
Evolving social media  3
boundaries of communication, information and entertainment in a global context, 
a change unlike any other thus far.
 Early computers and the predecessors of the Internet, such as ARPANET, 
were constructed for the purpose of helping to process and distribute information 
among the scientific community. Like many things originally intended for 
limited use, computers and the Internet eventually became an integral part of the 
modern- day household. The significance of these technologies at the societal 
level is linked to the development of a new way of conceptualising context, 
namely through the information society framework (e.g. Castells & Himanen, 
2002) or network society (van Dijk, 2012). The information, or network, society 
is a concept introduced for the purposes of better understanding the growing role 
of new technologies within the societal context, and is a multi faceted phenom-
enon which has inspired a number of books. For the sake of a more focused 
approach, we will not delve into the theoretical discussion of the specifics of what 
constitutes an information society. Rather, we will focus on a few of the central 
elements that are associated with these societies. In particular, we are concerned 
with the dynamics of the darker aspects of the online society here.
 In Chapters 2 and 3 we address some key theoretical tools and integrate both 
criminological and social psychological theories on computer- mediated 
behaviour. Criminologists have shown factors associated with criminal victimi-
sation involving risk environments (e.g. Pratt, Holtfreter & Reisig, 2010; Reyns, 
2013), and social psychologists have underlined the significant overlap between 
identity group behaviour and conditions favouring anonymity of some kind (e.g. 
Spears, Postmes, Lea & Wolbert, 2002). These perspectives help us to under-
stand the behaviours of content creators and consumers, and the social dynamics 
at play in the online environment in terms of risk and victimisation. Chapters 4, 
5 and 6 focus on the rising presence of online hate in the cross- cultural context 
and show empirical findings regarding exposure and impacts of online hate and 
harmful content among young people. In Chapter 7 we go beyond empirical 
observations by introducing what we call the Identity Bubble Reinforcement 
model, or IBR model, in order to more fully understand risky behaviour and rein-
forcing phenomena. Finally, in Chapter 8 we link the book’s main themes 
together and assess implications for the future.
 In order to provide a better understanding of some of the main aims of this 
book, we endeavour to answer the following key questions:
• What is online hate, what forms does it take, and what are the implications 
of exposure?
• How prevalent is exposure to hate material among young people cross- 
nationally and does exposure vary by nation?
• Which components of past theory can be leveraged to improve understand-
ing of hate in the current online environment?
• How do risk factors, social identity dynamics and the mechanisms of the 
modern online environment relate to exposure to hate?
• How might the risk of online exposure to hate shape the future of Internet use?
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The following chapters therefore aim to provide answers to these question by 
utilising past theoretical frameworks and recent research literature while also 
offering empirical interpretations based on unique cross- national survey data 
collected in the UK, the US, Germany and Finland. The interpretations based on 
our findings provide us with new possibilities for understanding the changing 
computer- mediated landscape in which young people of today spend an increas-
ing proportion of daily life. We can, through our data, detect the current charac-
teristics of exposure to hate within countries, while also mapping out common 
denominators in terms of hate material cross- nationally. However, before delving 
into the dark side of the Internet, this chapter takes a few steps back to better 
contextualise how we, as modern Western societies immersed in new techno-
logy, arrived where we are today. Through this, we hope to clarify some of the 
core elements of the present- day information society and what they were built 
on. In particular, we provide a brief overview of the evolving roles of social 
media in the rising culture of risk.
1.2 From new media to social media
“New media” is perhaps the most common and popular term associated with the 
distinction between old and traditional media that has resulted from the emer-
gence of new electronic technologies. According to Livingstone (1999), the term 
“new media” was first coined in reference to advances in home entertainment, 
such as video cassette recorders (VCRs), computer games or satellite television. 
However, today, the common understanding of what constitutes new media has 
taken a slightly more evolved form. New media not only relates to the digitalisa-
tion of traditional media, such as newspapers and television (Lawson- Borders, 
2003; Lievrouw, 2004), but also includes various aspects of digitised interaction, 
thus combining the central elements that make up the present- day technological 
landscape (see also van Dijk, 2012).
 Perhaps the most distinctive feature of new media is their interactive nature. 
These interactive functions are usually referred to as social media. Here, we treat 
social media as a distinct extension of the new media phenomenon, as they have 
developed to the point of being a global environment combining both technology 
and interaction on a new scale. So what do we mean by social media? Our defi-
nition requires a bit of background on the evolution of the Internet. We argue 
that social media are largely an end result of the transformation from what is 
referred to as the Web 1.0 society into the Web 2.0 society. From a practical per-
spective, this was really a transformation of behaviour. That is, users were previ-
ously far more passive consumers of all aspects of online content. This was in 
large part due to the fact that only relatively few individuals had the capability, 
tools and therefore means to produce content online. These few individuals were 
commonly known as webmasters. As a result, much online interaction operated 
like a one- way street, with a unidirectional flow of information to the consumer.
 With the transformation to a Web 2.0 society, a new highway was con-
structed. Here, content began travelling in both directions, as formerly passive 
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users were able to become increasingly active content producers. This resulted in 
technological advances in both online platforms and the tools used to access the 
Internet. In other words, technology had become affordable, simple and access-
ible enough to be conveniently usable by the masses, enabling a more active 
role. This, in turn, meant that control over what is produced online left the hands 
of the few and became the property of all users. This is not to say that self- 
expression in the online context did not exist before Web 2.0. It did, as a number 
of different online discussion boards were in operation in the early 1990s. What 
changed, however, was the ability to produce individualised content accessible 
by other users in a more structured and, most importantly, global platform with 
the aid of user- friendly technology. As such, social media involve platforms for 
expression and interaction where users are able to create content and manage 
social networks, with Web 2.0 being closely associated with the emergence of 
different social media services. MySpace was among the first global social net-
working services to be at the front line of the transformation from passive con-
sumption to active content production. As O’Reilly (2005) has expounded, Web 
2.0 was not so much a technological upgrade from Web 1.0, but rather a trans-
formation of how the Internet and ICT technology are actually used (see also 
Witte & Mannon, 2010). This meant that the social implications of technology 
were taken to a completely new level.
 Notably, social media are not an entirely new phenomenon. Kaplan and 
Haenlein (2010) note that the term social media was already in use in the 1960s, 
though the current understanding of what constitutes social media is vastly dif-
ferent from those early days. Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) also argue that despite 
the close connection between Web 2.0 and social media, they are not in fact one 
and the same thing. Web 2.0 serves as an “ideological and technological founda-
tion” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61) for that which eventually became social 
media. They argue that from the point of view of average consumers, the most 
widely used applications can be listed as follows:
1 social networking sites (e.g. Facebook)
2 video- sharing sites (e.g. YouTube)
3 Wiki sites (information sites that can be freely accessed and edited by users, 
e.g. Wikipedia)
4 various forms of blogs (personal or microblogging sites such as Twitter)
5 virtual communities (e.g. Second Life)
6 online game communities (e.g. World of Warcraft).
What must be noted here is that despite their study being only a few years old, 
Kaplan and Haenlein’s (2010) construction of social media is already slightly 
outdated. This serves as a clear example of the rapid pace at which social 
media continue to evolve as new services constantly emerge. Photo- sharing ser-
vices such as Instagram are currently among the most popular social media 
applications, whereas the likes of Periscope, a live video- streaming service, is 
gaining popularity quickly as well. Present- day social media are thus becoming 
6  Evolving social media
increasingly a live visual tool, serving as a window into the everyday lives of 
modern young and formerly young people alike. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that this is merely a natural progression from reality television, which has 
been around since the 1990s. Indeed, it is interesting to note that today many 
have the necessary tools to create content with a production value similar to 
content commercially mass produced. The result is the emergence of an entire 
industry based on social media content creation.
 Another important aspect of the growing role of the different types of social 
media is that these services have also become important tools for constructing 
and shaping identity, particularly among young users. By posting pictures on 
Instagram, sharing a self- made video clip, commenting on Facebook, writing a 
blog or posting on Twitter, users are exploiting a multitude of methods for self- 
expression through customisable profiles. At the same time, these social tools 
are also a means for receiving feedback and constructing a form of dialogue over 
shared interests or relationship creation, for example. Returning to the highway 
metaphor, the two- way lane system provides tools for constructing and reshap-
ing identity through self- expression, but it also allows modelling and self- 
adjustment through the reception of instant feedback from other users and 
desired groups (see also Buckingham, 2008; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). The role 
of social media has therefore become multilevel, being not merely a means for 
information retrieval and communication but also becoming central in the devel-
opment of social identity and self- concept.
 Past research indicates that young people are commonly the forerunners in 
adopting new trends and technologies (e.g. Pedersen, 2005) and this is the case 
with social media use as well. What makes today’s young people particularly 
interesting is the fact that those born after the mid- 1990s are the first generation 
after the commercialisation of the Internet. This means that many of today’s 
young people have grown up being connected to a device or service, thus being 
highly integrated into the information society from a very young age (Boyd, 
2014; Davies, Coleman & Livingstone, 2015; Lehdonvirta & Räsänen, 2011). 
Therefore, today’s youth and young adults make a particularly interesting case 
from a research perspective for examining and gaining a better understanding of 
the role that the Internet, its social media and other forms of ICT play in their 
daily lives.
 It is important to acknowledge that the influence of social media is not limited 
to individual users, as it is constantly taking a growing role in a much wider 
societal context. As an example, the US presidential election in 2008 was one of 
the first major political events that involved extensive online campaigning. For 
most elections today, particularly in Western societies, campaigning actively 
leverages various forms of social media. Social media have played a major role 
in political crises, such as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (2014–), the 
Arab Spring (2011), the escalating situation in Syria (2011–) and the war on ter-
rorism. During the London riots of 2011, various social media services were 
used extensively for the purposes of organising and guiding protesters to scenes 
of unrest. Social media outlets such as Twitter are used both as a live source of 
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information by those desiring to be at the cutting edge of world events and as a 
dissemination tool for information management by those reporting from conflict 
zones where resources are particularly limited. Furthermore, terrorist organisa-
tions such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are increasingly using 
social media for the purpose of spreading their propaganda.
 These are just a few of the examples of what appears to be a constantly 
growing presence and influence of social media at different levels of the societal 
context. This development is the result of social media services being easy to 
use, conveniently accessible from all kinds of devices, and globally accessed by 
millions of users. Together, these tools enable users to meet needs and carry out 
connections with others in ways that have never before been possible at this 
scale of influence and efficiency.
1.3 Beyond social media
Social media in the societal context entail an ongoing, evolving process and as 
such it is difficult to predict what will happen next. New services, applications 
and platforms emerge constantly, yet no one can predict developments in the 
decades to come. What can be noted, however, is that the process is changing. 
That is, the core basis of different technologies and online platforms is already 
so extensive that most new updates are just that, updates of something already in 
use. Yet from a theoretical perspective, these new updates are significant, paving 
the way for another major shift from a Web 2.0 to a Web 3.0 society. If Web 1.0 
served as a platform for the Internet to become a global medium, where users 
were largely just passengers in terms of information and content consumption, 
Web 2.0 brought forward the interactive role of the Internet, now known as 
social media. However, the transformation into a Web 3.0 society, in essence, 
involves an accumulation of information and how that information is processed 
within three different contexts: government, private sector and individual users.
 In social media, we no longer make initial contact with other users purely on 
our own terms. Platform algorithms are increasingly making decisions for us, or 
at the very least we receive suggestions from the media concerning whom to 
contact and what new products we are likely to be interested in. Each and every 
Internet search is different, depending on the search engine one is using, where 
the search has been conducted and who carries it out. We, as users, may think 
that we are making independent decisions, but in reality a variety of algorithms 
are profiling us and trying to figure out who we are based on our behavioural 
patterns online. This is an issue that has become increasingly complicated for 
many desiring to seek out objective information that is not filtered on the basis 
of past consumption. Furthermore, this environmental mechanism can act to 
reinforce patterns of online behaviour unbeknownst to users.
 To understand this accumulation of information better, we turn to two Inter-
net heavyweights, Google and Facebook, taking a closer look at the very core of 
their revenue model system. Google, as most Internet users know, is by far the 
most commonly used online search engine developed by a company which has 
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evolved to a multinational level and develops everything from search engines to 
self- driving cars. Facebook, on the other hand, is the most well- known and glo-
bally used social networking platform. Like Google, Facebook has also branched 
out from its original core product into a vast number of new, and in some cases 
innovative, social media services. Both of these companies are driven by a 
shared core idea dedicated to connecting users to both information and other 
people. From a certain point of view it is possible to argue that these two com-
panies are merely providing free services that cater to some of the basic needs of 
their users. However, in order to grow and, most importantly, remain relevant 
and popular, both of these companies have had to build an efficient and produc-
tive revenue model. Thus, both Google and Facebook, like most Internet- based 
companies operating on the same playing field, base their revenue on the 
information they gain from users of their services. In practice, this means that 
these companies keep track of the online behaviour of those using their services, 
including their habits, interests, consumption and product preferences, whom 
they interact with online, and so on. This constant automatic information collec-
tion puts two and two together in a tireless manner, creating user behaviour pro-
files that are as accurate as possible.
 What this process therefore embodies is an accumulation of information. In 
order to get an idea of the amount of information an individual user has 
“donated” over a period of a few years, the case of Maximilian Schrems pro-
vides a good frame of reference. An Austrian law student, Schrems claimed 
1,222 pages of personal information from Facebook in 2011 in order to try to 
gain a better understanding of what the content regarding his social media activ-
ities was actually used for. Schrems has since taken legal action against Face-
book on the basis of the company transferring information from the EU to the 
US and between its officials (O’Brian, 2012). Schrems is just one of the 1.59 
billion active Facebook users (at the end of 2015). If each and every one of these 
users has even close to that amount of stored information about them, we can 
begin to get an idea of how far pattern- based information has accumulated on a 
global level.
 Now, data collection and information use based on individual habits certainly 
constitute an interesting topic on their own, but this is not the core focus of our 
book. We will, however, return to it later in a discussion of negative consump-
tion habits. Nonetheless, the aspect of cumulating online information in general 
provides a good gateway to understanding the increasing presence of hate in the 
online context. This entire process is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
 The cumulation of information also means that existing content does not dis-
appear. Rather, the information, both personal and general, once public, tends to 
remain at the disposal of other users. What this cumulating effect creates is what 
can be described as a type of personalised online profile. This profile tends to 
have two key elements, permanence and externally controlled identity reinforce-
ment. What we mean by permanence is that the information provided by users, 
whether willingly (i.e. posting something on social media) or involuntarily 
through collection by service providers (as in the Google and Facebook revenue 
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model described above), is difficult and in some cases even impossible to 
remove from the online sphere. By externally controlled identity reinforcement 
we mean search algorithms, the very same ones that dictate which results appear 
on Google searches, for example, based on past patterns of behaviour. Personal-
ised profiles therefore consist of all the information that is available regarding 
any individual in the online context. This content does not disappear, but rather 
increases as information accumulates. Past actions, preferences and habits exist 
in a self- reinforcing cycle, as the algorithm promotes content that might be of 
interest based on previous habits. Furthermore, people with similar profiles 
receive similar promoted material, thus increasing links between like- minded 
users. “You might be interested in this” is an increasingly common suggestion 
that users come across when embarking on searches for news and other content. 
The search engine algorithms make sure that past user preferences dominate the 
type of information we continue to receive in the future.
 What holds our interest here is the permanence of the content individuals 
themselves produce, particularly in association with hateful and harmful 
behaviour in the online context. In this context, references to hate speech are 
often introduced, igniting a relatively multileveled discourse. Notably, efforts 
have been made to define what constitutes hate speech in a more structured and 
empirical manner (Brown, 2015; Waldron, 2012). Yet, within public discourse, 
references to hate speech tend to be much more heated. Some argue for free 
speech, maintaining that individuals should be free to express their opinions 
about any topic of their choosing, whether it be religion, immigration, sexual 
orientation or otherwise. Others claim that there should be plenty of room for 
critical reflection regarding problems associated with, for instance, immigration 
or the threat of radical Islam. On the opposing side are those arguing that no 
such right exists when content inappropriately attacks certain groups of people, 
potentially inciting violence or prejudice against them.
Web 1.0
The information
web
Web 2.0
The social web
Web 3.0
The integrated web
Web 1.0 
Web 1.0 
Web 2.0 
Figure 1.1 The accumulation of information on the Internet.
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 We return to this discussion in greater detail in later chapters, but what we 
wish to bring forward briefly at this stage is the relationship between negative 
content and the online context. The reason for this is that the online context adds 
a different, and highly critical, dimension to hateful and harmful content in that 
it facilitates its development into something toxic. Our use of the term toxic is 
based not only on the nature of the content itself, but also on its longevity and 
continued danger. As such, toxic waste provides an effective parallel here. The 
fact that personal information and behavioural content cumulate online, com-
bined with the difficulty of removing it, carries serious implications where the 
material is damaging. Material that is likely to have a negative impact on 
behaviour is no different, with widespread dissemination combined with diffi-
culty of removal and little reduction of impact potential. Unlike past forms of 
large- scale accessible media, online hate material does not cycle out with the 
introduction of new material. The toxicity of its content can spread easily both 
early on and in perpetuity, carrying its original message with constant intensity 
and harming vulnerable targets.
1.4 Youth and culture of risk
The common reaction to many new and influential phenomena is generally two- 
fold. On the one hand, there is a level of excitement associated with the potential 
benefits and advancements, while on the other hand there is an equal sense of 
worry regarding what sorts of risk may be in store. Adoption of something new 
therefore tends to be a question of balancing between provided opportunities and 
associated risks (Livingstone & Helsper, 2010). The Internet and the technolo-
gical mechanisms associated with it, along with the ever expanding number of 
different social media platforms, are a prime example of this. Here, the debate 
has been extensive and continues, revolving around the balancing of immense 
social and expressional benefits against the inherent risks of entering an arena 
with users set on causing harm to others.
 The benefits of new technologies tend to include the increased opportunities 
for information access, learning and learning aids, social connections and new 
modes or capabilities associated with expression. The risks, on the other hand, 
include reliance on increasing screen time, lack of face- to-face interactions, 
privacy issues, cyberbullying, sexual soliciting, and all manner of targeted 
content aimed at causing harm. As noted earlier, younger users tend to be the 
earliest adopters as well as the most active users of new technologies. They also 
tend to be the highest- risk group when it comes to the potential dangers of these 
technologies. The reason for this is that young people are seen as less experienced 
when it comes to critically reflecting on the type of content facing them and the 
types of users because behaviours adopted during less mature developmental 
phases are reinforced, which potentially hinders access to beneficial content of a 
contrasting nature. Notably, existing research indicates that negative behaviour 
has become relatively commonplace in the online context, with sexual and 
other harassment, cyberbullying, soliciting and stalking becoming increasingly 
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common (Näsi et al., 2014; Ortega et al., 2012; Sourander et al., 2010; Wolak, 
Finkelhor & Mitchell, 2012; Yar, 2013; Ybarra, Langhinrichsen- Rohling & 
Mitchell, 2016). Furthermore, various types of harmful content including porno-
graphy and extreme violence such as death sites have been found to constitute 
developmental risks for young users (see e.g. Gossett & Byrne, 2002; Tait, 2008; 
Ybarra & Mitchell, 2008). Finally, online communities focusing on pro- eating 
disorders, pro- self harm and pro- suicide are also increasingly common (e.g. 
Boyd, Ryan & Leavitt, 2011; Dunlop, More & Romer, 2011; Keipi, Oksanen, 
Hawdon, Näsi & Räsänen, 2015; Minkkinen et al., 2016; Oksanen et al., 2015).
 Besides self- harm groups, there are various communities that glorify mass 
murderers, racist ideologies, xenophobia and radicalised political groups. 
Research has demonstrated their attractiveness to users seeking to commit radical 
acts such as school shootings (Oksanen, Hawdon & Räsänen, 2014). Statistically 
rare but socially and societally highly influential acts, such as the 2011 Norway 
attacks, have also been linked to online activism (Sandberg, Oksanen, Berntzen & 
Kiilakoski, 2014). The argument is at times put forth that these are relatively small 
groups and that only very few actually participate in the interaction and support 
represented causes. However, the nature of the Internet is such that even a small 
group of individuals can have a significant impact in the wider societal context 
due to the great potential for content exposure. As such, collective hate in the 
online context is not a particularly new phenomenon. The first major online hate 
site, Stormfront.com, was established in 1995 (Gerstenfeld, Grant & Chiang, 
2003), with many prominent hate groups also going online during the 1990s. Fur-
thermore, social media have played a significant role lately in bringing together 
like- minded people in the context of negative or risky behaviour.
 Hate- motivated online communities and discussion forums are not only about 
fandom in support of a particular cause. The planned attack on the University of 
Helsinki in 2014, for instance, was discussed and planned in the anonymous Tor 
network throughout the previous year. The two culprits had become acquainted 
in the online platform earlier on, building on their shared interest in causing 
significant harm, making a violent transition from online hate to offline crime. 
Linked to this combining of dangerous like- minded users, earlier studies indicate 
that hate groups have been actively working to recruit young people through 
information technologies (e.g. Lee & Leets, 2002). Lately, there has been an 
even greater proliferation of online recruitment in connection with extremism. 
Various organised hate groups, from white supremacists to transnational jihad-
ists, are active online (Brown, 2009). At present, one of the most notable of such 
groups is the aforementioned ISIS terrorist organisation. Groups such as ISIS 
have become a concern in Finland as well, as a significant number of jihadists 
have been recruited through social media from the different Nordic countries, 
with young males generally being the most likely recruits (see also Conway & 
McInerney, 2008). Therefore, the rise of social media has opened up additional 
avenues for promoting activism and radicalism and has also allowed a plethora 
of hate groups and terrorist organisations to flourish online (Oksanen, Hawdon 
& Räsänen, 2014).
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1.5 The dividing Internet
It is important to state here that the Internet as such is not, and should not be, 
automatically perceived as something particularly deviant. What needs to be 
acknowledged, however, is how powerful a societal tool it is in serving both 
exposure to information and social interaction today. This further raises the 
notion that the Internet can cater to two very different aspects as a facilitator of 
user preferences. On the one hand, a number of positive aspects are absolutely 
central to online behaviour, such as convenient access to vast amounts of 
information, social connections, services and unique modes of expression. On 
the other hand, unsurprisingly, these same aspects can be used for very negative 
purposes. Paralleling Robert Louis Stevenson’s literary classic, The Strange 
Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, the Internet can bring out very different sides 
of its users. In assessing negative exposure, the question of balance emerges: do 
the positives outweigh the negatives and where do we draw the line? And, more 
importantly, can the negatives be controlled in an effective manner without 
undoing the benefits that depend on identical platforms and modes of 
expression?
 One of the key aspects of this parallel with Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde lies in the 
motives for users’ behaviour. To what extent is content creation and type of 
interaction driven by users’ needs to express themselves in certain ways? Is user 
behaviour being affected by the content or mechanisms of the online environ-
ment itself? As noted earlier, technology is now at the core of most Western 
societies, and, at least in theory, these technologies are first and foremost 
designed as tools to create a more efficient society. Yet the original premise of 
the Internet did not fully account for all the different human factors, especially in 
terms of negative effects. What we mean by this is that it has been difficult to 
predict how and to what extent people incorporate technology into their lives 
and, more importantly, how it will influence and dictate their behaviour. On the 
one hand, technology allows us to carry a small device that easily fits in a pocket 
and grants access to vast amounts of information and entertainment, yet at the 
same time the Internet can serve as a platform where the very worst in people 
can suddenly emerge.
 The division between negative and positive has become a relatively distinc-
tive feature of the present- day online environment, as it can be seen to serve a 
number of different personal and social contexts. Some seek out positive groups 
for support or validation while others seek to strengthen entrenched negative 
perceptions. The division can be seen as existing between access and no access, 
those who benefit and those who do not benefit, between those who agree and 
those who oppose. In the online context, a division between something positive 
and something negative can be expressed as a digital divide. This notion origi-
nates from the division between those who have access to the Internet and those 
who do not (e.g. Hargittai, 2002; see also Näsi, 2013), as those with access were 
perceived to be in a more privileged position than those without, due to the bene-
fits of information and services available online.
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 However, over the years the definition of what constitutes a digital divide has 
evolved, mainly because access in general has become so much more common. 
The digital divide in many countries is therefore no longer about access but 
about user purposes (van Dijk, 2006). It is a division between those who use the 
Internet and ICTs for more practical purposes, such as information seeking and 
learning, and those who use it more for the purposes of entertainment, for 
example. A divide can also be made between social and anti- social behaviour, 
particularly in the context of polarised opinions and reactions to other users and 
content. The Internet therefore does possess the power to divide, not only 
bringing people together but also tearing them apart. In the sense that conflicts 
garner attention, it is not surprising that hate and harmful behaviour have become 
such a noted part of the online setting. Factors that explain the more traditional 
versions of the digital divide are relatively similar despite the evolving defini-
tion. Past research has found that those better off in socio- economic terms tend 
to be those who have benefited more from the new technologies (e.g. Goldfarb 
& Prince, 2008; Koivusilta, Lintonen & Rimpelä, 2004). In the following empir-
ical chapters we will examine whether similar factors help to explain the divi-
sion between social and anti- social behaviour in the online context.
 Another notable aspect of the present- day online communication and sociali-
sation divide is a kind of compartmentalisation. In the online context, this com-
partmentalisation has been referred to as a type of filter or social bubble (see e.g. 
Nikolov, Oliveira, Flammini & Menczer, 2015; Pariser, 2011). The notion of the 
bubble originates from one of the main premises of the Internet, which is to 
connect not only like- minded people but also users with information that is of 
interest. Thus, the bubble can be considered a space in which like- minded users 
are enclosed but also one that reaffirms users’ pre- existing perspectives. Social 
media are particularly effective at creating and developing different bubbles by 
connecting both people and ideas on an immense scale.
 According to Pariser (2011), a “filter bubble” is constructed on the basis of an 
individual’s past online behaviour. The logic behind the filter bubble relies on 
the premise that users who are interested in a specific topic are then targeted 
with content that fits their profile, and as a result content contrary to their views 
or interests is filtered away (Pariser, 2011). This also relates to our earlier discus-
sion about the revenue models of social media operators and online search 
engines, along with the constant collection of information based on users’ online 
behaviour in order to construct personalised user profiles. However, research 
appears not to support the idea of a filter bubble as a particularly dominant force 
in cutting people off from information that does not reinforce their existing 
views (e.g. Nguyen, Hui, Harper, Teryeen & Konstan, 2014; Zuiderveen Borge-
sius et al., 2016). Therefore, the bubble appears to serve more as a communal 
feature, bringing like- minded people together. However, according to Abisheva, 
Garcia and Schweitzer (2016), it is the bursting or collision of different types of 
filter bubbles that fosters increasing polarisation and negativity in the online 
context. That is, one’s views and ideology grow stronger within the bubble, yet 
in doing so reinforce separation from those who do not share similar perceptions 
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or ideology. Therefore, from the perspective of social cohesion, the premise in 
many online social interactions is already such that it is much easier to get into 
an argument about who is right and who is wrong than it is to find some form of 
common ground.
 The dark side of the Internet is increasingly evident. It has a whole host of 
different characteristics and can involve individual actors as well as larger 
groups dedicated to a particular cause. In this book our focus is on the darker 
aspects of the Internet and social media in particular. Our goal is therefore to 
provide new information, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, on 
the hate aspects of the Internet. In the following chapters we focus in more detail 
on different aspects of online hate. We first build a theoretical map of online hate 
by linking key theories from criminology, sociology and social psychology with 
forms of hate in the new online context. We then take a closer look at rising hate 
online, including hate groups, individual actors and created content prominent in 
routine contexts. We also present an empirical overview of hate in a cross- 
national context, as we look into exposure to hate material and its implications in 
four Western countries, namely the UK, the US, Germany and Finland. Building 
on these components of past theory and empirical findings concerning hate, we 
also present a novel model of online hate dynamics in terms of identity and 
behavioural patterns linked to environmental factors prevalent online, all towards 
bridging past theory with current online realities. Finally, we delve into the 
social spheres of hate online to establish a deeper understanding of the bigger 
picture of hate today and where we may be headed in terms of social media and 
the management of risk.
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2 Social media and identity
2.1 Expanded interaction and social media
The ways in which online hate functions today is a product of both user intent 
and the mechanisms available for making that content available. Online, users 
can express themselves to a potentially global audience in ways that were not 
possible just a decade ago. The matching of user intent with the tools available 
for disseminating content can result in wide- reaching effects even without spe-
cific audience targeting. An understanding of hateful intent and methods of how 
that intent can be delivered requires a contextual look at the users themselves 
through tried and true theoretical frameworks used in past research of the offline 
setting especially. Deep motivations and needs that drive users to seek out vali-
dation through communities or content dissemination can shed valuable insight 
into how and why certain behaviour is carried out online. As such, past theory 
on identity is helpful for grasping the motivations, needs and social context of 
the individual user, along with the environmental factors and tools available to 
the user to influence others.
 The interactions and social dynamics of self- perception carried out offline 
have of course been the focus of a great majority of past theory. The extent to 
which those theories are useful in the online social space is of interest here. In 
terms of peer recognition offline, for example, self- presentation to a desired peer 
group may be key to gaining acceptance. This can involve attitudes, appearance 
or mirrored behavioural norms. The audience receiving this self- presentation 
offline is tied to the element of physical presence, which then determines the 
scope of influence. If a new member of a peer group seeks to gain favour, the 
feedback loops are straightforward in the sense that physical space is shared and 
expression is transferred directly between parties. Indeed, word of mouth can 
also spread information beyond the initial social setting. Furthermore, risk may 
result from seeking attention from those uninterested in accepting the individual 
concerned. Social Identity Theory (SIT) does well to map the dynamics at play 
here, but what might this same process look like online?
 In the online setting, the key dynamics of this scenario remain highly rel-
evant; a desired group is targeted for validation seeking, group norms are 
assessed and self- presentation is tailored in a fashion pleasing to the desired 
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identity group. However, the degree to which the self can be tailored online 
extends far beyond that available offline. The lack of physical presence can be 
leveraged to highlight aspects of the self that may not be accurate. Furthermore, 
the accuracy of displayed identity characteristics may not be verifiable by the 
group itself due to the inability to interact physically with the user. Online, repu-
tation effects can also be managed in a way less possible offline as versions of 
oneself need not overlap. Online identities can be created and deleted easily. One 
can begin anew and even reinforce new attempts without disclosing unfavour-
able experiences and impressions left with other groups online. Furthermore, the 
sphere of influence in terms of who is able to find a customised online self can 
be global. Profiles created for specific purposes of validation, as in this example, 
can also be targeted based on the very characteristics that were meant to attract 
positive attention. Indeed, the dynamics of validation seeking from identity 
groups online and offline are quite similar. However, certain enabling tools of 
the online setting can also be used to enhance areas previously less malleable.
 Although the individual needs of users remain similar to those of the days 
before wide- scale social media use, the theoretical frameworks used in past 
research are not quite up to the task of framing the realities of the online setting 
adequately due to key areas of social dynamics that are closely tied to the 
enabling tools of the Internet. This is especially true in terms of the scope of 
access to others and the extent to which some level of lessened identifiability or 
visibility can be a factor in expression and interaction. Today, users have access 
to the world through social media platforms where they can present themselves 
as they please, yet are also subject to the targeting and reactions of a potentially 
massive audience. It seems reasonable to ask: are the online and offline social 
environments equivalent in the degree to which they offer a neutral setting for 
exploration and expression?
 We will identify social aspects of the Internet environment that are central to 
identity and link them to various themes of social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and related approaches to better understand the dynamics relevant 
to the online setting. This theory is an excellent starting point as it helps to frame 
an understanding of the individual despite perhaps lacking the scope to tackle 
the dynamic social setting available online today. Yet it acts as a stepping stone 
to the development of a novel theoretical approach applicable to the online 
environment prominent today.
 As the previous chapter illustrated, the Internet has become a central aspect of 
daily life for much of the Western world in terms of connecting a significant 
portion of both the social and the personal. Interaction is increasingly mediated 
by the online medium, where enhanced forms of expression, relationship man-
agement and socialisation are possible. Here, the scale of social networks can be 
increased and decreased depending on the desired audience size. Social media 
allow for new forms of customising relationships and interaction with other 
users, as user profiles, interest groups and modes of communication can vary 
according to the preferences of the users themselves. Furthermore, the online 
environment continues to branch out as its users manage and develop 
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expressional content and communities through efficient and convenient commu-
nication. This represents a truly dynamic setting where content creation, rela-
tionship management and social network scale can all be managed by users 
through interaction whose forms can also vary.
 A central aspect of this adoption of technological outlets is the social aspect 
of becoming connected to others. The popular modes of expression and inter-
action online reflect the relational desires and needs that exist offline. The Inter-
net is the meeting place of the world, and has been for some time. It continues to 
evolve, as do the users with whom it is most popular. The relational aspects of 
the Internet are consumed by young generations at a rate far surpassing other 
demographics (Lehdonvirta & Räsänen, 2011; Näsi, Räsänen & Lehdonvirta, 
2011). Today, users have the option to start their day by expressing sentiments 
to thousands or even millions if their social network scale so allows. Opinions, 
attitudes and norms on any number of issues can be affirmed or denied, targeting 
any number of specific or general audiences at a moment’s notice. Key social 
identities can thereby be reinforced at a pace and scale previously reserved for 
the social or cultural elite. Furthermore, whether those with whom one interacts 
are considered close friends or unknown followers depends on the user in ques-
tion. As such, the variance in expressional and relational forums online is vast.
 Indeed, though the capability exists, the majority of users do not have direct 
expressional access to millions or even thousands. Social networks online are 
important reinforcements of what happens offline as well, creating convenience 
in communication and reinforcing relationships already existing offline. Here, 
convenient access to others is sought, rather than access to a wider audience. 
However, the convenience and scale can work together for those targeting 
certain groups for damaging purposes. Thus, central to this popularity with 
young people is the aspect of being able to seek out relational benefit from 
others, which affords new opportunities for identity development, social explora-
tion and new methods for expression (Keipi & Oksanen, 2014). Online, users 
can explore who they are by learning, interacting and independently seeking out 
the fulfilment of various needs that they hold, especially socially. The Internet 
provides countless platforms from which to express oneself, seek feedback and 
develop opinions concerning anything imaginable. However, as mentioned 
earlier, these new opportunities available online can bring new forms of risk to 
users. Just as offline interaction brings various negative experiences, the same is 
true online. Harassment, targeted hate and bullying of various levels of severity 
are prevalent throughout the Internet, as users take advantage of the ease of com-
munication and effective platforms that are otherwise used in beneficial ways 
(Festl & Quandt, 2013; Wegge, Vandebosch, Eggermont & Walrave, 2015).
 In this online setting, users are empowered to choose social frameworks in a 
way that has not been possible before. Individuals are often limited by what they 
know. More specifically, aspects of the self may not be explored if the potential 
of similar others is unknown. Here, validation seeking may not be prioritised in 
important developmental ways where sought- after identity groups are inaccess-
ible. Online, access to others is made easy, as is seeking out like- minded 
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communities. On the Internet, social support and a desired form of validation 
may be only one click away, as so much is within anyone’s reach. As a social 
tool, the Internet is unparalleled in its flexibility in meeting users’ needs. Central 
to this usefulness in finding validation is the possibility of customisable self- 
presentation (Hogan, 2010); these methods of connectedness and expression 
chosen by users act as signposts towards identifying various needs whose fulfil-
ment is being sought. Online, users and communities of users can clearly identify 
themselves as they wish through social media. Here, like- minded networks can 
be conveniently found and joined. One result of the expressional benefits and 
access to others online is the presence of countless accessible social spheres 
revolving around all imaginable shared characteristics; in the online setting, the 
variety of available identity- reinforcing groups is unparalleled.
 This freedom of movement online can empower users by providing more 
convenient ways to strengthen a sense of independence through encouraging ful-
filling forms of expression. Online interaction can bring new opportunities for 
relating to like- minded individuals or communities. These benefits can be most 
valued by those who seek a sense of belonging that perhaps may not be as 
accessible offline (Blais, Craig, Pepler & Connolly, 2008). These online mecha-
nisms can be unique to the setting or can be an extension of the setting already 
present offline. The environment provided by the Internet can be used, on a more 
personal level, for entertainment, escapism, learning or any number of other 
experiences depending on the user in question.
 Social media, as mapped out in the previous chapter, provide the backdrop 
for the dynamics with which we are concerned here. This multifaceted environ-
ment for interaction and expression hosts all manner of positive, neutral and 
damaging material. As a whole, social media make up the most used portion of 
the Internet (Wang & Stefanone, 2013). Linked to its popularity is the avail-
ability of like- minded interactive partners and personally discoverable interest- 
based groups (Keipi & Oksanen, 2014). Here, access and personal identification 
add to the relational possibilities being sought by many users and set the stage 
for the realities of online hate. Social media platforms such as Facebook can thus 
be used in any number of ways: from maintaining offline relationships with 
those who already know the user in question, to creating a global network of 
new connections based on a customised and exaggerated profile in the search for 
validation or self- gratification.
 Just as in the offline world, communities of like- minded individuals form 
organically, as users balance a desire for connection and strengthening of shared 
interests. Online groups can provide reinforcement to users’ identity expression 
and exploration, complementing the mechanisms affecting the individual offline 
as well (Davidson & Martelozzo, 2013). Identity development is a key motivator 
in seeking out a sense of worth and importance from desired groups online, espe-
cially when interests are shared (Panek, Nardis & Konrath, 2013). Significantly, 
these online communities can also reinforce negative effects, for example 
through the production and targeting of damaging material and sentiment 
(Oksanen, Hawdon, Holkeri, Näsi & Räsänen, 2014). The mechanisms of the 
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online setting that can also be used for beneficial connectedness and group rein-
forcement can also be leveraged to encourage negative effects for targeted 
groups (Näsi et al., 2014). The effects of these groups can be extensive, includ-
ing motivating extreme forms of violence and hatred among users (Oksanen, 
Hawdon & Räsänen, 2014). The scale of both the positive and the negative 
potential of online groups and user activity is dependent on the fulfilment of the 
needs of participants. An understanding of those needs allows for a clarified 
view of why social behaviour online takes the forms considered most prevalent, 
especially in terms of expression, seeking validation and group formation.
2.2 Social identity theory and the online setting
When delving into hate material and the targeting of groups, we simultaneously 
encounter the issue of group dynamics. Namely, we are dealing with sides that 
oppose one another, and this requires a contextual understanding of where group 
associations come from and what purposes they serve. The foundation of an 
understanding of group formation and socialisation in general, in terms of both 
the online and the offline settings, requires a perspective rooted in the concept of 
identity and how a sense of self develops. This opens the discussion to delving 
into why group formation matters and what characteristics unique to the online 
setting might affect the dynamics of that fundamental socialisation and resulting 
expression in the form of both positive and, especially, negative content. In a 
discussion of the animosity between individuals or groups with targeted identi-
ties, an understanding of the dynamics actively driving such interaction becomes 
necessary.
 SIT helps us to map out the dynamics driving popular forms of social media 
activity while also highlighting areas of the online environment that are beyond 
its scope and thus require a new complementary contribution. SIT was originally 
developed by British social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1979, 
1986). This highly regarded theory was based on both Tajfel’s and Turner’s 
empirical work in the early 1970s (e.g. Tajfel, 1972, 1974; Turner, 1975), where 
they brought forth a great deal of innovation on social categorisation and inter-
group relations. The term SIT was coined in 1978 by Turner and Brown, and 
further developed by Turner who continued working on the theory after the 
death of Tajfel in 1982 (Turner & Brown, 1978; Turner & Reynolds, 2010).
 According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), people categorise themselves and 
others to make their world understandable and they identify with these categories 
and use them to make social comparisons between different groups. In other 
words, SIT is concerned with group phenomena within the individual and makes 
the assumption that a notable source of self- concept is determined by one’s 
belonging to various social groups while also discriminating against other unfa-
voured groups. These memberships are then categorised internally by indi-
viduals, who also categorise the affiliations of others, all the while evaluating the 
interplay between them. Furthermore, the development of a positive social 
identity is central to the motivation to foster favourable group memberships by 
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displaying behaviour rewarded by desired groups. Thus, groups have behavi-
oural norms which also distinguish them from others. SIT was grounded on a 
minimal group paradigm, through finding that the simple act of categorising the 
self and others into groups causes discrimination against outsiders and favourit-
ism towards one’s own in terms of how resources and sentiment are distributed 
(Billig, 2002; Turner & Reynolds, 2010). Despite the minimal conditions of 
early experiments, where participant groups were randomly assigned to interact 
without face- to-face contact, the study led to this clear delineation between 
favouring and discriminating.
 As such, one’s identity is continually evolving through countless comparisons 
and negotiations between the self and what or whom one experiences (Abrams 
& Hogg, 2004; Jenkins, 2004). Here, the individual and his or her social context 
are continually interacting, giving and taking, while forming the next version of 
the self. Aspects of the self evolve as the self- concept develops through social 
contact. As individuals carry out this process while approving or disapproving of 
all manner of content and behaviour, a sense of self in relation to others takes 
shape in new ways and can lead the individual to norms that reinforce past 
values and group affiliations (Thoits, Virshup, Lauren & Ashmore, 1997). As 
such, identity is social by nature and formed through interacting with various 
environments. It is the contrast between the individual and the social environ-
ment that shapes one’s core identifications. Thus, we make decisions of who we 
are based on our preferences, what we know and the other possibilities that are 
available to us.
 SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) frames this development of the individual within 
a social context and through that helps to explain why interaction is important to 
users, along with the dynamics of group formation and validation so central to 
popular forms of online behaviour. Put simply, social identity is the foundation 
that connects an individual to the social group. It represents a sharing of core 
values or motivations that strengthens social bonds to the point of adopting a 
group’s identity. Here, similarities and differences are identified between the self 
and others. This comparison begins a continual interplay between how others 
identify with an individual and how that individual identifies with those others 
(Turner, 1975). This process is one of continual comparison, being set into 
motion by recognising familiar aspects in others. Here, individuals form an idea 
of their social environment through categorising themselves and others into 
groups, while also establishing a favourable view of their own group and finding 
self- concept and emotional significance with membership. This represents the 
social self, and can take many forms, limited only by the number of group 
associations that are available today.
 As such, SIT is a major part of a rich empirical research corpus showing the 
human need for social belonging (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As users 
navigate the social landscape online, comparison is a continual process through 
which users determine favourable and unfavourable identity characteristics. This 
exploration is centrally motivated by a drive to experience a sense of validation 
and significance (Tajfel, 1979). Thus, as in the offline setting, social identity 
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online is the individual’s knowledge of belonging to a social group combined 
with a sense of significance attributed to that membership. Here, points of refer-
ence in terms of where one fits into society at large are created through identify-
ing with others.
 Perceptions of others and how one is perceived by others influence the com-
parison process (Tajfel, 1981). This sense of self- concept developed through 
one’s social identity is founded in a sense of membership. And, as a multiplicity 
of memberships is a regular part of socialisation, it is the interaction of multiple 
identity group memberships that shapes one’s self- concept (Jenkins, 2004). This 
involves a great deal of role adoption depending on the norms of a group, where 
the individual adapts to new social contexts and group expectations. Notably, 
these groups can exist at all sorts of different social levels, from society- wide to 
professional and from cultural to interest- based (Hogg, Terry & White, 1995). In 
addition, the social space provided by the Internet in the form of social media 
allows for an interesting combination of comparative factors that has, in the past, 
been far less accessible. Online, not only can identity characteristics be com-
pared in the development of one’s own social identity, but the size and composi-
tion of the social networks of others also become a point of comparison. 
Individuals’ social networks and scope of influence are highly visible in the form 
of friend lists on Facebook, followers on Instagram, or subscribers on YouTube, 
for example. These points of comparison can be leveraged for validation in any 
number of ways, as the size of social influence can be effectively displayed in a 
concrete and easily understandable way.
 Throughout all of these various social group memberships and comparisons 
that can lead to discovering favourable identities, communication remains abso-
lutely central. Online, the number of available contacts, interest- based com-
munities, and identity group variations is second to none. Furthermore, the tools 
of communication accessible there are beyond anything available offline in terms 
of efficiency and convenience. These two aspects of the online setting, namely 
interactive partners and access to those users and their content, can motivate 
higher levels of interaction with both known and unknown partners, thus broad-
ening the scope of social contrast and points of comparison in the development 
of self- concept. Where communication is made more convenient and the need 
for social interaction for various needs is present, development is enabled that 
might otherwise have been slowed or even put aside in favour of something less 
challenging.
 Central to the discussion thus far has been the issue of how an individual’s 
perceptions can shift in the process towards identifying with certain groups. As 
identity groups become more defined and simultaneously more distinct from one 
another, how one views oneself can also shift and develop to a point otherwise 
unlikely. As such, a further development of social identity theory relevant to our 
discussion here concerning online phenomena is that of self- categorisation, or 
how an individual’s perception of self evolves according to determined ingroups 
and outgroups. This takes the previously mentioned aspect of identity develop-
ment through comparison and categorisation a step further. As an individual 
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comes to form a sense of ingroup and outgroup, a process of categorisation 
occurs where members of groups are simplified into representatives of the 
assigned groups. Here, self- categorisation creates social identity processes 
through the stereotyping of the self and others (Turner, 1985). As one adopts the 
norms of a group, distinctions develop between “us” and “others”. But how do 
members determine a point of comparison or standard by which the group is 
measured and therefore also compared to others? This point of comparison is 
known as the identity prototype, a representation of attributes embodied by the 
group in question.
 This plays out in practice in many ways throughout all levels of society. Polit-
ical parties have their prototypical representative, sports teams have their 
mascots or star players, countries have national heroes and religions have an 
embodiment of a way of life. As one navigates the multitude of identity groups 
throughout various social settings, categorisation is a continuous process, one 
heavily influenced by oversimplification. Here, identity characteristics are stereo-
typed according to a perceived prototype. This involves simplifying complex 
individuals who are members of a certain group into a stereotypical caricature 
informed by a group prototype. Furthermore, the identity prototype of a group 
displays features typical of group membership. In practice, this can be a repres-
entation of members who most accurately reflect the group or idealised combi-
nations of group norms or features. Central to the prototype’s value to the group 
is in the provision of an example of attributes that distinguish the group in ques-
tion from others, whether through beliefs, behaviours or attitudes; here, the 
prototype polarises similarities and differences between groups in order to ensure 
the group’s unique standing. Notably, this role can be actual or imagined by 
those associated with a certain identity group.
 In the realm of hate content, a prototype can be used to validate and even 
inspire damaging action, as behaviour and attitudes can be looked up to as some-
thing to be admired by other members while also motivating the production of 
hate content. The prototype reduces uncertainty in these cases by determining 
boundaries and practical definitions for group cohesion (Hogg & Terry, 2001). 
Notably, prototypes tend to be more attractive as idealised examples during 
times of uncertainty; fear can drive individuals to the simplifying effects of 
stereotypical or norm- inducing prototypes. For example, during times of crisis, 
minorities have been used as a scapegoat by national prototypes to direct over-
simplified views of cause and effect, resulting in widespread human rights viola-
tions. This pattern of upholding a prototype, reinforcement of group norms, and 
shared action among the group towards the “other” can be seen in all manner of 
social identity interaction from race wars to sporting events.
2.3 From individual self to group self
In terms of social identity, there is a shift from thinking in terms of being an 
individual to thinking in terms of one’s group identity. This process is one of 
depersonalisation, as one becomes to some extent absorbed into a group self, for 
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example through adopting new behavioural norms. It is important to note that 
depersonalisation is linked to an earlier theoretical phenomenon known as dein-
dividuation, which means immersion of the individual in a group identity to the 
point of losing individual identity through a social form of anonymity (Lea & 
Spears, 1991). This early view of a loss of self rather than a simple shift in self- 
awareness to the group level provides a foundation for a balanced view of the 
effects of group identity.
 Even before the development of the Internet and the various levels of custom-
ised visibility there, anonymity was considered a central component of some of 
the most powerful forms of collective behaviour (Reicher, 1987). Here, ano-
nymity refers to instances where individuals are so deeply identified as part of a 
group that they are absorbed to the point of becoming free from individual 
behavioural accountability. Notably, deindividuation theory was an attempt to 
explain the violence of crowds and the irrationality of mobs. Deindividuation 
assumes that because anonymity removes interpersonal cues, it also decreases 
attention to others, creating a level of impersonality that acts to promote conflict 
and negative behaviours (Singer, Brush & Lublin, 1965; Zimbardo, 1969). Here, 
reduced self- awareness is considered central to facilitating negative behaviours 
due to the freedom from accountability that can result from hiding identifiability, 
distilled as “disinhibited behaviour” (Walther, 1996). This loss of self results in a 
weakening of one’s sense of individuality when socially unacceptable behaviour 
becomes attractive due to relative freedom from social norms. In practice, this 
can take many forms; identifying with a group and acting as a representative can 
result in behaviours beyond what one might consider acceptable otherwise.
 Zimbardo, one of the early pioneers of deindividuation theory, carried out 
experimental research that helps to illustrate the issue. In one experiment (Zim-
bardo, 1969), one set of participants were made anonymous by wearing clothing 
similar to the uniform of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) while others were identifiable 
through normal clothing with nametags. Both groups of participants were dir-
ected individually to cause pain to a target; results indicated that those under the 
veil of anonymity were more likely to cause harm driven by externally imposed 
instructions. Here, a loss of individuality and personal responsibility seemed to 
drive harmful action that might otherwise not have been carried out. As such, 
central in deindividuation research was seeking an explanation for the negative 
behaviour of violent or otherwise damaging groups of people (Diener, 1979).
 However, not all outcomes of research on anonymity tied to deindividuation 
were destructive in nature, as decreased aggression and increased affection 
through anonymity were also found (Gergen, Gergen & Barton, 1973; Johnson 
& Downing, 1979). Furthermore, increased self- awareness, enhanced decision- 
making and even decreases in disinhibition were also observed in other studies 
(Lea & Spears, 1991; Matheson & Zanna, 1988). As such, deindividuation can 
occur in any number of settings for either positive or negative ends: from 
military units, gangs and cults to sports teams, law enforcement and political 
parties. Central here is the role of group cohesion in promoting certain norms 
which can indeed be either positive or negative.
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 The social identity component of depersonalisation builds upon the loss of 
self discovered through early research into deindividuation phenomena. Here, 
depersonalisation refers to a shift in thinking from individual self to the group 
member self, rather than a loss of self as put forth by deindividuation. Deindi-
viduation predicts negative behaviour, yet anonymity was found to result in 
positive outcomes as well. Depersonalisation helps to explain this contradiction 
in effects. As one interacts on the basis of social identity group membership, 
one moves towards acting as a representative rather than as wholly independent. 
Here, depersonalisation moves the individual from being self- regulated in 
terms of behaviour to acting according to group norms. This is different from 
deindividuation in that depersonalisation does not imply a loss of rationality 
and civility in behaviour. The need to account for the presence of rationality 
in the group identity setting would become a central component of later 
criticism of deindividuation theory, as social identities can indeed exist simul-
taneously with individual identity, thus negating a complete loss of self 
(Reicher, 1987).
 This dynamic is especially apparent in cases of conflict, where ideals clash 
and individuals interact based on group representations. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the message boards and comment sections of the Internet where 
heated arguments can appear among strangers in places having nothing to do 
with the topic of contention. The online setting truly offers a fresh glimpse into 
the dynamics of social identity processes: the comment section of a benign 
YouTube video can turn into a battlefield of philosophy, religion, politics or any-
thing else for that matter.
 Stereotyping and depersonalisation are centrally important to the dynamics of 
online hate, where categorisation and group norms work to damage a targeted 
group or individual. As individuals are grouped into negative categories, targets 
are no longer seen as unique individuals but rather as representatives of a hated 
group whose concept is driven by an oversimplified prototype. Skin colour, 
sexual orientation and religious belief are all examples of characteristics used to 
trigger hate despite the multitude of other characteristics held by the victims in 
question. A further danger of the group dynamic is that of shared responsibility. 
As depersonalisation takes place, harmful action can be justified by group norms 
rather than individual responsibility; a form of social anonymity emerges. Thus, 
social identity dynamics can magnify damage by encouraging extreme behavi-
ours under the influence of a particular group.
 This process of depersonalisation can produce all manner of perceptions, 
from greater empathy, mutual assistance and social acceptance, to deepened 
racism, ethnocentrism and sexism. Here, context is key; where validation and 
acceptance are found, so also is a set of norms whose adoption may be required 
for the continued meeting of social needs. If it is necessary to reinforce and to 
display harmful norms in order to maintain an affiliation, any mechanisms 
making that process easier or freer from possible accountability can facilitate 
great harm. It should be noted that this depersonalisation is a shift in self- concept 
and perception of others, and is not inherently damaging or beneficial. Rather, it 
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is the process by which social identity develops when adopting norms and repre-
senting an identity group one finds a connection with.
 Experimenting with social identities is an important part of human develop-
ment (Bosma & Kunnen, 2001; Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam & Jetten, 
2014; Gilman & Huebner, 2006). As individuals develop, particularly through 
adolescence to emerging adulthood, they begin to question their place in 
society, and consequently their identity and personal values (Arnett, 2004; 
Erikson, 1963, 1980). For some, the Internet becomes a toy or virtual world for 
escapism, while for others it is a learning tool or social instrument. Here, the 
online setting is a tool for discovering one’s identity through creating new areas 
to explore while also facilitating contact with users unlike oneself (Liu, 2011). 
Online, the interactional possibilities are endless, as are the identity groups to 
which one has access. The potential for learning, entertainment and social ful-
filment of the online setting is linked to the scale and accessibility of each. 
Users who struggle with feelings of loneliness or social discomfort in school 
tend to seek out interacting partners with whom they have no contact offline 
(Livingstone, 2008). Online access enables the exploration of new contacts, 
offering a validation that offline groups have not provided. Experimenting with 
new identities and independent exploration of new aspects of the self have been 
shown to be of great benefit to many users (Näsi, Räsäsen & Lehdonvirta, 
2011). A multitude of individual needs for validation and group membership 
are thereby met continually online.
 Social media act as a tool here for relationship formation among users. 
Finding group validation online creates a healthier state of mind in those 
seeking support in various areas. Feeling understood and appreciated and 
sharing significant interactions are especially strong predictors of wellbeing, 
while their lack is a strong predictor of low self- esteem and depression (Reis, 
Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe & Ryan, 2000). Indeed, Internet use is associated with 
a decline in loneliness and with other positive social effects through the provi-
sion of beneficial social interaction and the discovery of identity groups. As 
the Internet is more a facilitator than an inhibitor, its effects can be both bene-
ficial and destructive, depending upon, fundamentally, the participant in ques-
tion. This being the case, identity group cohesion can also be either destructive 
or beneficial, the extent being determined by the group itself rather than the 
dynamics common to both.
 Group membership is a crucial component of the internal versus external nego-
tiation that is identity (Amiot, de la Sablionniere, Terry & Smith, 2007). As men-
tioned earlier, self- categorisation theory (Turner, 1985) suggests that identification 
with any group is based on the extent to which individuals can enhance their social 
identity through categorising themselves as group members (Chattopadhyay, 
George & Lawrence, 2004). This theory proposes that individuals must associate 
themselves and others with particular social categories to derive social identities, 
often strengthened by identity prototypes or strong group norms (Turner, 1985).
 Continual comparisons based on categorisation takes place within one’s 
social environment. One’s environment is a determinant of what types of 
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comparison are possible. Online, the world is within users’ reach, allowing them 
to contact any number of unique perspectives, backgrounds, motivations and 
interests. In this sense, the scope of identity development online is broadened 
due to the multiplicity of contacts and information sources. The link here 
between a broadened environment and identification processes is related to the 
previously mentioned risks and benefits available online. Just as the social 
aspects of the Internet can provide wonderful opportunities, so too can they rein-
force harmful identifications.
 Furthermore, the need for validation and social support sought online is espe-
cially prominent in users who are most actively seeking their place in the world 
(Livingstone, 2008). The customisation of one’s social sphere is at a level never 
before seen, combined with all manner of self- validating online content suited to 
the demands of the user in question. Social media are full of fan clubs, support 
groups and interest- based communities of every shape and size. Here, users can 
become strongly bonded to online communities through shared goals or ideals. 
Notably, self- disclosure is a key component of relationship formation and main-
tenance as it fosters social trust both online and offline (Fogel & Nehmabd, 
2009; Sheldon, 2009). Communication is a central component of bonding, also 
online. Regardless of the social disposition of a particular user, investment in 
online networks facilitates interpersonal trust, which is ultimately necessary for 
online communities to survive (Sheldon, 2009; Valenzuela, Park & Kee, 2009). 
As bonds are strengthened through shared interests and common goals or atti-
tudes, users who trust are those who also remain committed to identity groups 
and especially prototypes.
 Notably, the level of independence and individuality of a user is negatively 
related to the strength of identification with an online community or peer group 
and less autonomous users are therefore more likely to be strongly tied to online 
groups (Lehdonvirta & Räsänen, 2011). The implication for hate content online 
from these findings is one that adds to risk. Namely, impressionable users 
seeking validation and acceptance are most likely to bond with groups online, 
including ones espousing damaging values.
2.4  Social identity issues: online versus offline interaction
As social identity involves an overlap of internal and external processes, the 
Internet further enables users to develop and adopt multiple social identities 
and experiment with new virtual identities according to specific needs. Signifi-
cantly, the Internet plays an important role in social identity formation and 
development as it allows individuals to explore values and beliefs within 
environments that they perceive to be relatively free from excessive external 
pressures.
 A significant structural component of computer- mediated interaction inherent 
in most forms of communication online linked to relative safety through lessened 
visibility is modified social presence. In the online setting, the degree to which 
an interacting participant is experienced physically is typically diminished. 
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Whether chatting online with a friend, interacting on a comment section or 
message board through a username or customising a social media profile, users 
are typically interacting and presenting themselves in a less physically present 
manner. These different forms of social presence are essential to understanding 
the dynamics of online interaction. This modifier of social presence, or ano-
nymity, is prevalent in various forms today and can be used for a number of pur-
poses, whether beneficial or destructive.
 Anonymity is an important aspect of the online setting and is best understood 
as a spectrum, ranging from less anonymous to more anonymous, that is, from 
visual anonymity to pseudonymity, then full anonymity (Keipi, 2015). This 
range of anonymity highlights some of the variation and dynamics of different 
online environments. Visual anonymity means that some user features are 
hidden, namely physical face- to-face characteristics. This form of anonymity has 
effects on disclosure and expression, even when users are otherwise known to 
one another (Joinson, 2001). Next, pseudonymity refers to navigation and inter-
action using created usernames or personas designed for the online setting 
which, despite being created for that setting, carry reputation effects. Finally, full 
anonymity means users are completely unknown and untraceable (Keipi & 
Oksanen, 2014); this is typically only feasible with the help of onion routers 
such as Tor.
 In general terms, anonymity online carries two primary characteristics, 
namely diminished identifiability and diminished social presence, which can 
exist simultaneously or separately. A user is identifiable when their offline iden-
tity can be determined. Notably, social presence can be diminished even when 
users are known to one another. Users taking advantage of social media, for 
example, might be known to one another offline, yet social presence is absent in 
their communication and thus a degree of anonymity exists that may affect 
expression and disclosure (Keipi & Oksanen, 2014). Here, visibility is dimin-
ished despite the presence of identifiability. On the other hand, a user might 
participate in interaction using randomly generated video chat providers such as 
Omegle. Here, participants are visible but interaction is random and therefore 
not based on usernames. This would be an instance of high visibility but limited 
identifiability. Both of these components of online anonymity carry effects on 
interaction, especially in terms of disclosure.
 Social trust is often a precondition of whether or not one wishes to remain 
anonymous or reveal one’s identity in the online setting. Users who avoid face- 
to-face interaction are more likely to connect with others online, where some 
form of anonymity can be used to encourage self- disclosure (Merchant, 2012; 
Sheldon, 2008). Some degree of anonymity, namely being able to control the 
pace and type of information disclosed about oneself, one’s physical appearance, 
and the ease of finding desired interactional partners based on traits, interests 
and predefined groups, makes an important difference between Internet com-
munication and face- to-face interaction (Bargh & McKenna, 2004; Tanis & 
Postmes, 2007). Online, the capacity for avoiding unwanted physical reactions 
can encourage users to express themselves more openly due to lessened risk of a 
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strong negative experience from the interacting partner while also increasing 
intimacy due to connecting on shared interests (Nowak, Watt & Walther, 2005; 
Qian & Scott, 2007).
 The online setting and the way users can determine visibility affect some 
central dynamics of how interaction takes place. Emotional expression through 
facial features, for example, has been shown to be central in how reactions are 
formed and how responses are structured. Feedback is instantaneous, with non- 
verbal cues often transmitting reactions far more quickly and effectively than the 
spoken word or written text. Online, many of these cues are not available for 
users trying to determine the mindset of others with whom they are communicat-
ing. Interestingly, physical expression in the online setting is limited in the sense 
that live physical cues are typically missing, yet text and verbal communication 
may be enhanced. This is a unique new balance involving trading a great deal of 
the possibility to interpret others’ immediate responses for an environment 
where one can express oneself more freely.
 The anonymity of online interaction can provide a sense of safety for users 
and their social identity, allowing individuals to experiment with multiple identi-
ties online. Through various forms of social media, users are able to expand 
opportunities for identity exploration and self- validation. Virtual worlds, online 
chat sites, message boards and forums, social networking sites and content com-
munities all provide unique ways of seeking out desired information or support. 
This evolution of online communities and social identity sources is made up of 
mechanisms and built- in interactional patterns that past interaction did not 
provide.
 Linked to the anonymity available online is flexibility in terms of how one is 
viewed. Here, computer- mediated interaction combined with platforms of social 
media allow for a great deal of customisation in terms of how users wish to be 
viewed by interacting partners; self- presentation has become central to how 
users explore social opportunities online (Allen, Szwedo & Mikami, 2012). As 
mentioned, identifiability can be manipulated online, which may enhance both 
social benefits and individual exploration of identity, for example (Livingstone 
& Brake, 2010).
 Much like the capacity for finding ideal online groups to match individual 
interests or values, the online setting allows for a significant degree of flexibility 
in terms of self- presentation in order to gain favour from desired audiences 
(Panek, Nardis & Konrath, 2013). Here, the possibility for desired peer recogni-
tion can be enhanced through controlling one’s visible persona by producing an 
idealised self. Users thus have a multitude of options in this setting to enhance, 
diminish, create or ignore aspects of themselves that are perceived to influence a 
desired audience’s attention. This idealised self can then be used to attract 
desired group membership (Anderson, Fagan, Woodnutt & Chamorro- Premuzic, 
2012). Online, users can appear to be almost anyone, with specific interests, 
attitudes or characteristics brought to the forefront of their public profile. This 
flexibility is a particularly valuable tool when seeking out acceptance from a 
certain group revolving around a clear identity prototype, for example.
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2.5 Social identity, Internet anonymity and online risk
The components of Social Identity Theory presented, namely self- presentation, 
self- categorisation and depersonalisation, are all central to a framework relevant 
to the dynamics of the online setting. Here, phenomena identified in the offline 
setting in terms of foundational social processes driving relational behaviour are 
applied to the online setting and its unique characteristics, combining the unique 
online environmental characteristic of anonymity with the inherent social iden-
tity processes carried by users.
 Here, the Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects (SIDE) comes 
into play as an extension of Reicher’s (1987) critique of deindividuation 
theory. SIDE, developed out of the aforementioned Social Identity Theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self- categorisation theory (Turner, 1982), was a 
wide- scale effort by Lea and Spears (1991) to reconcile various contradictory 
findings on the effects of anonymity. Before the SIDE model, as mentioned 
earlier, anonymity had been linked to all manner of behaviour, from increased 
aggression, deviance and dishonesty to increased empathy and cooperation. 
With SIDE, an effort was made to bring both positive and negative effects of 
anonymity into a common framework. This was carried out through experi-
ments involving anonymity and computer- mediated communication in a labo-
ratory setting. Participants’ identity group membership was reinforced and 
interaction was studied in conditions of anonymity and identifiability. Results 
showed that anonymity combined with group membership increased conform-
ity to group norms, thus establishing group self- awareness. This contradicts 
deindividuation theory which posits total loss of self- awareness. Here, the 
cognitive aspect of conforming to group norms was reinforced, as group ideals 
were embraced by anonymous participants even without group interaction or 
group control of behaviour in the experimental setting. Thus, conformity to 
the group was individually and therefore cognitively motivated even in con-
ditions lacking group accountability.
 SIDE thus proposes that as one interacts in conditions of social invisibility, or 
anonymity, there is a movement from thinking in terms of the self to thinking in 
terms of the group. This, as described earlier, is depersonalisation which comes 
about through the weakening of interpersonal cues of communication, causing a 
shift from self- awareness to group self- awareness by self- categorisation (Lea & 
Spears, 1995). This has the effect of promoting behaviour of the identity group 
that one bonds with without forcing a complete loss of self. Here, the complexity 
of the self is given up in favour of self- stereotyping in order to strengthen group 
bonds and better distinguish oneself from other groups.
 Anonymity thus has the effect of influencing forms of self- categorisation and 
adherence to group norms as complex individuals are seen as simplified group 
representatives (Lea & Spears, 1991). This finding, in turn, helps to shed light on 
the dynamics of social interaction online by users in various states of anonymity. 
Online, especially through social media, common interests and aspects of per-
sonal identity can bind users to online communities with an enhanced effect. 
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This enhancement is rooted in connecting with other users on shared interests or 
identity characteristics in a more focused manner online, a process strengthened 
by a level of anonymity as users seek validation from a desirable target (Keipi & 
Oksanen, 2014). In the online setting, group identity dynamics tend to be 
enhanced during interaction where the filter of lessened identifiability or social 
presence can enhance certain identity characteristics as both participants become 
representatives of a given group. Figure 2.1 illustrates this phenomenon of 
depersonalisation, as the offline setting allows for more complete interaction in 
terms of physical cues. In the online setting, interaction is more focused, with 
narrower identity characteristics becoming visible between participants. Online, 
users meet on simplified grounds where things are dealt with and communicated 
in a contextually limited way. This limitation occurs both in terms of how one is 
perceived and how one sees the other.
 The SIDE model linked to the aspects of social identity described earlier 
helps to explain why the comment section below an otherwise benign video or 
news article can turn into a warzone of politics, race or anything else. Here, 
social identity groups clash on the basis of stereotyping, seeing the “other” as an 
oversimplified representative of an opposing group. Though this process is 
common offline as well, the online setting includes a secondary mechanism, 
Person A
Social identity offline
Social identity online
Person B
Person A Person B
Figure 2.1 Online depersonalisation.
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namely the aforementioned anonymity. This lessened social presence can, in 
turn, enhance stereotyping and group cohesion by limiting the visibility of the 
complex “other” while also potentially lessening the accountability of the users 
in question. Online, the dynamics of social identity and depersonalisation are 
similar to the offline setting, but online anonymity can magnify the limited view 
of the opposition in addition to further lessening the shared responsibility carried 
within a social identity group in the representative role.
 These components of social identity formation, namely comparison, cat-
egorisation, norm reinforcement, prototype- based ideals and depersonalisa-
tion, are all prevalent online and help to explain highly popular behaviours 
there. The addition of lessened physical presence, customised self- presentation 
and access to wide audiences globally illuminates areas that go beyond the ori-
ginal offline social environment of SIT. These characteristics are particularly 
relevant in the weighing of online risk in terms of hate due to their applic-
ability to harmful action. The identity reinforcement mechanisms available 
online are, in a number of the ways mentioned, enhanced compared to the 
offline space. Consequently, the targeting of others is also facilitated to a 
heightened degree. How does the online environment itself affect identity for-
mation? Are there relevant structural components of the Internet that past 
theory does not account for due to its focus on the offline setting? Given the 
immense evolution in social interaction and the environments in which it 
occurs, it seems reasonable to suggest that a fresh look at how identity and 
risk intersect in the new online environment is warranted.
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3 Lifestyle and online risks
3.1 The conditions of risk
Risk of varying degrees is a normal part of everyday life. Daily routines can 
carry the potential for a negative or less than ideal outcome; traffic delays may 
cause problems at school or at work, weather conditions may change suddenly, 
resulting in inconvenience in terms of plans, and individual choices can affect 
the outcome of one’s routine in any number of slightly or extremely harmful 
ways. In the offline setting, risks tend to involve physical space, driven by some 
level of face-to-face interaction and consequence of choices or circumstance. 
Here, damage resulting from risk comes as an extension of the situation to which 
an individual has been exposed.
 Past experience and advice from trusted others in general help us to navigate 
through various forms of risk. We all take regular steps daily to ensure positive 
outcomes in practical ways. Avoiding or minimising potential risk may be as 
simple as locking one’s car doors, avoiding specific city streets after a certain 
time of day, or checking the weather forecast before making travel plans. Some 
leave the lights on at home when travelling, keep valuables hidden when walking 
through high- crime areas, or avoid sharing credit card information where trans-
actions seem unsafe. However, avoiding risk is not always simply an issue of 
modifying behaviour to pre- empt harm. Even when routines and regular environ-
ments are relatively free from the likelihood of high risk, other key factors can 
intrude, regardless of perceptions of safety.
 The choices of other independent actors with whom one comes into contact 
either directly or indirectly are a central source of risk and therefore also of vic-
timisation. A choice to steal, cheat or attack can have nothing to do with the 
actions of the victim apart from being physically present or randomly exposed 
by unrelated choices. The likelihood of victimisation is not a simple thing to cal-
culate when the potential intent of others seeking to harm cannot be known. 
Though some measure of safety can be ensured by limiting one’s exposure to 
people, places and environmental conditions, risks can find their targets when 
victims are accessible and aggressors are mobile and motivated. The level of 
social risk can be hard to predict owing to the difficulty of predicting the choices 
and motivations of others. Sharing the same physical space with dangerous 
40  Lifestyle and online risks
individuals is an obvious source of heightened risk, regardless of how benign a 
potential victim’s behaviour may be.
 Thus, we all carry notions of what qualify as high- risk individuals, places, 
times and locations. Regardless of routine or lifestyle, an awareness of what is 
possible in a negative sense is present offline. But the components of prevention 
capacity, victim accessibility and aggressor choice are all relevant to the online 
setting as well despite, the lack of physical presence. Therefore, in continuing 
the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter, the transition to the online 
setting with its unique characteristics illustrates the need to contextualise the 
social aspects of the Internet in terms of risk. This is central to an assessment of 
hate online, as it occurs in a certain social space with unique mechanisms of 
communication, access to others and content creation. As the study of offline 
risk has been around far longer than research on online risk, a good understand-
ing of online victimisation requires a look at past theoretical frameworks con-
nected to assessing victimisation.
 When discussing risk, it is helpful to distinguish between absolute and proba-
bilistic exposure. These two work together to determine the general likelihood of 
victimisation. Here, absolute exposure involves those people, places, times or 
materials that are prerequisites for a given form of victimisation. For example, 
inaccessible victims make targeting impossible just as a lack of material goods 
makes theft of those goods impossible. Victimisation cannot therefore occur 
without absolute exposure, namely contact between aggressor and victim.
 Absolute exposure is a prerequisite for probabilistic exposure. If homes are 
available to be robbed, then differences between experiences of theft victimisa-
tion among a population become possible. This probability refers to the likeli-
hood of negative experience in terms of certain people, places or times, for 
example. Different activities, routines, social environments and attitudes carry 
unique levels of risk compared to otherwise equivalent others; some city streets 
are more dangerous than others, some deviant behaviours are more severely 
penalised and some interactions are more likely to result in personal harm.
3.2 Starting points for understanding victimisation
In past research on risk assessment, environmental factors have been central, 
namely through an identification of key issues contributing to dangerous or 
harmful interactions. The environments in which a person can be victimised 
today have widened in scope with the introduction of Internet- based communi-
cation. The sphere of influence of users and the potential sources of negative 
experience have grown exponentially. Traditional settings for victimisation, such 
as homes, city streets and workplaces, have been extended to the non- tangible 
and globally accessible online environment in devices carried in users’ pockets 
throughout their everyday lives.
 Just as in the offline setting, individuals use the online space to perform 
certain routines, for example checking emails and certain social media profiles 
on a daily basis. However, users also encounter online material accidentally, 
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becoming lost in the interconnections of the web, entering websites they did not 
intend to visit, being exposed to hostility, and experiencing victimisation. Here, 
users’ online lifestyles affect online victimisation just as offline lifestyles affect 
offline victimisation. However, despite the extensive use of the online space for 
exploration and socialising, as well as the growing body of literature investigat-
ing online victimisation, it is not particularly clear who is most at risk of being 
victimised in the virtual world, who is not, and why that is.
 The online setting and the hardware facilitating its use have radically trans-
formed communication and access to others over the past few decades. Inter-
action is instant without being tied to a shared physical space. Mobile devices 
are continually present in daily life, acting as a window into the content and 
users of a global marketplace. Indeed, the benefits of this interactive landscape 
are vast, but what about the risks? Has the risk environment changed with the 
move to the online setting?
 Early approaches to understanding victimisation through systemic theory 
include Lifestyle- Exposure Theory (LET) (Hindelang, Gottfredson & Garofalo, 
1978) and Routine Activity Theory (RAT) (Cohen & Felson, 1979), which have 
come to form a foundation of research and victimisation. Both of these frame-
works are concerned with understanding the ways in which patterns of lifestyles 
and routine activities in the social context allow various forms of victimisation, 
with LET providing a broader probabilistic view and RAT a more focused situ-
ational one built around the convergence of three factors, namely a motivated 
offender, a suitable target and a lack of capable guardians. According to RAT 
and LET, the combination of these three factors results in victimisation. Both 
theories emphasise that the point of aggressor opportunity is determined in large 
part by the activity patterns of daily life (Cohen, 1981). Here, negative experi-
ence is linked to the ways in which the individual in question carries out routine 
activities.
 LET and RAT have much in common through overlapping themes and termi-
nology, and this has led to them being paired together in past research. Their 
similarities have encouraged researchers to use them together and even inter-
changeably (e.g. Stewart, Elifson & Sterk, 2004; Wilcox, Sullivan, Jones & Van 
Gelder, 2014). Both are concerned with victimisation that occurs through a con-
vergence of a motivated offender, an attractive target and the absence of a 
capable guardian, yet they approach risk in different ways. Furthermore, both 
theories share the same core terminology, with LET’s Hindelang and colleagues 
(1978) coining the term “routine activities”, which would later be taken up by 
RAT’s Cohen and Felson (1979).
 In terms of past implementation, LET has been less prominent in research and 
testing despite its prominence in setting the stage for understanding risk and the 
development of other theoretical approaches (Holt & Bossler, 2008; Meier & 
Miethe, 1993). Its contributions focus on the contextual factors that help to 
determine susceptibility to risk through various demographic measures that are 
themselves tied to the central role of lifestyles involving various degrees of risk. 
Furthermore, its take on the risk context is valuable in setting the stage for more 
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focused and tested approaches. RAT, on the other hand, has been a central com-
ponent in various approaches to victimisation research. We will first provide a 
discussion of the fundamentals of LET in order to create a helpful context for a 
closer look at RAT in order to apply it more specifically to the topic of online 
hate which is so central here.
 LET represents one of the earliest systemic theories concerned with victim-
isation. Originally, Hindelang et al. (1978) developed the framework in order 
to deepen understanding of differences in the risks of victimisation across 
various social groups. Here demographic differences in the likelihood of being 
victimised are linked to variance in the lifestyle choices of victims. According 
to LET, these differences are significant due to their being linked to various 
risk levels in individuals, groups and places, for example. With certain combi-
nations of lifestyle factors come situations of heightened risk of victimisation. 
It is clear that living in high- crime areas raises the likelihood of victimisation 
above that in rural locations where potential threats are limited due to a limited 
number of aggressors. The contextual factors related to individual exposure 
are central here, through identifying characteristics that can be linked to 
various social dangers.
 Demographic factors can reflect the conditions of daily life, and can be 
useful in mapping the likelihood of experiencing risk situations. As mentioned 
earlier, risk is a part of daily life to varying degrees across populations. 
Depending on individual behaviour and social context, experience of risk may 
be unexpected in one setting and unsurprising in another. Here, high- volume 
activities may naturally predispose individuals to risk or help to prevent vic-
timisation. Where contact with others, including potential offenders, is higher, 
so is the likelihood of facing danger of some degree. It follows that spending 
time at home is negatively related to victimisation, while time spent in public 
settings opens the door to all manner of risk. This is unsurprising, given that 
the prerequisites for aggression are less commonly present in the homes of 
victims than in more public settings where access, escape and target value are 
generally found.
 Although Hindelang and colleagues (1978) used demographic characteristics 
including age, gender and race in the analysis of risk, they were primarily con-
cerned with how likely victimisation is for those who share certain traits. It is 
important to note that lifestyles are central to LET, although individual traits are 
used to help identify certain behavioural trends (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). This 
progression leads to the conclusion that young men are assumed to have life-
styles quite different from those of elderly women. Furthermore, LET maintains 
that lifestyle characteristics or norms that contribute to the likelihood of risk are 
socially determined by structural constraints, collective responses and role 
expectations. Group dynamics are thus highly relevant here in terms of deter-
mining lifestyle differences. Thus, the characteristics that make certain lifestyles 
distinct are important as markers of shared expectations concerning behavioural 
norms and the structural factors that act to either limit or enable available 
behavioural choices. As one lives one’s daily life adhering to certain structural 
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or social expectations, LET argues that patterns of activities emerge along with 
reinforcing associations that contextualise one’s social environment. Taken a 
step further, these patterns of behaviour, or lifestyles, along with the correspond-
ing associations, can either reinforce or diminish the likelihood of victimisation 
through affecting levels of vulnerability and levels of contact with various 
sources of risk.
 These contextual elements of victimisation theory provided by LET act as a 
baseline here for RAT, which is concerned with the links between routines and 
risk exposure. For our purposes here the contributions of LET are used to set the 
theoretical stage in terms of risk for the more widely tested RAT. We therefore 
transition from the probabilistic lifestyle characteristics approach to more 
focused behavioural or situational factors associated with the patterns of indi-
viduals that are linked to victimisation. In doing this, we build on LET by 
delving into RAT and link this past research to the unique and often risk- 
enhancing characteristics fostered by the online environment. This, in turn, helps 
to clarify certain key limitations inherent in past victimisation theory when 
applied to the evolving social setting available online.
 According to RAT, everyday routines place individuals at risk of victimisa-
tion by exposing them to dangerous people, places and situations. Thus crime 
can occur when a motivated offender, a suitable target and a lack of capable 
guardians are present simultaneously. Here, the convergence of these three com-
ponents determines the occurrence of an experience of victimisation. As a theor-
etical tool, RAT has been well established and much used for the study of 
various forms of aggressor behaviour resulting in victimisation. Its framework is 
also concise and highly applicable to a diverse set of environments and situ-
ations. It has therefore been widely used in offline victimisation research (e.g. 
Stewart et al., 2004; Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2000). The framework maintains 
that four components are central to the process of victimisation, namely the 
issues of value, inertia, visibility and accessibility. First, in terms of value, the 
offender weighs the value of the fulfilment resulting from targeting a victim. 
This could be an issue of gratifying aggressive tendencies or simply the 
monetary value from a robbery. Second, as regarding inertia, the offender meas-
ures the level of resistance that the target is able to offer. A ready defence or dif-
ficulty in achieving the aggressor’s goal is a strong deterrent. Third, in terms of 
visibility, a target must be identifiable by the offender in order to be targeted. 
Here, the degree to which the aggressor’ is aware of suitable targets helps to 
determine the viability of negative action. Finally, in the case of accessibility, 
the offender is concerned with the possibility of escape, once targeting is com-
plete. If it is very difficult to avoid identification, the offender will be motivated 
to avoid action.
 Thus, routine activities in which people engage can become risky environ-
ments where being a target is determined by exposure to dangerous people, 
places and situations, and is influenced by the ability of potential guardians to 
confront potential offenders. RAT argues that if individuals’ routines expose 
them to potential offenders in unguarded environments, criminal victimisation 
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will occur (Felson & Boba, 2010; Reyns, Henson & Fisher, 2011). Specifically, 
the greater the exposure and proximity to motivated offenders and attractive 
targets, the greater the number of instances of victimisation. Conversely, guard-
ianship protects against victimisation by discouraging harmful activity.
3.3 A comparison of LET and RAT
Despite their similarities, there is a key difference between LET’s and RAT’s 
frameworks in terms of how the risk of victimisation is approached, one that 
Pratt and Turanovic (2016) argue has been forgotten in much practical applica-
tion of the theories. Namely, LET focuses on exposure to high- risk places, 
people and times where risk and victimisation are seen as a function of prob-
ability. Being involved in behaviours one might consider risky such as theft or 
drug use does not ensure victimisation, but taking part in such things does 
increase its likelihood. On the other hand, RAT is focused on the convergence of 
targets and offenders in a shared time and space where guardians are not present 
as determining victimisation in absolute terms.
 RAT proposes that the absence of any of the three components (motivated 
offender, suitable target, lack of guardianship) is enough to prevent crimes 
involving victimisation. Probability of risk is therefore not the focus here, but 
rather a description of the victimisation as it unfolds (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). 
This lack of emphasis on probabilistic risk was taken further by Cohen and 
Felson (1979) to show that risk is connected not only to risky routines but also to 
everyday activities. Central to their early theory was the argument that victimisa-
tion is not necessarily a result of relative deprivation during difficult economic 
times. Rather, times of prosperity could mean more theft as there is more to 
steal. Thus, risk of victimisation through theft was seen to be possible when fam-
ilies left home to carry out everyday routines that would leave their homes vul-
nerable to theft due to lack of guardianship. Here, targets, motivated offenders 
and a lack of guardianship converge as a result of routines that limit the victim’s 
ability to prevent harmful action.
 Certain routines are riskier than others and thus more liable to facilitate vic-
timisation. That is the territory of LET, focused on the probability of risk. RAT’s 
original focus on the risks of leaving the home vulnerable must be kept in mind 
when the framework is used to assess risky routines. RAT is concerned with the 
presence of three structural components of risk and victimisation, while LET 
takes account of the presence of varying degrees of these components in various 
settings resulting in a probabilistic point of view.
 For both, physical proximity to high- risk environments plays a central role in 
experiences of victimisation. As the space between potential targets and aggressors 
increases, the role of proximity as a deterrent to negative experience is clear; much 
risk is avoided when potentially damaging interactions are physically impossible. It 
is intuitive that spending significant amounts of time in high- crime areas means 
higher levels of potential interaction with aggressors who have given those places 
their negative reputation, thus increasing the risk of becoming a victim. If time is 
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spent where many aggressors are most comfortable, the cost of committing aggres-
sive acts is lessened (Cohen, Kluegel & Land, 1981). This is particularly evident 
in, for example, perceptions of the dangers of inner- city areas where violence and 
aggression may be more likely. Here, perceived vulnerability is attributed to degree 
of proximity according to both LET, in terms of probability, and RAT, in absolute 
terms of whether the three components converge.
 Furthermore, risks of personal victimisation are a function of the amount of 
time spent in public places in general, especially during times when darkness 
can be exploited to lessen the identifiability of the aggressor (Hindelang et al., 
1978). Here, settings where lots of interaction is possible, access to potential 
victims is high and accountability can be manipulated, become high- risk 
environments. As such, public spaces prove helpful to aggressors in a number of 
ways. First, one need not justify one’s presence there and thus searching for 
victims can be explained by any number of reasons; there is no cost of entry into 
such a space, and inclusion is not predicated on any enforced criteria. Open 
spaces are available to all, regardless of qualification or intent.
 Furthermore, the visibility of targets is central to determining whether a 
motivated offender takes action. Assessing target suitability involves a series of 
steps. First, it must be possible to identify a suitable victim, whose individual 
characteristics are deemed minimally risky if the negative action is taken. 
Second, the target must be accessible to the aggressor. Simply identifying a 
target does not cause any damage to that target if further action is not possible 
due to physical constraints or protection mechanisms, for example. Third, a 
target is determined to be suitable if it is attractive to the offender, whether in 
terms of symbolic or economic value. In terms of common theft, easily trans-
portable items with high value are ideal targets due to high reward combined 
with easy concealment of the targeted item and therefore of the role of the 
aggressor who would otherwise be liable for punishment.
3.4 Theoretical gaps in Internet research
We have entered a new online interactional space globally, and frameworks of 
risk invariably change with the environment. The basic premises of RAT and 
LET involving a convergence of victim and aggressor in time and physical space 
change if the setting is non- physical. Although there exists no new, widely tested 
theoretical risk framework for the online setting, RAT has been applied to 
various Internet- based phenomena. Early applications of RAT to the online 
setting were therefore focused on experiences of victimisation (Choi, 2008), 
cyberbullying (Holt & Bossler, 2008), Internet fraud (Pratt, Holtfreter & Reisig, 
2010) and cyberattacks through viruses and information theft (Kigerl, 2011), for 
example. Here, users’ actions created target suitability, with high levels of online 
activity being directly linked to victimisation and targeting in these areas. More 
recently, RAT has also been applied to online issues including overall 
cybercrime experiences (Näsi, Oksanen, Keipi & Räsänen, 2015), hacking 
(Leukfeldt, 2014), harassment (van Wilsem, 2013), unwanted sexual attention 
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(Holt, Bossler, Malinski & May, 2016), cyberstalking (Reyns, Henson & Fisher, 
2015) and a combination of hacking, malware, identity theft, consumer fraud and 
stalking (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016).
 Furthermore, the general approach of LET and RAT to linking time spent in 
public spaces to risk has a parallel in the online setting. Here, targets’ accessibil-
ity to motivated offenders has been shown to lead to victimisation through direct 
user- to-user messaging (e.g., Holt et al., 2016; Mitchell, Finkelhor, Jones & 
Wolak, 2010) and social media use (e.g. Holt, Fitzgerald, Bossler, Chee & Ng, 
2015; Marcum, Higgins & Ricketts, 2010; Mitchell, Jones, Finkelhor & Wolak, 
2013). Despite the applicability of RAT online, certain characteristics of offline 
theory are of doubtful relevance to the online setting due to fundamental differ-
ences in how interaction and navigation take place.
 The central question here is to what extent the theoretical concepts developed 
for the offline setting can be effectively used to study behaviour in the online 
environment. Indeed, RAT’s applicability online is contentious. On one hand, 
online victimisation is regarded as a new phenomenon due to the novelty of the 
environment in which it takes place while, on the other hand, RAT is viewed as 
perfectly applicable due to its provision of adequate means for assessing occur-
rences of victimisation (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Again, the risk involved in 
spending time in a given environment is a product of how motivated an offender 
is, how accessible a victim is, and how protected that victim is externally. 
However, applying RAT to the online risk environment rather than to typical 
settings prevalent offline can be problematic due to fundamental differences 
between the two social environments that diminish the relevance of key risk 
pillars of the theory (Marcum et al., 2010; Reyns, 2013; Yar, 2005).
 In the study of risks associated with routine activities, social situations 
mediate the likelihood of an individual or group taking an action that is harmful 
to others. Offline, according to RAT, situations where damaging action is deter-
mined to be effective depend on a particular convergence in the same physical 
space at the same time. Without this convergence of target and offender, vic-
timisation is unlikely. The online setting presents an interesting alternative 
environment. Here, routines certainly exist but the dynamics of convergence are 
different. Online, a multitude of global users are constantly available for inter-
action or communication. Convergence is possible on a level never before seen, 
affording a great deal of opportunity for potential offenders. This convergence 
is no longer physical, which is central to RAT, but rather social or content- 
driven. The online setting is also less ordered in the sense that routines of 
offenders, victims and guardians rarely coincide in physical space and identify-
ing patterns of this convergence is particularly challenging online. As such, the 
social space provided by the Internet goes far beyond the limits of offline 
spheres of influence in terms of factors contributing to risk. Figure 3.1 illus-
trates changes in the three key components of RAT between the online and 
offline settings.
 Online, the incentives driving aggressors are also potentially different from 
the offline setting in that physical gratification is rarely sought. Rather, online 
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hate targeting is driven more by intangible motivations that can take many 
forms. Here, damaging targeting can take place in a shared online space and time 
or in settings determined by users unknown to the aggressor later on due to 
material remaining accessible beyond the creator’s intended target and location 
online. The online marketplace for this sort of gratification is immense, as targets 
abound, identifiability can be limited, access to escape is convenient and targets 
are vulnerable to abuse. Compared to the offline setting, online aggressors, are at 
a great advantage when carrying out their targeting. Anonymity can be used to 
disguise identity and help in escaping from a situation, the convenience of 
navigation in social media platforms allows for efficient movement between 
interactional locations, and a huge number of suitable targets are easily search-
able by identifying characteristics or social profiles online.
 Furthermore, the number of motivated offenders is exponentially greater than 
those of any one given city, no matter how large a population it holds. Second, 
online users are highly accessible in most social media. Interests, social identity 
groups and self- presented characteristics are often clearly visible on the Inter-
net’s social platforms. Finally, user protections online are limited due to the 
scope and ease of access to others and various forms of content. Exposure to 
harmful content or specific targeting can even be accidental online, where neg-
ative material is not necessarily categorised as such and kept separate from other 
content within social media platforms. Offline victimisation theory provides a 
framework in which online harassment, bullying and hate should be included as 
they constitute cases of externally imposed harm. Thus, although the online 
environment may be different from the offline, the mechanisms and interactional 
characteristics remain equivalent, even if enhanced and linked to lessened social 
presence that eliminates the necessity for physical convergence.
Vulnerable targets Target protections
Motivated offenders
Offline risk intersect
Level of
participant risk
Vulnerable targets Target protections
Motivated offenders
Online risk intersect
Level of
participant
risk
Figure 3.1 Routine activity risk online and offline.
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 The environmental aspect of anonymity online also adds to the negative 
aspects of user experience in terms of risk through enabling aggressors in new 
ways. As users have recourse to easier forms of self- concealment, the external 
costs of aggression can be lessened (Keipi & Oksanen, 2014). This is especially 
closely linked to the visibility and accessibility components of RAT. Namely, 
anonymity can be used to manage visibility in order to lessen accountability that 
might otherwise result from targeted victimisation. Also, anonymity can be lev-
eraged to create a customised self that can then be used to gain access to victims 
who might otherwise avoid contact with the aggressor. Notably, anonymity is 
beneficial to the aggressor not only in direct interaction but also in terms of cre-
ation of content whose second- and third- degree effects may be felt in perpetuity 
by unsuspecting users who encounter various forms of damaging material, even 
if the original intent was not to target them specifically. Here, the scope of 
sources of victimisation is broadened by the combination of content permanence 
and heightened negative expression as a result of the use of pseudonyms, for 
example.
 Thus, the components and prerequisites of RAT benefit from an environ-
mental update in terms of how the online setting differs. First, convergence in 
physical space is now less relevant to the experience of victimisation as aggres-
sive interactions are carried out in a shared platform or social network. Further-
more, temporal convergence can also be irrelevant, as content created to target 
others can be easily accessed accidentally, resulting in damage from exposure. 
Thus the two prerequisites for victimisation to occur are expanded in that con-
vergence is virtual and an ever present possibility whenever one navigates 
online. Here, the victimisation results from content created by another user, and 
its negative effects need not be tied to shared time and space. The issue of guard-
ianship is also altered, as online co- presence at the moment of interaction or 
exposure to the content concerned cannot prevent the expression of hate by an 
aggressor. Instead, software providing various filters, firewalls and navigation 
controls may detect risk though these protections are far from comprehensive.
 Here, in terms of RAT especially, the foundational assumption that regular 
routines can involve risk where the three primary factors converge is affected. 
LET’s core of lifestyle factors based on behavioural patterns that involve risk 
and stem partly from victim choices are also central here. Online, regular naviga-
tion routines can involve all manner of harmful content, exposure to which 
may be a function of intent completely beyond the victim’s choices due to the 
high degree of overlap between the social spaces of both targets and offenders in 
that setting. A user may be navigating in any number of content- driven or 
networking- driven platforms and be exposed to negative content from numerous 
sources. Though victimisation offline can also be experienced in places con-
sidered safe, that online navigational sphere considered free from risk may be 
more difficult to gauge due to the hidden nature of content creators until harmful 
material is actually experienced.
 The frameworks of LET and RAT provide valuable insight into risk factors 
that can be built upon with phenomena common in the online setting today. First, 
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the number of motivated offenders potentially able to reach a victim should be 
taken into account, in addition to the lowered cost of aggression afforded by ease 
of communication. As such, in terms of LET, the distribution of risk, or likeli-
hood of victimisation, is affected by both increased numbers of aggressors and 
access that is relatively independent of the online behaviours of victims. Further-
more, the potential negative effects of lessened social presence in lowering 
accountability should be included, in addition to the remarkably broad reach of 
aggressor material meant to hurt when disseminated online. In terms of new 
issues central to RAT, these tools available in the online environment create con-
vergence of risk components on a massive scale. However, offenders, targets and 
level of guardianship need not converge in shared physical space or even at the 
same time. The hateful intent of the aggressor can reach the target, causing 
potentially harmful effects, even without the knowledge of the originator but 
based on the capabilities for access and dissemination unique to the Internet.
 The visibility of the suitable target should also be acknowledged, given the 
global scale of personal visibility, for example through social media. Again, spe-
cific targeting is not required to create a significant risk online. Hate material can 
be created and spread globally without aggressor knowledge of who will be vic-
timised by it. Here, hate material can carry second- and third- degree effects 
much sooner and to a wider audience than would be possible offline. Third, 
effective guardianship in the online setting is difficult when material and threats 
can arrive by so many avenues, whether through text, video, image or otherwise. 
Keeping these problems in mind, after a more thorough assessment of online 
hate as it exists today, we propose a novel theoretical model in Chapter 5 that 
combines social identity dynamics, unique online environmental risk factors and 
the risk of online hate.
 A new theoretical approach that takes into consideration the unique character-
istics of the online setting in terms of visibility, accessibility and aggressor capa-
bility, combined with the issues of anonymity and content dissemination, would 
help to fill the gaps inherent in the primarily offline theoretical frameworks of 
LET and RAT. This new perspective should use these key interactional phe-
nomena to assess the likelihood of victimisation, in addition to delving into the 
structural issues inherent in the online environment that may reinforce certain 
negative behaviours. Indeed, this would encompass three areas, namely the per-
spective of the victim and the aggressor through situational interactions, the cap-
abilities of aggressors to create content, and personal characteristics that may be 
reinforced by the mechanisms built into the online setting.
 While discussing our general theoretical approach, we also wish to acknow-
ledge the surrounding societal context. One important aspect missing from pre-
ceding research on exposure to online hate is that of cross- cultural differences. 
In particular, a vast majority of empirical studies concerning negative aspects of 
Internet usage such as online hate or online risk focus on samples from single 
countries. This means that the findings might be restricted to only one context, 
thus limiting knowledge on what they could mean in a wider global perspective. 
A lack of comparative data also prohibits plausible theoretical discussions based 
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on empirical findings, for instance in making evaluations regarding the propor-
tion of users who become exposed to hateful or harmful online contents.
 Throughout this book, we argue that theoretical notions are valid and useful 
only when they are applied in the right context. Our theoretical foundations are 
applicable relatively universally. In other words, the propositions of LET and 
RAT can be applied to various situations associated with online activities and 
exposure to hate. Our empirical data come from societies in which computers, 
mobile phones and social media platforms are unavoidable tools in the everyday 
lives of all young people. Despite this, even the behavioural patterns of Internet 
use differ considerably among the four countries examined. Therefore, while 
looking at exposure to hate at the individual level, we also need to acknowledge 
certain institutional characteristics that differentiate these countries. We will 
discuss these characteristics from both cultural and legal perspectives, which 
together help us to position the empirical observations as to why the rates of 
online exposure to hate are different across the countries under study.
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4 The rise of online hate
4.1 From bigotry to hate crime
On 15 May 2010 a man posted a message on a social media discussion board 
stating his plans to shoot the Finnish Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, 
after which he would set off a bomb in the house of parliament. The man was 
reported to the police and was subsequently charged with threatening behaviour. 
However, the Supreme Court of Finland later found the suspect not guilty 
(HelHO:2012:1). The verdict was due partly to a loophole in the law which 
states that the potential victims must be aware of the threat and feel threatened 
by it. It is this intersection between the law and the right to express plans, 
thoughts or opinions in the online context that prompts us to take a closer look at 
the landscape in which we currently live.
 The growing role of the Internet in the wider societal context has been rapid, 
to the extent of having developed faster than laws intended to protect its users. 
Now, aggravated and hateful behaviour have always played some part in human 
interaction, but it is the emergence of the Internet and different social media that 
have helped to push many aspects of negative and anti- social behaviour into the 
wider public forum. A few decades ago, the aforementioned disgruntled Finnish 
man would likely have merely expressed his thoughts in the corner of a local 
pub to a small audience. However, the tools available to us today allow such 
messages to be amplified through various avenues of social media to reach a far 
wider audience.
 Hate aimed at individuals or specific groups of people is actualised in both 
speech and action. It is grounded on ideology and prejudice that are modified 
culturally and reinforced in everyday interaction. Although bigotry has been a 
familiar concept throughout history, the idea of hate content as a crime is new 
(Gerstenfeld, 2013, p. 2). Hate crime typically refers to targeted crime motiv-
ated by prejudice, for example on the part of certain social groups linked by 
racist views. In the online context, hate becomes criminal only if there are laws 
classifying behaviour in terms of what can and cannot be said. The approaches 
taken in this classification differ cross- nationally. For instance, the United 
States has adopted a more liberal stance on what content is allowed, largely on 
the basis of the First Amendment and freedom of speech. On the other hand, 
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many European societies have enacted laws which regulate statements that 
threaten or insult a specific group of people (Hawdon, Oksanen & Räsänen, 
2016; Waldron, 2012). These laws vary from country to country, however, and 
so do the sanctions for breaking them. The need to balance freedom of expres-
sion with safeguards, especially given the expansion of online communication, 
has induced many European nations to establish better ways of regulating 
online hate speech.
 Although the terms “hate crime” and “hate speech” are in common use, 
various scholars emphasise that defining hate is actually a highly complex task, 
and that it is very difficult to distinguish what is hate speech from what is not 
(Citron & Norton, 2011; Foxman & Wolf, 2013; Waldron, 2012). The reason for 
this lies in the often unclear dichotomy between the rational or ideological side 
of hate and the irrational and highly emotional side, as they can both coexist to 
varying degrees. Defining hate becomes far simpler in the case of extreme 
actions carried out by individuals or groups. Extreme acts such as mass murders 
or terrorist attacks are manifestations of hate and do not require debate as to 
whether or not hate was involved. However, at the other end of the hate classifi-
cation spectrum, the right to express hate clashes with calls for limits on the free 
expression of opinion. Definitions are also liable to be manipulated. Some of the 
most notorious hate groups have been clever enough to exploit these disagree-
ments. For example, the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) claims to represent love of its 
own race rather than targeted hate of another.
 The Council of Europe has sought to raise awareness of online hate speech 
with the Young People Combating Hate Speech Online campaign (2012–2014). 
According to the Council, hate speech
covers all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial 
hatred, xenophobia, anti- Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intoler-
ance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethno-
centrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and 
people of immigrant origin.
(Council of Europe, 2013; see also Banks, 2011)
This formulation includes many, but not all, potential forms of hate.
 In 2016, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
released a general policy recommendation on combating the expression of hate 
in any medium from the written or spoken word to cultural products such as 
paintings, music or videos. Their sixty- six-page report includes guidelines on 
how to prevent the expression of hate and how to counter it. It recommends that 
EU states should sanction hate speech while also safeguarding freedom of 
expression. This represents a challenging balance. Besides legal sanctions and 
regulations, ECRI underlines self- regulation and the importance of raising 
awareness. Their definition of hate speech is wide and aims to cover its most 
distinctive forms:
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Hate speech . . . entails the use of one or more particular forms of expression 
– namely, the advocacy, promotion or incitement of the denigration, hatred 
or vilification of a person or group of persons, as well any harassment, 
insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatisation or threat of such person or 
persons and any justification of all these forms of expression – that is based 
on a non- exhaustive list of personal characteristics or status that includes 
“race”, colour, language, religion or belief, nationality or national or ethnic 
origin, as well as descent, age, disability, sex, gender, gender identity and 
sexual orientation.
(ECRI, 2016, p. 16)
Our perspective is that hate and aggression are potentially everywhere in human 
interaction, and that they are not necessarily limited to the most well- known 
examples such as racism and religious bigotry. The potential for hatred includes 
harmful and threatening statements involving the active targeting of individuals 
or larger human collectives. We begin our review with organised hate groups 
that may act violently or simply concentrate on the dissemination of hate propa-
ganda. Notably, the most common forms of online hatred are not necessarily 
expressed by these notorious groups but rather by ordinary, less visibly affiliated 
individuals. As such, we will show how hate has become a part of everyday 
reality online through various forms.
 Keeping in mind the complexity of defining hate content (e.g. Blazak, 2009; 
Citron, 2014; Douglas, 2007; Wall, 2001), we build on the work of Franklin 
(2002) by defining online hate expression as the use of information and commu-
nications technology (ICT) to “advocate violence against, separation from, defa-
mation of, deception about or hostility towards others” (p. 2). We therefore focus 
on individuals or groups who use ICT to express sentiments that attack others 
based on race, national origin, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, or 
any other characteristic that defines a particular group.
 It is important to note that exposure to online hate creates a distinct form of 
victimisation, as abuse is purposely targeted at a collective identity. Given the 
multifaceted nature of the Internet, involving all manner of expressional and 
interactional tools, we consider any form of expression that targets the identity 
of a group of individuals to be hate speech and hate material (Hawdon, Oksanen 
& Räsänen, 2014; Oksanen, Hawdon, Holker, Näsi & Räsänen, 2014). Con-
sequently we use the classifications of hate speech or hate material interchange-
ably and also consider any material fitting the above description as relevant to 
the purposes of this book. It is also important to note that in our approach, and in 
the data involved in the studies included, the context of harmful online content is 
also founded on respondents’ own- perception of material that they themselves 
found hateful or degrading and that inappropriately attacked certain collectives 
or individuals.
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4.2 Organised hate groups
Hate is disseminated by both individuals and organised hate groups. Hate groups 
may have a wide variety of targets and ideological views, ranging from terrorist 
organisations to gangs of various types, often not identifying themselves as hate 
groups (Gerstenfeld, 2013, pp. 130–131; Oksanen, Räsänen & Hawdon, 2014). 
Though they are varied, these groups share the common denominators of com-
prising a number of individuals, being organised to some extent, and publicly 
targeting either private individuals or groups. As such, they only exist when 
there is something to oppose. Hate groups are also based on very stark distinc-
tions between an ingroup (us) and an outgroup (them). This very basic distinc-
tion may, in certain social conditions, increase prejudice against others, as noted 
in social psychology (Brown, 2010; Tajfel, 1970). In specific social and historic 
conditions, outgroup members are devalued or even dehumanised. In such con-
ditions, ingroup attachment to violent ideologies can facilitate violence.
 The US has, in many respects, constituted a safe haven for organised hate 
groups, including well- known examples such as the KKK, Holocaust Denial and 
Christian Identity. The KKK has famously influenced US politics in many dif-
ferent eras, with the US history of fighting hate having often been relatively 
unsuccessful. For example, the Southern Poverty Law Center monitors the 
actions of over 1,600 US extremist and hate groups. These include a wide range 
from anti- immigrant groups, white nationalists and black separatists to various 
extreme Christian hate groups. Furthermore, added to this list are organised or 
semi- organised terrorist organisations (e.g. Blazak, 2009). For example, it is dif-
ficult to consider ISIS anything other than a terrorist hate group.
 Hate groups have always been skilled users of mass media and technological 
innovations. Technological developments over the past thirty years have facilit-
ated and improved the effectiveness of their tasks remarkably. White suprema-
cists in the US were among the very early users of the electronic communication 
network during the 1980s. Hate is said to have gone online as early as March 
1984 when neo- Nazi publisher George Dietz used the bulletin board system 
(BBS) as a method of online communication. The White Aryan Resistance BBS 
followed, adopting this form of communication in 1984 and 1985 (Berlet, 2001). 
At that time linking two computers via BBS was very unusual, as it was 
only commercialised in the 1980s with faster modems. These first developments 
are, however, a good reminder that online hate and aggression are not new 
phenomena.
 The first online hate site appeared soon after the introduction of the World 
Wide Web. Stormfront.org, thought to be the first major hate site, started in 1995 
(Bowman- Grieve, 2009; Brown, 2009). Although some other minor hate sites 
had been created at this time, Stormfront.org was initiated by Grand Wizard of 
the KKK Don Black, who was able to take this new format to a new level in 
terms of both depth and content (Levin, 2002). Stormfront.org gradually became 
more popular and expanded rapidly, continuing into the 2000s. By 2009, the site 
had over 159,000 members (Bowman- Grieve, 2009) and by 2015 the number of 
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registered users of Stormfront.org was approximately 300,000 (Potok, 2016). 
Although its user numbers have continued to rise, as of 2015 Stormfront had a 
rank of only 13,648 on the list of the most popular sites online (Potok, 2015).
 It was during the 1990s that organised hate groups became increasingly active 
online. During that time there were, on average, 400 hate sites and dozens of 
KKK, neo- Nazi, racist skinhead, Christian Identity and black separatist organisa-
tions sites as well. Besides websites such as Stormfront.org, different discussion 
forums became the main channels for spreading hate- filled ideologies during the 
1990s and early 2000s. With the rise of social media during the 2000s, involving 
the development of various social platforms fostering personal expression, feed-
back and interaction, the Internet gradually became more interactive. This devel-
opment has certainly changed the overall picture of online hate. Social media 
have made online hate communication more viral and visible than ever before. 
As Foxman and Wolf (2013, p. 11) state, the rise of social media has been a 
game changer:
A few years back, we might have dismissed the anti- Semitic groups, racist 
organisations, and other vicious haters on the Internet as outliers . . . not 
worth taking seriously or responding to. But today we live in the world of 
Web 2.0, which has transformed the way the Internet is being used. In the 
interactive community environment of Web 2.0, social networking connects 
hundreds of millions of people around the globe; it takes just one “friend of 
a friend” to infect a circle of hundreds or thousands of individuals with 
weird, hateful lies that may go unchallenged, twisting minds in unpredict-
able ways. And with the users of Web 2.0 comprised largely of younger 
people, the impact of the misinformation contained there may persist for 
generations to come.
Social media have allowed hate groups to be increasingly visible and successful 
in reaching and recruiting significant numbers of Internet users. Hate groups 
have been known to actively recruit young people using online technology (Lee 
& Leets, 2002). Young people are considered the age group most vulnerable to 
these recruiting methods. The existence of these groups has become a permanent 
online phenomenon (Chau & Xu, 2007). According to the Southern Poverty Law 
Center that regularly monitors online hate and radical groups, the number of 
active US hate groups fell after peaking in 2011. At the end of 2015, there were 
892 active hate groups online. It is believed that activism has shifted towards 
lone wolves such as Dylann Roof, who murdered nine African Americans in a 
church shooting in the summer of 2015 (Potok, 2016).
 Hate groups are by no means diminishing, despite this small decline in the 
US after the peak in 2011, as between 2014 and 2015 the number of hate groups 
witnessed a 14 per cent increase (Potok, 2016). Current Internet platforms 
provide better access than ever before for any and all activists wishing to find 
like- minded peers online. The Internet and later social media have facilitated the 
rise of an international extremist community (Burris, Smith & Strahm, 2000; 
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Gerstenfeld, 2013). These groups and their members are active in sharing and 
disseminating information that potentially encourages lone wolves who are 
motivated towards radical actions and actively seek a community to validate 
those motivations. Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, school shooters 
and young ISIS recruits are just a few examples of people who have been motiv-
ated and validated by hate online.
4.3 Everyday hate and social media
Hate projects powerful images. In considering hate, the white robes of the Ku 
Klux Klan, swastikas or skinheads may come to mind. However, it is a common 
mistake to consider hate mongers as total loners or members of an organised 
hate group which is working to destroy the very cornerstones of civilised soci-
eties. Those individuals emailing hateful messages are not necessarily total out-
siders separated from the everyday life of most people, as they are likely to 
belong to the same social circles and age groups as many of the victims. The 
creators of harmful content may be classmates, neighbours, or members of the 
same clubs or hobby groups as their victims, and have social contact with them 
outside the online setting. Gerstenfeld (2013, p. 5) reminds us of this misconcep-
tion in her book on hate crimes:
It is tempting for many of us to feel smugly superior to those who perpetrate 
hate crimes and to think of them as deviants and fanatics. . . . [H]owever, 
most hate crime offenders do not fit this profile. In fact, for the most part, 
they are us.
Various types of hateful content were available for broader audiences long 
before the introduction of the Internet. Before the Internet, there was radio and 
television; before that, print media. Different tools of communication have pro-
vided avenues for sending, receiving and retrieving disturbing and criminal 
material, for example books and newsletters. Both the KKK in the US and the 
National Socialist Party in Germany during the early twentieth century shared 
the characteristic of successfully using the newest available technology, namely 
radio and film (Levin, 2002). Both groups used existing prejudices and available 
technologies, and exploited economic and social crises to leverage power for 
themselves.
 Since the Internet, and social media in particular, became the most important 
communication tool in everyday life, the capacity for spreading all types of 
content, including hate, has increased. First of all, similar opportunities are pro-
vided to virtually any user who has access to the Internet, while in the past signi-
ficant resources and connections were needed to effectively have a message 
widely distributed for consumption. Second, any of these users has access to this 
global stage while also having the ability to customise how they are perceived in 
terms of both identifiability and visibility. In online interaction and expression, 
users can hide behind a form of anonymity through a username or a created 
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profile that has been customised to meet personal needs. Third, social media and 
ICTs create fast- paced communication environments where physical cues and 
traditional feedback become less important.
 Already over thirty years ago, studies showed the prevalence of uninhibited 
behaviour and angry messages in anonymous computer- mediated communica-
tion, a phenomenon already termed then as “flaming” (Kiesler, Siegel & 
McGuire, 1984). Anonymity is naturally one factor behind this behaviour, but it 
does not directly cause aggression or negative sentiment. Rather, anonymity is a 
tool that can diminish the costs of expression, even if negative, due to relative 
freedom from external pressures linked to social norms, feedback and account-
ability. This interactive aggression through technological devices is thus some-
thing that has been known for some time as a significant phenomenon in 
technologically mediated communication. The negative sides of anonymity can 
still be witnessed in platforms giving users the tools to express themselves freely 
without direct incentive- altering consequences.
 What is perhaps most striking is that users do not necessarily hide their iden-
tities when targeting others with negative content. Users have now become 
accustomed to saying things publicly via their Facebook profiles, including 
extreme viewpoints advocating harm to others. In Finland, for example, the 
Minister of Migration and European Affairs Astrid Thors filed a report to police 
for the investigation of a Facebook group named, “I’m prepared to do some jail 
time for killing Astrid Thors!” Similar incidents have also recently taken place 
in other countries as well. Politicians and celebrities are often the targets of 
online aggression, due to their stances on certain issues or simply lifestyle 
choices. These very heated conversations do not necessarily concern societal 
topics such as immigration or politics at large; even personal decisions such as 
diet and health habits can be chosen as points of severe contention (Pöyhtäri, 
Haara & Raittila, 2013).
 As mentioned, almost anything can cause people to become upset online, and 
almost anything can eventually lead to hateful communication. Much of the 
hateful communication, regardless of focus, is disseminated within the everyday 
online settings where people spend much of their interactional and expres-
sional time. Notably, online hate overlaps with both cyberbullying and online 
harassment, which by definition involve threats or other offensive behaviour tar-
geted at individuals (see Jones, Mitchell & Finkelhor, 2013). Online hate is also 
linked to cybercrime, including some forms of online harassment, stalking and 
defamation. Hate content can also blend in with other types of everyday aggres-
sion. Hence, we should pay attention not only to the most radical organised hate 
groups or lone wolves, but also to the ways in which rhetoric is openly used in 
social media consumed on a wider scale where users may not be expecting such 
aggression.
 Now in the second decade of the new millennium, the Internet and social 
media have become saturated with content that informs and inspires both young 
and old. Approximately 90 per cent of working- aged individuals in Europe and 
North America are active users (World Internet Statistics, 2016). The online 
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setting provides convenient tools with which users may fulfil both personal and 
group motivations, whether beneficial or destructive. By providing instantaneous 
access without a system of identification, the Internet permits groups and indi-
viduals espousing hate to transmit their ideas to a worldwide audience. The stage 
of expression has become global and generally accessible to all users equally. 
This holds implications in terms of the scope of potential damage through 
increased audience, effectiveness of targeting and heightened hate motivation 
through knowledge of wide- scale content visibility.
 These interpretations are not equally valid across all countries. The rates of 
both victimisation and exposure to online hate may vary as well. This has been 
established in earlier research through several extensive cross- national compari-
sons on school bullying (e.g. Currie et al., 2008; Elgar et al., 2015). Craig and 
colleagues (2009), for instance, provide a comprehensive study on bullying and 
victimisation among children and teenagers using representative survey data col-
lected at schools from forty nations. According to their findings, exposure to 
bullying varied from less than 10 per cent to over 45 per cent for boys, and less 
than 5 per cent to over 35 per cent for girls. They examined direct and indirect 
forms of bullying, both physical and verbal. Adolescents in northern Europe 
reported less bullying and victimisation than those in Eastern Europe, Central 
Europe and the American continent.
 Similar interpretations of the online world can be made, although there is not, 
as yet, an abundance of research on cyberbullying globally. In the European 
context, however, rates of younger people who have been bullied online tend to 
vary. One of the most noteworthy findings of the 2010 EU Kids Online survey 
was that approximately 6 per cent of 9–16-year- old children reported that they 
had been bullied. However, in Estonia and Romania, the percentages were much 
higher, at 14 and 13 per cent respectively. In Italy, on the other hand, the propor-
tion of bullied children was very low at just 2 per cent (Livingstone, Haddon, 
Görzig & Ólafsson, 2011). In addition, different studies conducted on cyber-
crime victimisation show differences between countries (e.g. Näsi, Oksanen, 
Keipi & Räsänen, 2015; Reyns, Henson & Fisher, 2011).
 In general, the findings from preceding comparative studies give an important 
insight. Even in the online world, geographical locations and national borders do 
make a difference. Therefore, we should also seek to examine how all of the dif-
ferences between the countries studied translate into the online context, despite 
the increasing overlap between online and offline interaction and many of the 
everyday activities that are carried out in both. The Internet and social media 
have become saturated with content that informs and inspires both young and 
old individuals. However, by providing instantaneous access without a system to 
easily identify interacting participants, the Internet permits groups and indi-
viduals espousing hate to transmit their ideas to a worldwide audience at a higher 
impact than has been possible before.
The rise of online hate  61
4.4 Exposure to online hate from a cross- national 
perspective
Based on recent comparative survey data, we are able to give an empirical over-
view of online hate. The data are drawn from a cross- sectional survey carried out 
in 2013 and 2014, targeted at teenagers and young adults aged between 15 and 
30. The questions addressed young people’s online activities, social activities, 
subjective wellbeing, self- esteem and trust as well online hate. We did not 
market our survey as a “hate speech” survey and questions concerning online 
hate were placed in the middle of the survey, as explained below.
Data description
The empirical examples presented in this book come from unique cross- sectional 
surveys, conducted in four nations. The data were collected as part of the research 
project “Hate Communities: A Cross-national Comparison” (funded by the Kone 
Foundation, 2012–2016). The project’s YouNet2013 and YouNet2014 surveys 
included socio- demographic variables and questions about online activity, online 
risks and online hate content. We also enquired into online and offline interactions, 
social trust, self- esteem, life satisfaction and violent victimisation. Respondents 
were given a chance to provide feedback to the research team concerning the 
survey. The research team originally designed the surveys in English, with native 
Finnish and German speakers translating the survey into Finnish and German 
respectively. The questionnaires were then back- translated into English and com-
pared with the original surveys. The surveys were pre- tested with students at the 
University of Turku, Finland, and at Virginia Tech in the US.
 The data for Finland (n = 555) and the US (n = 1,033) were collected in the 
spring of 2013 while the data for Germany (n = 978) and the UK (n = 999) were 
collected in the spring of 2014. Respondents to each survey were recruited from a 
demographically balanced panel and the respondents voluntarily agreed to parti-
cipate in research surveys (for details, see Näsi et al., 2014). The quota sample 
sizes were estimated by Survey Sampling International (SSI), a company which 
was also responsible for the recruitment of the survey respondents. SSI is a global 
provider of data solutions and technology for consumer and business- to-business 
survey research (SSI, 2016).
The most common method for estimating the prevalence of hate and harmful 
content in everyday life is to measure subjective experiences of exposure. In 
order to measure exposure to online hate, the respondents in our study were 
asked, “In the past three months, have you seen hateful or degrading writings or 
speech online, which inappropriately attacked certain groups of people or indi-
viduals?” Figure 4.1 shows the proportions of 15–30-year- olds who had wit-
nessed online hate (i.e. cyberhate) in each dataset.
 The average rate of exposure in the four countries was approximately 42 per 
cent. But as Figure 4.1 shows, the proportion of respondents who were exposed 
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to online hate materials varies by country. Approximately 53 per cent of Amer-
ican, 48 per cent of Finnish and 39 per cent of British respondents reported 
having been exposed to online hate material. The differences are very significant 
in statistical terms (p < 0.001). The proportion is somewhat lower in Germany, 
with 31 per cent having been exposed. In this sense, we can say that of the sur-
veyed adolescents and young adults, a notable share had witnessed hateful or 
degrading material.
 Compared to the high figures for exposure to online hate, very few of our 
survey respondents admitted to producing online material that other people inter-
preted as hateful or degrading. In percentages, these figures are 4.1 for the US, 
4.0 for Finland, 3.4 for the UK and 0.9 for Germany (Kaakinen et al., 2016). 
Even fewer admitted to being a member of a group that produces online material 
that other people interpret as hateful or degrading (in the US 2.4 per cent, 
Finland 2.2 per cent, UK 1.1 per cent, and 0.4 per cent in Germany). These pro-
portions are quite understandable given the global audience and potentially 
significant effects that a few content creators can have on many online consum-
ers. Hence, the relatively high rates of exposure to online hate in different coun-
tries should not lead to the assumption of there being an equivalence in content 
producers. Nevertheless, we have a wide range of potential actors contributing to 
the phenomenon, ranging from single actors to various online groups, more than 
enough to negatively affect the lives of a significant portion of Internet users.
 When discussing the rates of exposure, it is also important to evaluate how 
the users find hate materials in the first place. Our survey included a question 
concerning how the respondents happened to see online hate material. Naturally, 
this item was shown only to those respondents who reported that they had come 
across the sites showing hateful or degrading material. The questionnaire 
had three options to choose from. First, “I deliberately found my way”; second, 
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Figure 4.1  Exposure to online hate among 15–30-year-old respondents in the UK, the 
US, Germany and Finland. Percentages.
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“I got the link to the site from a friend or acquaintance of mine”; and third, “I 
got there by accident”. Figure 4.2 shows the responses by country.
 The general pattern of responses is relatively clear in all countries, although 
differences also exist between them. The general pattern is that most of the 
respondents were not actively seeking hate material. This is perhaps not surpris-
ing, since in most discussions both researchers and practitioners tend to worry 
primarily about young people who become exposed to violence, pornography 
and other potentially harmful material through the choices of others (e.g. 
Foxman & Wolf, 2013; Livingstone et al., 2011). In Finland and Germany, 66 
per cent of the 15–30-year- old respondents reported that they ended up on the 
hate sites accidently. In the UK and the US the responses were lower (with 50 
and 42 per cent), but still clearly higher than other categories. Figure 4.2 also 
shows that the impact of social contacts is very important online. In the UK, the 
US and Germany, approximately one- fifth of the respondents received a link 
from their friends or acquaintances that led to sites showing hate material. In 
Finland, only 11 per cent reported having received a link which directed them to 
those sites. However, what is also noteworthy is that many users saw hate 
material as a result of deliberate action. This means that they either sought out 
hateful content or were interested in familiarising themselves with such material. 
Cross- country differences are considerable here as well. In the US, 37 per cent 
of the respondents said they ended up on sites showing hate material deliber-
ately. The numbers are lower for other countries (29 per cent in the UK, 23 per 
cent in Finland, and 16 per cent in Germany).
 Figure 4.2 gives us insight into the ways in which teenagers and young adults 
end up seeing hateful material online. Most reached hate sites by accident, with 
deliberate visits being far less common. This is an important reminder of the 
potential threats that new communication technologies pose for average online 
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Figure 4.2  How respondents happened to find online hate content in the UK, US, 
Germany and Finland. Percentages for those exposed to online hate.
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users. Similarly, another important question has to do with which services and 
media platforms were associated with exposure to hate material. It is well known 
that young people are especially active in certain social media platforms, such as 
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. On the other hand, it is possible that certain 
types of hate material are available in less used services, such as personal 
homepages or message boards. Notably, proponents of hate are increasingly 
bridging the gaps between concrete violence and online material. For example, 
ISIS has been recruiting young people who are highly active on various forms of 
social media through these very channels. Propaganda involving the motivation 
of hate is made easily discoverable online as a first step in strategic action by 
dangerous groups to attract young people who may share their views to some 
extent, in order to encourage further harmful behaviour.
 At the general level, we do not know which of the different online services 
should be regarded as potentially dangerous across the four countries, but our 
data do give information on this issue. The questionnaire included a question 
regarding different online services where hateful or degrading material was seen. 
Again, this question was shown only to those who reported having been exposed 
to online hate material. The respondents were given a list of the thirteen most 
common online services (ranging from social media to photo- sharing sites and 
online games) and were asked to assess each. Table 4.1 lists different platforms 
and services in which the respondents said they saw hate material.
 As the table shows, the most popular online services are also the most 
common sources of hate material. Facebook was clearly the most common site 
for witnessing hate material in all the countries. YouTube appeared to be the 
second most common source of exposure, although it was clearly behind Face-
book in all four countries. At the same time, the prevalence of hate material seen 
in different online sites tended to vary from country to country. For example, 
notable differences by country were observed when comparing Twitter and 
Table 4.1  Exposure to hate in SNS sites and online environments in the UK, the US, 
Germany and Finland. Percentages for those exposed to online hate
UK US Germany Finland
Facebook 63.8 62.8 77.3 48.1
YouTube 37.0 47.9 43.5 37.2
Twitter 26.1 21.1  8.7  3.8
Tumblr 12.9 14.2  4.0  3.0
Wikipedia  4.9  4.5  3.7  1.9
General message board 15.2 19.2 14.7 41.4
Newspaper message boards  7.0  6.4 14.0 21.8
Blogs  8.3 13.2  7.7 16.2
Home pages  2.3  5.4  6.4  5.3
Photosharing sites (e.g. Instagram)  4.1  6.5  2.7  3.8
Online games  4.4  6.4  4.7  4.9
Instant messengers  4.1  4.2  3.7  1.5
Pop-up sites  4.7  5.6  2.0  1.5
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general message boards. Over 20 per cent of those exposed to online hate in the 
UK and the US saw such material on Twitter. The number was only 8 per cent in 
Germany, and only 4 per cent in Finland. Despite this, more than 40 per cent of 
Finnish respondents who were exposed to hate content witnessed such material 
on general discussion boards. The proportions were less than 20 per cent in all 
other countries.
 Together, the findings above reflect the fact that young online users in dif-
ferent countries tend to be active in different online media. In addition, various 
sites are likely used for varying purposes in different countries. As already dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, several interpretations have been given as to why cross- 
national variations in exposure rates exist. On the one hand, the clear difference 
between the UK and the US is interesting. Both of these countries are English- 
speaking and share many cultural characteristics. On the other hand, it is some-
what surprising that the exposure rate in Finland comes close to that of the US. 
Finland is often considered a Nordic welfare state, a homogenous country char-
acterised by a low level of social and economic inequality between population 
groups. One of the key features of Finland contributing to this low economic 
inequality is a far- reaching welfare network allowing for effective redistribution 
of wealth in society. The US is typically referred to as a more capitalist country, 
which generally enforces individual freedom and price competition within 
various markets (e.g. Kvist, Fritzell, Hvinden & Kangas, 2012; Mishra, 2014). 
Yet, despite these institutional differences in income inequality and heterogene-
ity of population that in the past have been linked to social instability, the hate 
exposure figures of these two countries deviate only slightly.
 One possible interpretation of the cross- country variation relates to the role of 
society type in terms of ICT infrastructure and overall Internet use patterns. All 
four nations are among the world’s leaders for Internet user penetration rates. 
According to recent statistics (Internet Live Stats, 2014), the Internet penetration 
rate was 87 per cent in the US and 94 per cent in Finland. The rates were lower 
in the UK and Germany, of 89 and 87 per cent, than in Finland. Since the Inter-
net is used more frequently in Finland than in the UK or Germany, these and 
other types of individual- level factors can result in national differences. Further-
more, in addition to Internet use rates, there is the issue of how users interpret 
online content. It is possible that users from different countries relate to harmful 
content differently, classifying certain content as benign that users from other 
nations might take as negative. In this case, Finnish and US responses to online 
hate were similar, pointing to a convergence of online reaction independent of 
cultural borders.
 In preceding research, cross- national differences in ICT use have been sum-
marised in terms of cultural or legal characteristics that separate countries from 
each other (e.g. Barbosa & Faria, 2011; Räsänen, 2006). Broadly speaking, cul-
tural differences between societies mean that there are political, economic and/or 
social differences between them that can be understood in the light of certain 
cultural features. These differences can refer to specific arrangements that create 
varying structural conditions for citizens to engage in particular activities.
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 The distinctive structural characteristics of a country result from various 
historical and political processes within it. Welfare state classifications involve 
the idea that state variation and development can be described through a typo-
logy of different societal characteristics (e.g. Arts & Gelissen, 2002; Esping- 
Andersen, 1993). Similarities and differences between welfare state types have 
been found to have significant effects on many dimensions of individual life con-
ditions, social activities and cultural participation (Kvist et al., 2012; Räsänen, 
2006). Here, it can be assumed that political and social institutions also influence 
exposure to hate material online, via the extent to which online activities are 
structurally determined by different socio- demographic factors and cultural 
customs. For instance, the UK, the US and Finland are often characterised as 
being different in terms of ethnicity, political climate, trade union participation 
or gender equality. These general differences thus provide the potential for for-
mulating a feasible method of understanding the effects on Internet connectivity 
and exposure to online hate in different countries.
 Along with specific cultural features, however, we also need to acknowledge 
the differences in jurisdiction between the four countries. All of these nations 
have constitutional guarantees of free speech, yet they vary in the extent to 
which they tolerate hate speech (Hawdon et al., 2016). In the legal tradition of 
the US, free speech is protected under the Constitution and can only be regulated 
in specific, clearly defined circumstances. German law provides a contrast to the 
American approach. As specified in its Basic Law, Germany regulates and speci-
fies punishments for general as well as specific forms of hate speech. In the UK, 
the Race Relations Act criminalises the intentional use of language that is likely 
to incite hatred against groups based on their colour, race or national origin. 
Finally, Finland has banned the expression of opinions by which a certain group 
is threatened, defamed or insulted on the basis of race, skin colour, birth status, 
national or ethnic origin or any comparable basis. These differences in legal 
frameworks affect the cultural and social norms of behaviour as individuals 
interact both online and offline.
 Earlier research has also shown that the risk of exposure to different types of 
disturbing material varies by individuals’ socio- demographic background and 
various behavioural characteristics. Figure 4.3 shows that this is also true when it 
comes to exposure to online hate. The figure shows the proportions of those 
exposed to online hate material by frequency of Internet use, living arrangements, 
age and gender. The proportions of exposure are combined for all the countries. 
The largest difference can be observed in terms of ICT activity. About 43 per cent 
of those who reported using the Internet several times a day had been exposed to 
online hate material, while the same was true of only 30 per cent of those who 
used the Internet less often. The difference is very significant (p < 0.001). This 
shows that frequent online activity is an important factor associated with exposure 
to risk. Indeed, this is not a surprising finding given that spending time in a danger-
ous environment tends to increase the likelihood of negative experiences.
 Furthermore, it has been noted for adults and young people alike that frequent 
Internet use is associated with general social activity both online and offline (e.g. 
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Räsänen, 2008; van Dijk, 2005). Here, we can see that frequent use of the Internet 
is clearly an activity that increases the risk of exposure to hateful material. Accord-
ing to the general theoretical lines of Routine Activity Theory (see Chapter 3 
above), people with wide social networks have a higher risk of being exposed to 
online hate. As the source of the risk here is other users, more access to others tends 
to increase the likelihood of encountering the work of negatively motivated users.
 Additionally, in all four countries, males (44 per cent exposed) were more 
likely than females (40 per cent exposed) to encounter hate material online 
(p < 0.01). However, the differences by age are even more visible. It is perhaps 
not surprising that the younger the online user, the more likely he or she is to 
encounter hateful material. At the same time, the difference between those who 
are over 26 and under 18 is significant (p < 0.001). Approximately 34 per cent of 
respondents in the older age group reported exposure, while the proportion for 
the younger group is 47 per cent. The findings regarding age especially are in 
line with our general assumptions presented in earlier chapters of this book.
 Similarly, Figure 4.3 indicates that respondents living with their parents (45 
per cent exposed) were more likely to have witnessed hate material than those 
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living independently (41 per cent exposed) (p < 0.05). This is surprising given 
the fact that parents typically provide a level of guardianship to children. 
However, the size of the difference is only a few percentage points and among 
our sample it is the younger respondent group who have the highest risk of expo-
sure. The difference is statistically significant (p < 0.05). Needless to say, 
younger people also tend to live with their parents more often than do older ones. 
These findings show that some basic background characteristics are useful for 
understanding young people’s risk of exposure to various online materials. In 
addition to these factors, place of residence has also been found to be associated 
with the risk of exposure to online hate (see Livingstone & Bovill, 2013; Näsi et 
al., 2015; Räsänen et al., 2016). Our findings also indicate that big city residents 
are more likely to see online hate content (p < 0.001).
 However, the previous information regarding exposure to online hate does 
not give us any information about what type of hate material young people are 
typically witnessing. As already discussed, it is possible that a particular type of 
hate material can be encountered more often in one country than in another. 
Political or religious issues, for instance, are discussed very differently across 
Europe. Therefore, the amount of hateful material targeting religious or political 
views can vary considerably cross- nationally. Our data give us the possibility to 
examine this issue. The questionnaires included the question: “Which of the fol-
lowing did the hateful or degrading material that you came across online relate 
to?” The question was followed by a list of ten different thematic topics, includ-
ing sexual orientation, ethnicity and physical appearance. Table 4.2 shows the 
proportions of respondents who saw hate material about each topic. The percent-
ages are shown for those who reported exposure to hateful or degrading mater-
ials, and not for the total samples.
 As the table shows, in all four countries most hate material focused on sexual 
orientation and ethnicity. About 50 per cent or more of those who reported expo-
sure to online hate said they had seen material targeted at these features. In 
Finland and the US, the proportions are over 60 per cent (p < 0.001). This is not 
Table 4.2  Exposure to different types of online hate content in the UK, the US, Germany 
and Finland. Percentages for those exposed to online hate
UK US Germany Finland
Sexual orientation 55 61 50 63
Ethnicity 57 60 48 67
Political views 31 48 36 29
Religious conviction/belief 43 45 44 40
Gender 44 44 20 25
Physical appearance 39 41 31 44
Physical disability 18 13 17 17
Terrorism 19 22 15 18
School shootings 10 21  6  9
General hatred of people 16 18 28 23
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an unusual observation, since sexuality and ethnicity are more or less universal 
themes in daily discourse across the world. Political views were also relatively 
common targets of hate, although there were considerable differences by country 
(p < 0.001). In the US, 48 per cent of respondents said they had seen hate target-
ing political views, while in Germany the proportion was 36 per cent. The rate 
was about 30 per cent in both Finland and the UK. These findings related to 
politically charged hate can be viewed through the lens of American political 
culture, which is significantly more populist than that of the other of these coun-
tries. This can result in higher levels of division between members of opposing 
political parties. In political terms especially, it is argued that the US is different 
from many other Western countries, and even from the rest of the world (Lipset, 
1997, pp. 34–35).
 Hate material focused on gender was more often witnessed in the UK and US 
(p < 0.001). Over 40 per cent of British and American respondents had seen 
hateful material based on gender, compared with only about 20 per cent of 
Finnish and German respondents. This likely points to the fact that the incidence 
of gender- targeted hate content varies between countries. We must of course 
acknowledge that when dealing with national levels of exposure, comparative 
interpretations are never absolute and they can vary significantly on the basis of 
context. This is especially true for general issues, such as for material targeted at 
gender, ethnicity or appearance.
 Hateful and degrading material that is not specifically targeted is relatively 
common. Material dealing with general hatred of people was witnessed by 28 
per cent of the German respondents and 23 per cent of Finns. In the US and the 
UK, the proportion of those witnessing such material was below 20 per cent 
(p < 0.001). Perhaps connected to this, exposure to material on physical disability 
also varied only slightly among the countries, from 13 per cent (US) to 18 per 
cent (UK). Exposure to terrorism was slightly more common among the Ameri-
can and British respondents compared with the others. This is likely related to 
the primary role of the US and UK in the war against terror. However, the differ-
ences for the last two items are not statistically significant (p > 0.05).
 Yet another variation between the countries has to do with material related to 
school shootings. In the US, hateful material targeting school shootings was wit-
nessed by over 20 per cent of respondents, while fewer than 10 per cent saw this 
type of hate material in all other countries (p < 0.001). This finding is likely due 
to the fact that the US has witnessed more school shootings than any other nation 
in the world (Böckler, Seeger, Sitzer & Heitmeyer, 2013), with such incidents 
having increased during the 2000s (Blair & Schweit, 2014).
4.5 Hate takes new forms
Our data show that exposure to online hate material is common. This finding 
should be a red flag in the sense that the data show hate as a common part of 
the online experience that can carry negative effects. Online hate is often dir-
ected at specific types of persons, directly concerning physical appearance, 
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gender, sexuality and religious and political beliefs. Online hatred also involves 
the dissemination of extremely violent material or material associated with ter-
rorism and school shootings. The intent behind such content and the negative 
effects on the wellbeing of the users exposed represent a serious risk in the 
global online setting. In our data, hate takes a very personal form and is often 
directed at physical appearance, sexual orientation or gender. Here, the ramifica-
tions of exposure can be especially severe due to these characteristics being so 
closely tied to identity. Furthermore, as younger users tend to be more exposed, 
this represents a significant risk to the wellbeing of those in the key stages of 
social and psychological development in terms of both identity and self- image.
 Online hate may also be quick to find new forms (see Williams & Burnap, 
2015). People group together and organise quickly after societal changes, and 
social media facilitate this effectively. Existing organised hate groups are also 
eager to take advantage of economic insecurity or societal changes. The most 
recent results from Finland indicate that after the Paris terrorist attacks of Novem-
ber 2015 and mass immigration due to the Syria crisis, hate became more politi-
cised and people reported seeing more online hate concerning ethnicity, religion 
and terrorism (Kaakinen, Oksanen & Räsänen, 2016). Hate can thus be specifically 
targeted at individual characteristics, or motivated by developments on a global 
scale relating to issues central to certain identity groups. This is just one example 
of how quickly international and domestic events can direct media discussions and 
have a consequent impact on the behaviour of social media users.
 Our survey shows that exposure to online hate varies from country to country. 
We have already suggested that technological factors may help us to understand 
some of the differences, although each country may be considered advanced in 
terms of ICT usage. In addition, legislation might play a role, as mentioned, in 
terms of how hate content is punished in the countries surveyed. This carries 
weight in terms of differences in hate material targeting religion, where the 
varied legal ramifications involved may explain why the rates of exposure vary 
between countries. Additionally, some of the differences can also be explained 
by demographic and cultural factors, for example by ethnicity.
 Online hate can harm us in many ways. People are easily influenced by emo-
tional content and it is often the case that they rely on very basic reactions rather 
than rationality. Hate triggers what Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman (2011) 
has called System 1 thinking, which is fast, automatic and emotional. People 
react to anger with anger, rather than by using System 2 thinking, which is slow, 
logical and conscious. Hence, we react before we think about what we are 
saying. This very emotionality keeps the engine of social media going. Studies 
show that negativity is the fuel of online conversations (Chmiel et al., 2011, 
2014). When fast and irrational System 1 thinking is combined with social- 
psychological factors affecting group behaviour, we begin to understand how 
hate escalates and only leads to more anger.
 The expressed negative emotions and hate have no positive consequences. 
The current body of literature does not support the idea of cathartic aggression 
(i.e. letting off steam) (Bushman, 2002). Entire websites called rant sites are 
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devoted to venting off. Martin and colleagues (2013) set up two studies on visi-
tors to rant sites and found that they were more angry than other people, and 
expressed their anger in maladaptive ways, reading and writing rants being asso-
ciated with negative shifts in mood. Despite the potential benefits such sites may 
have in the short term as a way for some individuals to let off steam, longer- term 
effects point to negative impacts on wellbeing. Furthermore, angry and hateful 
online users may easily disturb the online activity of dozens or even hundreds of 
other users without having to face any consequences for their actions.
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5 Impacts of online hate
5.1 Potentially harmful or always harmful?
The previous chapter examined exposure to online hate at a very general level, 
through teenagers’ and young adults’ exposure to hateful or degrading material. 
These observations relate to the possible consequences of exposure to hate. We 
proposed that exposure to hate and especially personal victimisation by hate 
leads to negative outcomes, posing a serious threat to the subjective wellbeing 
and happiness of young people (Proctor, Linley & Maltby, 2009).
 Given that there is a potentially vast amount of online content that can be per-
ceived as negative or harmful, it is necessary to systematically examine how 
often young people actually see this type of material in order for us to form an 
idea of the extent of exposure to hate online. While numerous scholars and activ-
ists note the potential dangers of the widespread availability of online hate 
materials (e.g. Foxman & Wolf, 2013; Waldron, 2012), few have investigated 
how, and how often, young people become victimised by cyberhate. Moreover, 
we need a comparative perspective to evaluate the situation in Europe. Inter-
national comparison is important, as while the Internet offers a relatively homo-
geneous communication environment for individuals, the existing patterns of 
Internet use vary greatly from one country to another (e.g. Livingstone & 
Helsper, 2010; Räsänen, 2008).
 Online hate involves both indirect and direct harm. Indirect social harm raises 
possible ethical and legal questions as to whether the dissemination of hate 
material should be allowed in society (Waldron, 2012). Content that proposes 
direct harm may cause socially and psychologically damaging effects at both 
personal and group levels (Leets & Giles, 1997; Tynes, 2006). For example, the 
long- term effects of exposure to hateful online material may include reinforcing 
discrimination against vulnerable groups (Foxman & Wolf, 2013). As a result, 
victims may develop defensive and hyper- vigilant attitudes that can potentially 
be dangerous, lasting for months or even years (Leets, 2002).
 Preceding studies suggest that personal victimisation by different forms of 
online hate is also relatively common, especially among young people. Consider-
able research has been conducted into various forms of online victimisation, 
including online grooming (Whittle, Hamilton- Giachritsis, Beech & Collings, 
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2013), online harassment (Bossler, Holt & May, 2012; Jones, Mitchell & Finkel-
hor, 2013; Näsi et al., 2014), cybercrime (Näsi, Räsänen, Hawdon, Holkeri & 
Oksanen, 2015; Oksanen & Keipi, 2013), and especially cyberbullying (Helweg- 
Larsen, Schütt & Larsen, 2012; Sourander et al., 2010; Tokunaga, 2010). Here, 
the examination of the implications of negative content and behaviour raises 
questions around wellbeing, social trust, self- image and social relations. Our 
analysis here focuses on the associations between online hate and certain demo-
graphic variables in order to determine at- risk groups.
5.2 Victimisation by hate, harassment and crime online
Before turning to the consequences of exposure to online hate, we need to deter-
mine how common personal victimisation by negative online behaviour really is. 
In our questionnaires we examined online victimisation through three different 
items measuring cyberhate, cybercrime and cyberharassment. First, the respond-
ents were asked whether or not they had personally been the target of hateful or 
degrading material online. The second item was concerned with whether or not 
they had been a target of harassment online (for example, whether people had 
spread private or groundless information about them or shared pictures of them 
without permission). The third item measured whether or not someone had had a 
crime committed against them online in the past three years.
 Figure 5.1 shows that personal victimisation by cyberhate is clearly less 
common in Germany (with only 4 per cent) than in the US (15 per cent), the UK 
(12 per cent) and Finland (10 per cent) (p < 0.001). These differences are notable 
despite the Internet user penetration rates being very high in each of the four 
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countries. The English language may play a role here in addition to other socio- 
cultural factors. We return to this issue later on in the chapter. The differences 
between rates of victimisation by cyberharassment and cybercrime are clearly 
smaller. Cyberharassment was relatively common in the four countries with rates 
of victimisation ranging from 15 per cent in the UK to 19 per cent in Germany 
and Finland. Victimisation by cybercrime was not as common as victimisation 
by hate or harassment online. Figures for cybervictimisation range from 6 per 
cent in Germany to 7 per cent in the UK. Hence, the cross- country differences 
are marginal for cyberharassment and cybercrime.
	 The	findings	 regarding	personal	victimisation	clearly	contrast	with	 the	find-
ings related to exposure to online hate. Although many users were exposed to 
online hate, only some became targeted victims. We were therefore interested in 
examining the reasons for this victimisation. For this purpose, our questionnaires 
listed a total of eight types of motives, ranging from ethnicity or nationality to 
sexual orientation, political views and appearance. In Figure 5.2 we show the 
reasons for cyberhate victimisation by country.
 Figure 5.2 shows that, for victims of cyberhate, appearance was the most 
common reason for victimisation in all four countries. The percentage was 
highest in Finland and lowest in the UK, as 50 per cent of Finns and 38 per cent 
of British were victimised based on their appearance. The percentages were 
42 for Germans and 43 for Americans. Although the importance of appearance 
has been widely discussed in recent studies on consumption and lifestyle 
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(e.g. Grogan, 2007; Sarpila, 2014), empirical studies on social media use have 
not previously delved into how widespread a phenomenon appearance- related 
hate material actually is. Appearance- related targeting is just one of the exam-
ples	of	how	hate	can	be	very	personal	and	subjective.	This	is	a	significant	issue,	
particularly since younger users value self- presentation, seeking validation 
through	 selfies	 and	 in	 their	 use	 of	 photo-	sharing	 platforms	 such	 as	 Instagram	
(Kim, Lee, Sung & Choi, 2016). Through creating visual material of themselves 
to attract attention, young people expose themselves as targets of potential criti-
cism, insults, bullying and various other forms of hateful messages.
 In terms of the other reasons for cyberhate, the results varied greatly between 
the countries. In Germany and the UK, sexual orientation was the second most 
common reason for victimisation (in Germany 35 per cent, in the UK 32 per 
cent). In the US, the second most common reason for hate victimisation was eth-
nicity or nationality (36 per cent). Finland was somewhat of an exception here, 
as the second most common reason for victimisation was content categorised as 
“some other than any listed types”. Almost 40 per cent of those victimised by 
cyberhate in Finland disclosed that the reason for their victimisation related to 
something not in the listed categories. Besides appearance, other similarities 
were also prevalent cross- nationally. Disability and sex/gender were among the 
least common reasons for cyberhate victimisation in each of the four countries, 
with less than 10 per cent of respondents listing them.
 Overall, personal victimisation was relatively common in terms of our com-
parative data, indicating that hateful material is quite often targeted at Internet 
users personally. This of course raises additional questions on the nature of 
social media and other computer- mediated communication, one such question 
being: how do the different forms of hate victimisation really affect respondents’ 
wellbeing?
5.3 Impacts on wellbeing
Past research has shown that exposure to hate material and experiences of vic-
timisation are associated with negative consequences. For example, sleeping dis-
orders, increased anxiety and feelings of fear and insecurity can result from 
cybercrime, hate victimisation or other forms of online harassment. In addition 
to negative psychological outcomes and even psychiatric symptoms, online hate 
has been found to affect people’s daily activities and the ways in which they 
relate to their surrounding environment (e.g. Lee & Leets, 2002; Näsi et al., 
2015).
 In the social sciences, there are various traditions for understanding and con-
ceptualising	people’s	wellbeing.	There	are	a	number	of	definitions	of	physical,	
mental and social wellbeing. Views differ as to their theoretical and methodo-
logical foundations (e.g. Diener & Seligman, 2004; Veenhoven, 2010). For 
example, some prefer to stress the role of material or economic components 
whereas others see them as more cultural or psychological effects. In addition, 
contrary views have been presented as to whether wellbeing should serve as a 
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predictor rather than as an outcome. The question therefore is: does perceived 
wellbeing result primarily from certain life conditions and activities or should 
wellbeing be seen as something that can explain people’s activities and life 
patterns?
 Research on quality of life and wellbeing relies primarily on three different 
traditions, namely the socio- psychological, the economic and the ecological 
traditions. According to Schuessler and Fisher (1985), for instance, in social 
psychological approaches, quality of life and wellbeing are normally associ-
ated with experiencing happiness, contentment and other subjectively 
described conditions. These subjective conditions are achieved through the 
satisfaction of physiological and social needs, as well as those needs con-
nected with self- realisation. In the economic tradition, on the other hand, 
emphasis is put on the rational nature of an individual’s actions. The pursuit 
of quality of life and wellbeing are seen as means by which rational actors 
may	 obtain	 the	 most	 significant	 utilities	 possible	 from	 available	 resources.	
Finally, the ecological approach differs from the social psychological and eco-
nomic traditions as it foregrounds the effect of an individual’s physical 
environment and social circumstances. In this approach, experiences of well-
being	are	defined	as	 resulting	 from	different	 situational	 factors,	 such	as	day-	
to-day social interactions and routines.
	 Many	alternative	but	relatively	similar	classifications	of	research	traditions	
have been presented in the literature (e.g. Diener, 2000; Veenhoven, 2010). 
What is considered important are the different dimensions of wellbeing and 
quality of life, because the meaning of wellbeing can vary from one occasion 
to another. In our study, we were primarily interested in impacts on subjective 
wellbeing (SWB). As discussed above, SWB has been used in sociological, 
psychological	 and	 economic	 research	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 such	 issues	 as	
differences in experienced standard of living, enjoyment of life, life satisfac-
tion and happiness. A high level of life satisfaction or happiness, for instance, 
offers positively evaluated descriptions of an individual’s situation. However, 
there has never been a consensus in the social sciences on the most effective 
measures of wellbeing, despite agreement on important components (e.g. 
Etzioni, 1968; Kouvo & Räsänen, 2015; Veenhoven, 2010, 2012). Here, we 
examine SWB through all of its most widely used dimensions:
•	 happiness	(general	dimension)
•	 economic	condition	(economic	dimension)
•	 trust	(interpersonal	dimension)	and
•	 self-	esteem	(psychological	dimension).
The four listed dimensions capture all of the essential components of wellbeing. 
In the literature on SWB there are several partially contradictory research tradi-
tions. In empirical studies, however, different dimensions of SWB are often used 
interchangeably. Here, the four dimensions are used to capture the qualitative 
evaluation of an individual’s current life situation. Happiness was measured by 
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widely applied question: “All things considered, how happy would you say you 
are?” The economic dimension was evaluated by the question: “At the moment, 
how	satisfied	are	you	with	your	own	economic	situation?”	Our	measure	of	inter-
personal trust was based on the question: “Would you say that the following 
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with these 
people?” Those listed were people in general, family members, good friends, 
work colleagues and other acquaintances. Finally, self- esteem was based on the 
Single- Item Self- Esteem Scale, namely through the indicator, “I have high self- 
esteem” (Robins, Hendin & Trzesniewski, 2001).
 Each of the items was originally measured on a ten- point scale (1 = “extremely 
unhappy/dissatisfied/not	 true	 of	me”	 and	 10	 =	 “extremely	 happy/satisfied/very	
true of me”). Since our data come from a cross- sectional study, we cannot say 
very much about the direction of the effects. However, we discuss the effects of 
exposure to hate rather than the effects of SWB. We will return to this issue in 
more detail towards the end of the chapter.
 According to a recent study, even witnessing hate material online resulted in 
lowered levels of happiness and life satisfaction among young Internet users 
(Näsi et al., 2015). However, in order to examine the association between SWB 
and hate victimisation more closely, we took into account the type of negative 
behaviour that the respondents were targeted by. We examine how cyberhate, 
cyberharassment and cybercrime victimisation are associated with different 
dimensions of SWB. Given that the rates of victimisation differ substantially 
among the studied countries, we examine them separately, beginning with the 
issue of cybercrime victimisation. Figure 5.3 shows the averages (on a scale 
from 1 to 10) for those who have been targets of hateful or degrading material 
and those who have not.
Tr
u
st
Se
lf-
es
te
em
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Ec
on
om
ic
 s
itu
at
io
n
Tr
u
st
Se
lf-
es
te
em
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Ec
on
om
ic
 s
itu
at
io
n
Tr
u
st
Se
lf-
es
te
em
US Germany Finland 
Not a cyberhate victim 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Ec
on
om
ic
 s
itu
at
io
n
Tr
u
st
Se
lf-
es
te
em
H
ap
pi
ne
ss
Ec
on
om
ic
 s
itu
at
io
n
UK 
Cyberhate victim 
Figure 5.3  Victimisation by cyberhate and its association with wellbeing in the UK, the 
US, Germany and Finland. Means (evaluated on a scale from 1 to 10).
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	 As	the	figure	shows,	the	levels	are	lower	for	all	dimensions	of	SWB	for	those	
who	have	been	victimised	by	cyberhate.	This	finding	is	consistent	cross-	nationally,	
despite the fact that the overall levels of wellbeing as well as related effects tend to 
vary from one country to another. The most notable differences emerge when we 
compare levels of happiness and self- esteem. Those who have not been victimised 
by cyberhate reported higher levels of happiness in all countries (p < 0.05). The 
effects are strongest in Finland (p < 0.01) and the US (p < 0.001). The same can be 
said about self- esteem, except in the case of the UK, which showed no differences. 
Furthermore, trust is lower in all countries among those who have been victims, 
although	the	difference	is	not	statistically	significant	in	the	UK.
 In addition, we must note that in the UK, the US and Finland there were no 
major differences in terms of economic situation, while in Germany (p < 0.05) 
victims reported lower economic satisfaction. This may be due to the fact that 
the	economic	dimension	of	SWB	is	not	the	first	aspect	affected	by	cyberhate	vic-
timisation. Here, economic situation is a background condition, which helps 
individuals orient themselves for future life events and forthcoming decisions. In 
addition, it has been shown that satisfaction with one’s economic situation is 
also	associated	with	broader	societal	factors,	such	as	inflation	or	unemployment	
rates (Dolan, Peasgood & White, 2008). Nevertheless, economic wellbeing has 
significance	 for	 all	 our	 daily	 experiences	 and	 our	 findings	 show	 that	 personal	
victimisation by cyberhate associates negatively with economic satisfaction.
 Figure 5.4 shows the results for cyberharassment. Again, it appears that happi-
ness has the most notable association with harassment experiences in the US, 
Germany and Finland (p < 0.001). The UK is clearly an exception, however, since 
the levels of SWB do not appear to vary at all between those who have experi-
enced online harassment and those who have not. Our data do not allow us to 
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Figure 5.4  Victimisation by cyberharassment and its associations with wellbeing in the 
UK, the US, Germany and Finland. Means (evaluated on a scale from 1 to 10).
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make strong interpretations as to why cyberharassment has only marginal impacts 
on different dimensions of SWB in the UK. But in the other countries, those who 
had been harassed reported lower scores than those who had not had such experi-
ences (p < 0.05). In addition to happiness, harassed respondents reported far lower 
self- esteem and satisfaction with their economic situation than others in the US, 
Germany and Finland. Similar differences also exist in terms of trust.
 Finally, Figure 5.5 shows the mean ratings of SWB among those who have 
been cybercrime victims and those who have not. We see that in Finland the dif-
ferences between cybercrime victims and those who are not victims are the most 
significant,	whereas	 they	are	more	moderate	 in	 the	US	and	Germany.	 In	 inter-
preting	 these	 findings,	 we	 again	 need	 to	 bear	 in	 mind	 that	 the	 questionnaires	
mentioned the past three years, which is a relatively long period of time. It 
should be noted, however, that cybercrime victimisation is often a somewhat dif-
ferent experience from cyberharassment or cyberhate victimisation. This fact is 
likely	reflected	in	the	findings	as	well.
 Figure 5.5 also shows that happiness is affected by cybercrime victimisation 
in all the countries. The effects are very strong in Finland (p < 0.001) and 
Germany (p < 0.001), and somewhat weaker in the US (p < 0.05). In the UK, 
cybercrime victims reported lower happiness though the difference is not statisti-
cally	 significant.	We	 also	 observe	 interesting	 differences	when	 comparing	 the	
results by countries and by the four dimensions of SWB. For instance, we see 
that levels of trust are lower among the victims in Finland (p < 0.001) and 
Germany (p < 0.05). Findings also indicate that cybercrime victimisation has a 
negative impact on young people’s self- esteem. We observe this across the 
samples,	 except	 for	 the	UK.	The	 overall	 finding	 does	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise,	
given that criminal activities can be the most insulting expressions of hate that 
one can be targeted by.
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Figure 5.5  Cybercrime victimisation and its association with wellbeing in the UK, the 
US, Germany and Finland. Means (evaluated on a scale from 1 to 10).
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 In Finland (p < 0.01), Germany and the US, those who have been victimised 
by cybercrime expressed lower levels of economic satisfaction. In the UK, there 
is a weak difference which shows that economic satisfaction is lower for those 
who have not been victimised. However, the difference in the UK is only mar-
ginal	and	not	statistically	significant.	Again,	we	cannot	be	sure	about	the	direc-
tion of effects, but the results are clear: cybercrime victimisation is associated 
with different dimensions of SWB among the studied teenagers and young 
adults.
5.4 Associations between personal victimisation and social 
relations
In	 this	 final	 section	 we	 examine	 how	 cyberhate	 victimisation	 connects	 with	
general	offline	and	online	activity.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	Lifestyle	Exposure	
Theory (LET) and Routine Activity Theory (RAT) provide us with strong indic-
ators of which behavioural and environmental factors are associated with the risk 
of cybervictimisation. The basic argument in existing online studies is that tradi-
tional settings for victimisation, such as homes, restaurants or nightclubs, and 
workplaces, have been extended to include various online environments (e.g. 
Bossler & Holt, 2009; Holt, Bossler & May, 2012; Räsänen et al., 2016).
	 As	they	do	in	the	offline	context,	young	individuals	use	the	online	space	fol-
lowing	certain	routines,	for	instance	by	checking	their	social	media	profiles	regu-
larly, participating in online discussion forums related to their interests, looking 
for news and information from their regular sources, as well as, on occasion, 
seeking out new content. However, despite these daily online routines, users may 
also come across some online material by accident, entering websites with 
content they did not intend to be exposed to. In some cases, such accidental 
exposure reveals content that is hostile and harmful; or, worse, online behaviour 
can result in a person becoming a victim of actual crime. Despite being in a rel-
atively	different	environment,	 individuals’	offline	activities	also	continue	 to	be	
significant	 predictors	 of	 online	 victimisation,	 as	 negative	 offline	 networks	 can	
influence	 alternative	 leisure	 activities	 and	 potentially	 harmful	 and	 even	
dangerous online routines (Helweg- Larsen, Schütt & Larsen, 2012; Räsänen 
et al., 2016).
 A key notion of RAT is that routine activities are a universal source of risk 
factors and potential victimisation. That is, when all relevant background factors 
are accounted for, it is routine activity that eventually explains who is most at risk 
of becoming a victim of crime, converging in time and space with an offender 
and lacking appropriate measures of protection. In this sense, routine activities 
can explain cybervictimisation in different contexts and among different popula-
tion groups in a rather uniform manner. Because of this broad applicability of the 
risk setting combined with an activity level that is shared in online experience 
cross- nationally, we do not delve into cross- national differences in this context. 
Here, the question arises: how well can young people’s Internet use patterns and 
meeting	offline	friends	explain	their	risk	of	becoming	victims	of	cyberhate?
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 In our data, we examined users’ Internet use frequency as the online activity 
measure. That is, the item measured how often they log on. Similarly, social 
activity was measured using a widely applied item formulated as “How often do 
you meet face to face with friends, relatives or work colleagues for social 
reasons?” In the analysis, we compared levels of socialisation between those 
who report meeting friends/relatives/colleagues less than once a month and those 
who report meeting with friends/relatives/colleagues at least once a month.
	 Our	findings	do	not	indicate	clearly	that	more	active	users	of	the	Internet	are	
more likely to become victims of cybercrime. However, this is because 90 per 
cent of our respondents were using the Internet several times a day, thus a more 
detailed	measurement	of	daily	Internet	use	might	provide	more	detailed	findings	
through producing a valuable contrast. For instance, our question concerning 
respondents’ social media activity allows for a more detailed examination. In our 
data, social media use was measured by asking respondents to identify which 
from a list of twenty- one different social media services (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, 
Google+, YouTube, message and image boards, photo- sharing services) they 
were using. The results show that respondents who used more sites or services 
were more likely to be victims of cybercrime, cyberharassment and cyberhate.
	 However,	we	also	 found	 that	 respondents’	offline	activities	 tend	 to	have	an	
association with cybercrime and cyberhate victimisation. This association shows 
that respondents who were meeting their friends, relatives or colleagues face to 
face on social occasions less than once a month were more likely to become 
victims than those making social connections more often. However, cyberhar-
rasment	victimisation	was	not	associated	with	offline	activity.	Approximately	11	
per cent of those who met their friends, relatives or colleagues for social occa-
sions on less than a monthly basis had become victims of a cybercrime during 
the past three years. The proportion of victimised respondents is 6 per cent for 
those who met their friends, relatives or colleagues more often (p < 0.001). Sim-
ilarly, about 15 per cent of those who reported meeting with friends, relatives or 
colleagues less often than once a month had become victims of cyberhate. The 
proportion is clearly lower (10 per cent) for those who met with friends more 
often (p < 0.01).
 In terms of percentages, there appear to be only slight associations between 
meeting friends, relatives or colleagues and cyberhate victimisation. However, in 
broader	 terms,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 social	 activities	 both	 online	 and	 offline	 are	
associated with the likelihood of victimisation online. For instance, it has been 
found that while frequency of social connections seems to reduce the risk of vic-
timisation, frequent use of the Internet increases risk (e.g. Bossler et al., 2012; 
Räsänen	et	al.,	2016).	Such	findings	are	important	for	young	people,	due	to	the	
fact that of all demographic groups in Western societies, it is young people who 
spend the most time online. Thus, the positive relationship between the risks 
linked to victimisation and the quantity of time spent online can be well under-
stood given this assumption.
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5.5 Often harmful, always disturbing
While examining whether the Internet serves as a homogenising environment for 
experiences of victimisation, we must acknowledge how the four countries in our 
study	 compare	 in	 the	 offline	 context.	 While	 we	 lack	 the	 data	 to	 statistically	
explore potential explanations for these cross- national differences, we can offer 
some plausible hypotheses that future research might investigate in more depth. 
Effects of cross- national variation in crime rates and cross- national differences in 
anti- hate speech laws might be feasible points of departure here. Consequently, 
our	findings	may	in	part	be	explained	by	the	differences	 in	hate	speech	laws	in	
these	countries.	At	 least	 some	of	 the	variation	 in	findings	would	benefit	 from	a	
closer look at the institutional perspective. Each of the countries included is dif-
ferent in terms of the content that resulted in personal victimisation by cyberhate 
and also in terms of how victimisation was associated with wellbeing.
	 Part	of	our	findings	can	also	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	young	people	in	non-	
English-speaking countries do not necessarily have access to English- language 
sites. On the other hand, Finnish users, who come from a small language group 
(just over 5 million speakers) are more likely to need the English language for 
online navigation than, for example, Germans (over 90 million speakers). This is 
especially relevant when it comes to cross- country differences in exposure and 
victimisation to different forms of online hate. Naturally, the boundaries that 
come with language also connect with cultural and legal factors, which vary 
between the countries. The lower rates of exposure to hate and victimisation in 
Germany might also be explained by stricter controls on online material.
 Furthermore, the potential harms and dangers of cybervictimisation are not 
likely to impact all young people in similar ways. First, the highest risk group is 
made	up	of	 those	young	people	who	already	face	various	difficulties	and	have	
experienced	victimisation	offline	(Noll	et	al.,	2013).	They	may	also	have	fewer	
resources to cope with negative experiences online. Second, there is recent 
research evidence showing that primary groups may shield young people’s 
mental health when they encounter online risks (Minkkinen et al., 2016). In other 
words, if adolescents have good friendships and good relationships with their 
parents, they are less likely to be impacted by negative online experiences.
 All of this points to the fact that the sources of problems do not lie solely 
online	 (Mitchell	 et	 al.,	 2011).	Obviously,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 control	 all	 potential	
risks resulting from Internet use; in fact, it may be easier to reduce online risks 
by	addressing	various	contextual	offline	factors.	For	example,	online	victimisa-
tion has been shown to associate with low levels of attachment to family 
(Oksanen et al., 2014). Similarly, the psychosocial problems that young people 
confront	 offline	 overlap	with	 their	 negative	 online	 experiences.	 It	 is	 therefore	
critical to develop new ways for parents, teachers and youth workers to support 
young people and address the identity issues they face. In addition, we need open 
discussions about the high prevalence of aggressive, hateful and threatening 
online behaviour. Only by confronting it can we hope to address the potential 
harm	it	may	inflict.
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	 Media	literacy	also	plays	a	very	important	role,	much	as	it	has	in	the	offline	
setting where reading and interpretation become central to managing reactions to 
various forms of content. In Western societies it is no longer an exaggeration to 
argue that online skills are becoming a new source of socio- economic inequality. 
Being able to identify the different forms of online material and how they relate 
to different ideologies will be an increasingly important factor when considering 
the	 future	 of	 younger	 generations	 and	 their	 online	 proficiency	 linked	 to	well-
being.	 Visual	 information	 will	 have	 an	 increasingly	 significant	 role	 in	 how	
young people are exposed to content, especially for those where video, images 
and other signs are virtually ever present via various forms of social media. 
Suicide, violence, weight control issues and pornography are all part of this 
context,	 carrying	 increasing	significance	 in	 the	visual	arena	online	 in	affecting	
the development of exposed users. Furthermore, while empirical research on the 
impacts and consequences of online hate is accumulating, we should note that 
the online environment and its widely used applications are also evolving 
quickly. It follows that many suggestions from preceding research may not be 
applicable to tomorrow’s common online context. Thus, possible future develop-
ments in the online environment should be considered when projecting the valid-
ity	of	behavioural	findings	forward.
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6 Harm- advocating content online
6.1 Extreme becoming mainstream
On 11 May 2016 a young French woman broadcast her suicide on the Periscope 
live video- streaming service. The live footage was reportedly seen by a number 
of users and it was quickly erased by Twitter, the company that owns Periscope. 
This incident is an extreme example of how online and offline realities have 
merged. The Periscope suicide was not the first online suicide, however. One of 
the most famous of these cases involved a Swedish man who committed suicide 
online during a webcam feed in 2010. The man had stated his intention of 
hanging himself, which at first led many people to comment with empathy. 
Others did not believe him and called him a “troll” and an “attention whore”. 
The video, which is still online, shows the man hanging himself, slowly losing 
breath and finally dying. There are a number of other cases where viewers or 
online commentators have encouraged and motivated individuals to commit 
various horrible acts.
 Besides online suicide footage, the 2000s have seen a rise in various extreme 
and pathological communities that share information about ways to deliberately 
harm oneself. This self- directed hate expands the variety of harmful material 
already discussed in this book. Unfortunately, the Internet facilitates a myriad of 
communities devoted to self- hatred, harm and suicide. Some of them share 
material on death, murder and suicide on a wide scale while encouraging and 
instructing others to commit similar destructive actions. This material is created 
and distributed within small communities and is readily accessible to those 
seeking such exposure. We refer to such communities as harm- advocating online 
communities.
 Exposure to harm- advocating content is not a particularly new issue. In a 
wider research context, violent games and movies have long been the subject of 
debate, particularly in terms of their implications for young people (Anderson et 
al., 2010; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Ferguson & Kilburn, 2009). However, 
with the Internet, there is now an abundance of potentially harmful and hateful 
material online, including increasing amounts of what can be described as dis-
turbing content. Given the various platforms available for online sharing, such 
material is often user- generated and distributed within small communities. This 
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is very different from the role of violent media in past decades. It has been 
argued that both the enhanced accessibility of various media online and the 
scale of young people’s Internet use point to the potential for new forms of 
risks (Jones, Mitchell & Finkelhor, 2011; Livingstone, Haddon, Görzig & Ólafs-
son, 2011).
 Livingstone and Smith (2014) note that significant gaps in the research 
remain. These gaps are largely a result of the rapid changes in the technological 
environment. Different forms of online risks remain a relatively new research 
topic and so there is a need for more empirical research regarding the different 
associations of online risks with wellbeing. In this chapter we will first review 
some of the most common harm- advocating online sites and communities. We 
will then show empirical results regarding the exposure of adolescents and 
young adults in the US, the UK, Germany and Finland to such material, and how 
such exposure is related to their wellbeing.
6.2 The scope of harm- advocating online content
Harm- advocating online content is by definition unhealthy due to its promotion 
of ideas that are both physically and psychologically harmful, as determined by 
the mainstream of scientific knowledge. Past research has distinguished between 
risk and harm, risk representing a probability of harm and harm being defined as 
experienced damage (Breakwell, 2010; Schoon, 2006). Exposure to online 
content, along with offline factors, can have an effect on the wellbeing of young 
people through both the likelihood of facing risk, and the possibility of that risk 
being considered harmful (Livingstone & Görzig, 2014).
 The notions of risk and actual harm often go hand in hand. Pre- existing psy-
chological and social difficulties offline may lead to risk- taking online and even-
tually to actual harm to wellbeing (Noll, Shenk, Barnes & Haralson, 2013). In 
the online setting, it is common for users to be drawn to others with whom they 
are able to identify (Oksanen, Hawdon & Räsänen, 2014). A young person with 
mental health problems may find a sense of validation or community through 
contact with others having similar problems. From the point of view of this 
chapter and related research, harm- advocating online communities are analogi-
cal to online hate groups. Both might be attractive for some young people and 
eventually induce an identification with negative things, for example a life 
fixated on death, suicide ideation or self- harm.
 We focus here on four common forms of harm- advocating content, namely 
sites and communities promoting self- injury, suicide and eating disorders and 
portrayals of death and dying. All of these have fundamental links to online hate 
in more general terms. Pro- self-harm and pro- suicide communities intentionally 
support self- hatred, which is not uncommon for pro- eating disorder communities 
as well. Death sites portray extremely graphic images and videos of real murders, 
fatal accidents and visible violence to people which could be considered as an 
act of hatred itself.
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Pro- self-injury content
Non- suicidal self- injury (NSSI) involves the mutilation of one’s bodily tissue 
without suicidal intent and is a common phenomenon among young people 
(Favazza, 1998; Nock, 2010; Skegg, 2005). Self- mutilation and cutting are often 
cherished and even glorified in popular culture and are quite usual. Self- 
mutilation has been used in performance art and popular music for its shock 
effect, although the actual shock has worn off during the past decades. Accord-
ing to Armando Favazza (1996), self- mutilation is a cross- cultural phenomenon 
that may take a variety of forms, from skin cutting and burning to finger amputa-
tion and testicle crushing. Despite the extreme nature of some forms of body 
mutilation, most are non- suicidal. It is a coping method for those who might 
otherwise take much more severe action.
 The rise of pro- self-injury content online coincides with the rise of social net-
working. Whitlock, Powers and Eckenrode (2006) studied users of self- injury 
message boards and found that most of the users were females aged 12 to 20. 
Lewis and colleagues (2011) carried out a study where they examined hundreds 
of NSSI videos found on YouTube. Their analysis showed that the content was 
graphic and the videos were rated favourably by their viewers. The authors argue 
that the existence of such material in mainstream social media such as YouTube 
may in fact foster the normalisation of self- injury. According to the EU Kids 
Online findings, 7 per cent of 11–16-year- olds had visited user- generated sites 
on ways of physically harming or hurting oneself during the past twelve months 
(Livingstone et al., 2011, p. 98).
This is a pro- self harm community mainly for cutters. We may glorify, 
honor, and admire cutting or any other form of self- harm in our entries. Do 
not and I repeat DO NOT be critical towards our members. If you do not 
like what we do then leave. It is as simple as that. We do not need to hear 
your rude remarks and as soon as you leave a comment that will upset the 
community then you will be banned from the community.
 Please post any pictures behind a lj- cut. No teasers. Images and posts 
may be triggering . . . so enter at your own risk. If you think you can quit 
cutting . . . then good for you . . . but we don’t want to hear about it so just 
leave . . . just remember, we will always be here for when you slip up, 
because you WILL slip up. believe me.
(icut Diary from LiveJournal social networking site; 
http://icut.livejournal.com/profile)
Pro- suicide content
Pro- suicide content is an even more severe form of self- hatred found online. 
This involves sites and communities that both encourage people to commit 
suicide and enable users to share their suicidal ideas, death fantasies and inten-
tions, including concrete advice on how to carry out lethal acts (Becker & 
Schmidt, 2004; Biddle, Donovan, Hawton, Kapur & Gunnell, 2008; Kemp & 
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Collings, 2011; Minkkinen et al., 2016a; Recupero, Harms & Noble, 2008). 
People may also form a pact involving their wish to end their lives. Online pro- 
suicide content raised much discussion during the 2000s (Biddle et al., 2008; 
Luxton, June & Fairall, 2012; Rajagopal, 2004). The phenomenon first 
became known in Asian countries, especially Japan, where the Internet 
was linked to suicide pacts. These early 2000s cases involved people who knew 
each other beforehand and who committed suicide together (Harris, 2015; 
Rajagobal, 2004).
 One of the most well- known examples of pro- suicide communities is ASH 
(alt.suicide.holiday), a discussion group in the Usenet platform during the early 
1990s, before the commercial Internet era. The ASH community started off by 
reporting suicide news during holidays; users soon began sharing their own sui-
cidal ideas and developed their own language around suicide (Niezen, 2013). 
The social media era has greatly facilitated the sharing of a variety of material 
that promotes and glorifies suicide. The Suicidal Children blog on Tumblr 
(http://suicide- children.tumblr.com/), for example, posts suicide notes and 
people jumping under a train in a very graphic manner. Even in terms of extreme 
topics, the social media era has made finding other like- minded people through-
out the world far easier, all accessible within a few clicks.
 According to an EU Kids Online survey 5 per cent of children aged 11–16 
had seen sites on ways of committing suicide online (Livingstone, Haddon, 
Görzig & Ólafsson, 2011). Dunlop and colleagues’ (2011) survey of young 
Americans aged 14 to 24 reveals that 59 per cent had drawn information about 
suicide from online sources. Yet there is a lack of cross- national studies concern-
ing the characteristics of adolescents and young adults who are perhaps the most 
sizeable audience of harm- advocating online content, due to the high prevalence 
of self- harming behaviour and eating disorders among this age group (see 
Hawton, Saunders & O’Connor, 2012).
 It is important to underline that most online content on suicide does not in 
fact advocate it. The Internet is also home to various self- help and support 
groups that aim to provide positive feedback and encourage wellbeing for their 
members (Barak, Boniel- Nissim & Suler, 2008; Obst & Stafurik, 2010; Tanis, 
2007). A study based on web search engines by Recupero and colleagues (2008) 
found that only 11 per cent of suicide web hits were actually pro- suicide. Kemp 
and Collings (2011) assessed the visibility of such material using a web crawling 
data collection strategy. They found that pro- suicide sites tend to be a marginal 
phenomenon compared to sites dedicated to suicide prevention.
This site was designed to help people thinking of killing themselves. That 
help might consist of informing of the dangers of particular methods. And 
there are many dangers, in many methods. They aren’t on this site to dis-
hearten you, or overwhelm you with information, it is just the facts. A suc-
cessful, painless suicide takes a lot of research and preparation. And, if you 
read as much information as I have, you will realise it does take effort.
(Lost All Hope site, http://lostallhope.com/)
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Some sites also attempt to carefully instruct suicidal web surfers to continue their 
lives. Lost All Hope (http://lostallhope.com/) considers itself “one of the most 
comprehensive suicide resources on the web”. It lists suicide methods by lethality, 
time of dying and agony produced and it also gives further academic material on 
the topic. The style of Lost All Hope is fact- oriented. It encourages people to seek 
help if necessary and gives details about why people should not kill themselves 
on impulse. It also directs people to potential social support, including help lines. 
In other words, despite the site being oriented to preparing people to kill them-
selves, it simultaneously emphasises a view that suicide is a definitive and final 
solution that cannot be reversed and must therefore be well thought through.
 A review of fourteen empirical studies by Daine and colleagues (2013) 
showed that the Internet can have both a positive and a negative influence on 
young people at risk of self- harm or suicide. For example, users of suicide bul-
letin board systems have reported either anti- or pro- suicide goals, namely 
towards recovery from suicidal feelings or for help in preparation for suicide 
(Sueki & Eichenberg, 2012). Dunlop and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that 
exposure to suicide stories in online discussion forums was associated with 
increased suicidal ideation. Longitudinal studies by Sueki reported similar find-
ings, indicating that suicide- related Internet use (e.g. accessing information 
about suicide methods) increased suicidal ideation and depression (Sueki, 2013; 
Sueki, Yonemoto, Takeshima & Inagaki, 2014).
Pro- eating disorder content
Over the last decade, the emergence of pro- eating disorder content has become a 
growing public health concern. With the help of information technologies, such 
communities are easily accessible and interactive, encouraging harmful weight 
loss and weight control practices (Custers, 2015; Juarascio, Shoaib & Timko, 
2010; Lewis & Arbuthnott, 2012; Oksanen et al., 2015; Oksanen, Garcia & 
Räsänen, 2016; Rodgers, Lowy, Halperin & Franko, 2016). Although bulimia is 
more common than anorexia (Abraham, 2016), the majority of online content 
focuses on pro- anorexia (Lewis & Arbuthnott, 2012). Both pro- anorexia (i.e. 
pro- ana) and pro- bulimia (i.e. pro- mia) content includes advice on how to lose 
weight through interactive discussion forums and promotes “thinspiration”, that 
is, “inspirational” pictures of extremely thin bodies and personal stories about 
getting and keeping thin (Peebles et al., 2012).
Hello ladies, So recently I’ve been doing something that really works for me 
and I thought I would share it with you. Every time I’m about to binge or 
break a fast, I read one of these pictures i have saved on my phone. I thought 
it wouldn’t work but after reading these messages on these pictures, I really 
feel less hungry and less like eating. I’ll share them in this post and maybe 
they’ll help some of you.
(“How I Stop Myself From Eating” post to the Pro- Ana Lifestyle site, 
https://theproanalifestyleforever.wordpress.com/)
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Pro- eating disorder sites and communities offer a platform for open and 
anonymous discussion of issues related to eating disorders, for gaining know-
ledge and support about losing weight, and for receiving social and emotional 
support through a sense of belonging or simply being listened to (Custers, 2015; 
Oksanen et al., 2016; Rodgers, Skowron & Chabrol, 2012). Pro- eating disorder 
communities often advocate thinness as a lifestyle choice rather than treatment 
as a mental disorder (Borzekowski, Schenk, Wilson & Peebles, 2010; Conrad & 
Rondini, 2010; Harper, Sperry & Thompson, 2008), but the material is not 
homogenous and user stances towards eating disorders do differ (Brotsky & 
Giles, 2007; Csipke & Horne, 2007; Strife & Rickard, 2011). Content analysis 
of pro- eating disorder sites shows that users express much mutual support and 
solidarity in their comments (Borzekowski et al., 2010). Hence, members are 
likely to identify strongly with these communities, making it difficult for parents 
or professionals to intervene.
 Pro- eating disorder communities are found on various social media sites, includ-
ing Facebook (Teufel et al., 2013), YouTube (Oksanen et al., 2015; Syed- Abdul et 
al., 2013), Twitter (Arseniev- Koehler, Lee, McCormick & Moreno, 2016), Insta-
gram, Pinterest (Custers, 2015), and Flickr (Yom- Tov, Fernandez- Luque, Weber & 
Crain, 2012). The EU Kids Online report found that 10 per cent of 11–16-year- olds 
had seen pro- eating disorder content. Exposure was particularly high among 
14–16-year- old girls (19 per cent) (Livingstone et al., 2011, p. 98). According to 
Custers and Van den Bulck (2009), almost 13 per cent of girls and nearly 6 per 
cent of boys aged 13, 15 and 17 had visited pro- anorexia websites. According to 
the study, girls who visited such sites had a higher drive for thinness and perfec-
tionism as well as a more negative perception of their appearance. Similarly, 
members of pro- ana communities have been found to report high levels of dis-
ordered eating (Harper, Sperry & Thompson, 2008; Rodgers et al., 2012).
Real death content
Another pathological online genre is death video sites dedicated to portraying 
actual murders. In the history of Western popular culture, there is an entire 
mythology constructed around the portrayal of human death. The term “snuff 
film” was coined by Ed Sanders in relation to the Charles Manson family 
murders and their alleged plans to film the killings. Snuff was the title of a 1976 
splatter horror film which stirred up a great deal of controversy in the US at the 
time (Stine, 1999). “Snuff ” means supposed real footage of death.
 Although most people in the Western world are used to seeing violence in 
movies and television series and even on televised news reports, there is a pecu-
liar interest in both violent and accidental deaths of real people, as well as 
torture, maiming and abuse. Earlier, videos of these might have circulated as 
illegal VHS- tapes, but the Internet has provided a whole new platform for gore 
and shock sites, and some of the content can even be found through mainstream 
video- sharing sites. Some of the earliest of these sites, such as Rotten.com, were 
started as early as the mid- 1990s.
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 An analysis by Slater (2005) of 166 websites portraying extreme violence 
showed that almost half of them originated in the US (45 per cent), followed by 
the UK (12 per cent). Only 3 per cent of such sites were from Germany and an 
even smaller proportion from other countries. The sites typically included videos 
and images and provided links to other sites. These sites show a variety of forms 
of violence: they may represent violence as humorous, include directly hateful 
violence, animal violence, sexual violence, combat violence and very gory 
scenes of violence in general. More recently, social media have made it even 
easier to share content with others who share similar interests.
 Best Gore website contains gory images and videos and depictions of (but not 
limited to):
• death, including beheadings, executions, suicides, murders, electrocu-
tion, stoning, torching, drowning
• accidents, including car crashes, motorcycle crashes, workplace acci-
dents, sexual accidents, animal attacks
• war, including bomb victims often involving children, white phospho-
rus attacks, decapitation of POVs, mass executions, biological warfare, 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture
• diseases, including poisoning, heart attacks, terminal illness patients, 
drug abuse
• unusual fetishes, including needle fetishes, blood fetishes, genital 
mutilation
• body modifications, including self mutilation and more
(Best Gore: Welcome to Best Gore introduction text, 
www.bestgore.com/)
Luka Magnotta is a recent peculiar representative of this genre. Magnotta, who 
had a career as a pornographic actor, killed a Chinese exchange student, dis-
membered her and ate parts of her, and then mailed the remaining limbs to ele-
mentary school and political party offices in Canada. Videos of his actions were 
posted to Bestgore.com directly after the crime. Magnotta is just one among 
others in the Western world who has been fascinated with the possibilities 
offered by the Internet. In addition to live online footage of suicides, it is unfor-
tunately obvious that many are fascinated by the potential shock value offered 
by live murder. A recent demonstration of online hatred has been the actions 
taken by the ISIS terrorist group whose members have posted beheading videos 
on mainstream social media sites such as YouTube beginning in July 2014.
 A survey of American youth reported that only 4 per cent of young people 
aged 10 to 15 had seen death sites (Ybarra, Mitchell & Korchmaros, 2011). 
Viewing such sites was associated with seriously violent behaviour in a nation-
ally representative US study (Ybarra et al., 2008). However, it is important to 
keep in mind that media violence might influence a small minority of highly 
aggressive subjects who are likely to seek out violent content (Baumeister, 1997, 
pp. 278–280). According to a study by Michael D. Slater (2003), alienation from 
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school and family was predictive of browsing of violent online sites. Eventually, 
such exposure may have had negative impacts on wellbeing, as is proposed by 
the downward spiral model by Slater (2003) and colleagues.
6.3 Harm- advocating content from a cross- national 
perspective
Ellen Helsper and her colleagues (2013) created a cross- national categorisation 
of young Internet users tracking the likelihood of them encountering different 
online risks. It found that Nordic countries and the Netherlands belong to a cat-
egory of “supported risky explorers”: these are experienced social media users 
with strong parental support who also encounter more risks online, including 
harm- advocating material. On the other hand, children in the UK, Germany and 
most middle and southern European countries were found to be much more pro-
tected due to, for example, more restrictions on usage put in place by parents. 
Language barriers can also serve as a protective factor among young children.
 However, despite such categorisation of cross- cultural differences in potential 
risk exposure, a study by Sueki and Eichenberg (2012) found no country differ-
ence between American and Japanese suicide bulletin board users. Furthermore, 
Keipi and his colleagues (2015) compared the US and Finland and found that 
exposure rates to pro- suicide, pro- self-harm, pro- eating disorder and death sites 
were remarkably similar in the two countries. They concluded that cultural dif-
ferences may not always significantly predict online behaviour. Thus users may 
be exposed to similar content due to the globalising effects of the Internet despite 
differences between societies. Here, we turn to these differences and similarities 
between populations in more detail.
 Our data included general risk measures on exposure to harm- advocating 
content. The items were based on previous studies by research groups in both 
Europe (Livingstone et al., 2011) and the US (Ybarra et al., 2011). A set of four 
questions was used to measure exposure to harm- advocating websites and online 
communities. The respondents were asked whether they had seen the following in 
the past twelve months (yes/no answer option): (1) “sites about ways of physically 
harming or hurting yourself ” (pro- self-injury content), (2) “sites about ways of 
committing suicide” (pro- suicide content), (3) “sites about ways to be very thin (e.g. 
sites relating to eating disorders)” (pro- eating disorder content) and (4) “sites dedic-
ated to showing the deaths or murders of real people” (death content). These four 
items were used as dependent variables and operationalised as advocating harm to 
online users (e.g. pro- eating disorder, Livingstone et al., 2011; pro- suicide and pro- 
self-injury, Minkkinen, Oksanen, Kaakinen, Keipi & Räsänen, 2016b), as they 
address particular methods of harming oneself. Previous studies show that instruc-
tions on self- harm are part of pro- anorexia and pro- suicide sites and communities 
(Biddle et al., 2008; Boero & Pascoe, 2012; Borzekowski et al., 2010), and thus 
provide a clear risk for young people who become exposed to such content.
 Figure 6.1 shows the proportions of 15–30-year- olds who had seen harm- 
advocating online material in the US, the UK, Germany and Finland. As the 
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figure indicates, potentially disturbing online content was generally seen by 
fewer people than online hate content. Pro- eating disorder content (17 per cent) 
was the most common form of material seen by young people in the UK, the US, 
Germany and Finland, followed by pro- self-injury (11 per cent) and death sites 
(11 per cent). Of all our respondents, only 8 per cent had seen pro- suicide 
material. Yet we have to put these figures into perspective. The figures could be 
considered high due to the extreme nature of some of the material. In fact, in the 
US, 31 per cent had visited at least some site involving harm- advocating content 
during the past twelve months. The corresponding figures were 29 per cent for 
the UK, 28 per cent for Finland and 12 per cent for Germany.
 Consistent with our findings in previous chapters, German respondents were 
significantly less likely to witness harm- advocating online content than youth in 
the other three countries (p < 0.001), while the differences between Finland, the 
UK and the US were small. Furthermore, only 5 per cent of Germans reported 
visiting sites about how to physically harm or hurt oneself, while the percentages 
were higher in the UK (14 per cent), Finland (13 per cent) and the US (12 per 
cent). A similar division was evident with suicide sites, as less than 5 per cent of 
Germans had visited such sites, whereas approximately 10 per cent of respond-
ents in other countries reported doing so. Again, approximately 7 per cent of the 
German respondents had visited sites dedicated to being very thin, compared 
with over 20 per cent for the three other countries. Finally, just over 4 per cent of 
the German respondents had visited sites dedicated to showing actual deaths and 
murders during the last year, whereas the figure for Finland was nearly 10 per 
cent, for the UK 14 per cent, and for the US 16 per cent.
 There are a number of potential explanation for these differences by country, 
some of which have already been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. First of all, 
previous studies have shown that harm- advocating material is primarily on 
English- language sites originating in the US and also in the UK. This might 
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explain why US respondents have the highest rates of exposure to death sites. 
Second, we know from other studies that parents in some countries are more pro-
tective when it comes to their children’s Internet usage (Helsper et al., 2013). 
Although our sample is not restricted to children, such protective attitudes towards 
online content might continue during late adolescence and emerging adulthood. 
Third, language might play a role (see Chapter 5 above). This might explain why 
the percentages among young Finns were often similar to those in the UK and the 
US. As there is only a limited amount of content in Finnish, Finns seek out English-
 language content. The fourth explanation has to do with the average mental health 
of young people. German young people aged 15 to 29 have, for example, relatively 
low suicide rates compared to Finnish and US rates (WHO, 2014; see also Hawton 
et al., 2012). This might partially explain the results, especially as we are discuss-
ing a relatively pathological online phenomenon.
6.4 Harm- advocating content and its associations with 
wellbeing
Similar to what has already been seen in the previous chapters of this book, 
exposure to harm- advocating online content is likely to vary by individuals’ 
socio- demographic background and various behavioural characteristics. In the 
following, Figures 6.2–6.5 show proportions of exposure to pro- self-injury, pro- 
suicide, pro- eating disorder and death content by gender, age, living with 
parents, immigrant background, frequency of Internet use and exposure to and 
victimisation by online hate.
 First, Figure 6.2 shows that males were more likely to encounter pro- self-
injury contents than females (p < 0.05). This is somewhat surprising, given past 
research findings which show that intentional self- harm is more common among 
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young females than young males, though the gender difference has been found 
to decrease with age (Hawton et al., 2012; Skegg, 2005; see also Whitlock et al., 
2006). Younger respondents were slightly more likely to see pro- self-injury 
sites. Our results show some evidence of the guardianship factor (see Chapter 3 
above for RAT theory), as those living at home were less likely to visit pro- self-
injury sites (p < 0.05) than those not living at home. Immigrant background, on 
the other hand, increased the likelihood of exposure to pro- self-injury content 
(p < 0.001) as respondents with an immigrant parent were more likely to see such 
material than those who did not have an immigrant parent. There are no major 
differences in terms of frequency of daily Internet use, but those who had either 
seen online hate or been victimised by it were significantly more likely to visit 
pro- self-injury sites.
 Figure 6.3 shows that males were more likely to encounter pro- suicide 
(p < 0.05) content than females. This is not surprising since suicide rates are 
much higher among males aged 15 to 29 than females of the same age (Hawton 
et al., 2012; Skegg, 2005; WHO, 2014). As regards the potential guardianship 
factor, those respondents who were still living at home were less likely to visit 
pro- suicide sites (p < 0.01) than those who were not living at home. However, 
immigrant background also increased the likelihood of exposure to pro- suicide 
content (p < 0.01) as respondents with immigrant parents were more likely to see 
such material than those who did not have immigrant parents. Differences in 
terms of frequency of daily online use were minor, but both exposure and vic-
timisation to online hate were strongly associated with visiting pro- suicide sites.
 Figure 6.4 shows that females were more likely to visit pro- eating disorders 
sites (p < 0.001) than males. These findings are unsurprising, as we know that 
eating disorders are more common among the female population (e.g. Fairburn 
& Harrison, 2003; Treasure, Claudino & Zucker, 2010). It also appears that the 
oldest respondents are the least exposed to pro- eating disorder content exposure 
0 5 10 15 20 35 3025 
Not a cyberhate victim
Cyberhate victim
Exposed to cyberhate
Not exposed to cyberhate
Internet less often
Internet several times a day
Small town
Non-urban
Big city
Parent immigrant
Parent not immigrant
Lives with parents
Other
18–25
Under 18
26–30
Male
Female
 7 
 4 
 15 
 10  8 
 10  7 
5 
 8  11 
 10  7 
 9 
 9  7 
 7 
 10 
 31
Figure 6.3  Exposure to pro-suicide content by respondents’ background characteristics. 
Percentages.
100  Harm-advocating content online
(p < 0.001). Differences between those living at home with their parents and 
others were not significant. Furthermore, immigrant background was associated 
with visiting pro- eating disorder sites (p < 0.01), respondents with immigrant 
parents being more likely to see such material than those who did not have 
immigrant parents. There were only minor differences between those who used 
the Internet several times a day and those who did so less often. Victims of 
cyberhate were far more likely to visit pro- eating disorder sites (51 per cent vs 7 
per cent, p < 0.001). Also, exposure to online hate was strongly associated with 
seeing pro- eating disorder content. These figures are very high compared to 
those who had not been exposed to cyberhate or been victimised by it.
 Figure 6.5 shows that males were more likely to encounter death content than 
females (p < 0.001). This finding is supported by earlier studies, which have also 
shown that males visit death sites more often than females (Ybarra et al., 2008, 
2011). Age and living with parents were not significant background factors for 
seeing death sites. Those with an immigrant background were more likely to see 
pro- eating disorder content (p < 0.001) than those who did not have immigrant 
parents. Frequency of daily Internet use was not associated with visiting death 
sites. Those exposed to cyberhate and those victimised by it were strongly asso-
ciated with seeing death sites.
 Overall, Figures 6.2–6.5 show that age differences appear not to be very 
significant, but the youngest respondents were generally more likely to see harm-
 advocating online content. From a developmental perspective this is understand-
able, as young people face rapid changes in their life events especially during 
emerging adulthood but also during late adolescence. This can lead to increased 
instability and incidences of psychopathology (Arnett, 2000; Schulenberg & 
Zarrett, 2006). Thus, it is at this age and life phase that danger from exposure to 
harm- advocating content online is at its highest.
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 We did not find statistically significant differences between those who 
reported using the Internet several times a day and those who use it more seldom. 
Yet users accessing harm- advocating sites reported using more ICT and social 
media services than those who did not (p < 0.001). Hence, it seems that those 
visiting harm- advocating sites tend to be more active users at least in terms 
of the range of different sites and services used (Keipi et al., 2015). This finding 
is generally in line with results presented in Chapters 4 and 5 above where we 
show how ICT activity is associated with online hate exposure and online 
victimisation.
 One of our more striking findings is, however, that both exposure to and vic-
timisation by online hate are very strongly associated with seeing harm- 
advocating online material. Visiting pro- self-injury, pro- suicide, pro- eating dis-
order and death sites is much more common among those who have also seen 
hateful or degrading writings or speech online that inappropriately attack certain 
groups of people or individuals. To a certain extent, this may be an expected 
finding due to overlap between these types of material online. Death sites, for 
example, could be considered hate sites. However, we also find very high figures 
among online hate victims. There is a notable difference here compared to those 
who have not had experience of personal victimisation (p < 0.001). For example, 
40 per cent of cyberhate victims had visited pro- self-injury sites, compared to 7 
per cent of those who were not victims.
 In Figure 6.6 we provide associations between exposure to harm- advocating 
online content and subjective wellbeing (SWB), similar to those provided in 
Chapter 5 on online victimisation. Our measures of SWB include happiness, satis-
faction in terms of economic condition, trust of other people and self- esteem. Here, 
we examine how exposure to harm- advocating online content is associated with 
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these. As we can see from the results, those who had visited harm advocating sites 
generally reported lower SWB on all of the measured degrees. Differences in 
exposed and unexposed groups were strong in terms of perceived happiness 
(p < 0.001). Users who had visited pro- self-injury, pro- suicide and pro- eating dis-
order sites also reported lower self- esteem consistently (p < 0.001). Those who had 
visited pro- suicide sites reported not only lower happiness (p < 0.001) and self- 
esteem (p < 0.001), but also lower economic satisfaction and trust.
6.5 The downward spiral of negative online behaviour
Our data show that many young people had visited harm- advocating sites online. 
Figures for seeing at least one type of harm- advocating online content were rel-
atively high, especially in the US (31 per cent), the UK (29 per cent) and Finland 
(28 per cent), but significantly lower in Germany (12 per cent). This difference 
between countries, which cannot be entirely explained by our data, is linked to 
various factors that potentially protect German youth from witnessing extreme 
online content. The same findings also underline that young Finnish online users 
are in fact a very close match to those from the US and UK.
 We were also able to show consistent background factors of exposure to 
harm- advocating sites. Not only are the youngest respondents the most vulner-
able group, they become even more so when they have moved away from the 
family home. Since current online behaviour is grounded in social interaction, 
such material may carry different implications for adolescents and young adults 
compared to traditional media exposure. As already noted in previous chapters, 
online risks are sometimes linked to potential problems faced in offline 
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Figure 6.6  Exposure to harm-advocating online content and its association with well-
being. Means (evaluated on a scale from 1 to 10).
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circumstances, and we should be especially concerned about those young people 
who lack the proper contacts in their offline lives. Some problems may be pre- 
existing, only to grow stronger eventually in the online setting.
 Although some young users have life- affirming goals when searching for 
harm- advocating material (Daine et al., 2013; Sueki & Eichenberg, 2012), the 
general impacts of accessing harm- advocating online material are negative 
(Sueki et al., 2014). We see this in our findings as well, though we have to bear 
in mind that our data are cross- sectional. Those who had visited harm- advocating 
sites reported consistently lower subjective wellbeing. It is therefore important 
to recognise the existence of harm- advocating and extreme online communities 
and the relative ease with which young people may encounter this material and 
the communities producing it.
 Online hate is a phenomenon tied closely to harm- advocating sites and com-
munities. Sometimes the link is very direct, as death content is very often hate 
content. This connection has become obvious, for instance in the case of hate 
propaganda by ISIS which has disseminated it to mainstream social media since 
2013. However, self- directed sites such as pro- self-injury and pro- suicide sites 
have links with online hate phenomena as well. In our data, these links are quite 
obvious, especially when analysing online hate victims, as 65 per cent of the 
online hate victims had visited harm- advocating websites.
 Slater and colleagues (2003) have demonstrated how exposure to very dis-
turbing online content can be conceptualised as a downward spiral. In other 
words, existing psychological problems may motivate some individuals to seek 
potentially harmful online material. Thus exposure to this material can further 
magnify the problems. Harm- advocating sites such as pro- suicide sites may also 
contribute to a form of tunnel vision where participants actively attempt to block 
out options to solve their problems (Harris, 2015). The downward spiral has 
been demonstrated in school shooter cases, where the perpetrator was originally 
faced with problems in the online context only to become fixated with revenge 
on others. However, aggressors have often been unable to find support for their 
plans in the offline setting, and this drives them to become tremendously active 
online in order to search for validation there (Oksanen, Nurmi, Vuori & Räsänen, 
2013; Oksanen et al., 2014; Sandberg, Oksanen, Berntzen & Kiilakoski, 2014).
 Harm- advocating online material is user- generated, easily accessible and seen 
by many young people. Since current online behaviour is grounded in social inter-
action, such material may carry different implications for young people compared 
to traditional media. It is therefore important to recognise the potential implica-
tions of harm- advocating and extreme online communities and the relative ease 
with which young people may encounter this material and the communities pro-
ducing it. This material can, and does, play a role in the lives and therefore well-
being of many. Furthermore, our main findings are also relevant to medical and 
healthcare practitioners working with adolescents and young adults. Professionals 
should be aware that when individuals with potential mental health problems go 
online, they are at heightened risk of encountering not only life- affirming social 
support but also communities that may foster anti- healthy behaviour.
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7 Social spheres of online hate
7.1 The changing social milieu
London attracts millions of tourists every year. A large number of visitors flock 
to the main attractions that the city has to offer. Among must- see sites are Big 
Ben, Trafalgar Square and the famous department store Harrods; visitors then 
head over to hopefully catch a glimpse of the royal family in either Buckingham 
Palace or Kensington Palace. Now, before doing so, many visitors tend to 
wander into Hyde Park, a tourist destination in its own right, in order take a 
well- earned rest after a morning of walking. Often, depending on the time of 
day, weary travellers may notice a small group of people in the corner of the 
park, near the Marble Arch underground station. It is here that tourists come 
across London’s famous Speakers’ Corner. Throughout its vast history, extend-
ing from the 1850s, Speakers’ Corner has been among the most famous venues 
for publicly expressing one’s views.
 With this rich history, much like other Speakers’ Corners in many other 
cities around the world, the public expression of an opinion or an ideology has 
been an important aspect of social life for a long time. Today, this phenom-
enon has risen to a scale never before seen. What began as a small corner 
beside a park or a small gathering at a coffee house has expanded exponen-
tially. Today, various social media serve as personalised “Speakers’ Corners”, 
with the potential to reach a global audience from the convenience of one’s 
Internet connection. This change of venue and the tools available has also 
meant major changes in the public, or social, sphere of opinion. The public 
sphere has traditionally been understood as a physical place where people 
gather to discuss and debate societal issues. Although places like Speakers’ 
Corner still exist, the value and power of the venue for which it was created 
have diminished a great deal. Rather, it has become more of a tourist attrac-
tion than a forum for facilitating actual debate. However, this does not mean 
that the public sphere no longer exists. Rather, it is alive and well, be it at 
coffee houses, bars, living rooms, street corners and anywhere people meet 
and socialise. The change far surpassing physical location, however, is that 
social media in the larger societal context have made participation possible at 
a wide scale beyond previous limitations of influence or social prestige. The 
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stage for public discourse and highly visible expression has grown to a 
massive scale and everyone, it seems, has been invited.
 As illustrated in the previous chapters, our findings have shown exposure to 
online hate to be a prominent part of the online experience globally, especially 
among those highly active online. In this chapter we examine the increasingly 
stratified role of hate in the everyday context in more detail, along with the 
potential implications that this type of development may have in the future. We 
also introduce new theoretical tools for examining negative behaviour in the 
online context, to better explain why hate has become, in many ways, a new 
norm in online discussions. As noted before, many of the existing theoretical 
frameworks are based on offline behaviour. It is therefore necessary to strengthen 
existing approaches by providing new tools to understand negative online 
behaviour. Here, this is done by updating understandings of the behaviour and 
risk environment given in past work by including factors central to the unique 
characteristics of the current online environment.
7.2  Internet and the stratification of hate
Over the past two decades or so, the social sphere of hate has been highly influ-
enced by the Internet. As already noted in previous chapters, hate- motivated 
groups were among the first to turn to the Internet in their efforts to get their 
message across. Instead of merely occupying a street corner and handing out 
flyers to occasional random strangers, the Internet has made it possible to expand 
the social sphere of any particular cause by connecting with other like- minded 
people. As a result, the social sphere of hate took its first steps towards greater 
stratification.
 Now, obviously the same transformation applies to a whole host of other 
ideologies and interests as well and not merely to those motivated by hate. The 
Internet and social media have created individualised platforms for all kinds of 
causes, thus in part also explaining why hate has become a somewhat common 
aspect of the everyday social sphere due to high levels of interaction, visibility 
and topical overlap. In other words, hate is in many ways just like any other 
cause or ideology relying on the online social platform, and this in part explains 
why it often blends into the everyday online narrative of so many.
 So what do we mean when we talk about the stratification of hate? Let us 
focus on this question for a moment. To start with, nature provides a helpful 
example in conceptualising this development. Just as trees comprise rings that 
add a new layer of growth every year, building on the foundation of past growth, 
so too hate has seen a new type of layer emerge every time technology experi-
ences a spike in development. The result is a stratification online hate, as seen in 
Figure 7.1.
 In concrete terms, the central and oldest layer is made up of traditional hate 
groups that are still active offline and online. These groups continue to maintain 
websites that inform their audience of their basic ideology, grant access to 
comment sections on news or related events, and provide information regarding 
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potential social gatherings, protests and so forth. These websites typically have 
only a handful of visitors and a relatively small following due to the necessity 
for audiences to search specifically for a particular site. The second layer com-
prises online hate communities, such as stormfront.org, which tend to be less 
structured at a strictly physically operational level while also being more active 
online. They tend to have a much larger following and a much more influential 
role among like- minded users, being more active in drawing in attracted parti-
cipants. Finally, in the third and newest layer are social media. Now, this is by 
far both the most visible sphere for hate and its expression and the least struc-
tured, as it is both highly platform- driven and user- driven. Here, a multitude of 
users are all granted a high level of visibility for expression relatively free from 
the management or restrictions of an enforcing community as can be the case 
with the other layers. As the scale of the layer grows, so too does influence, audi-
ence size, and the degree to which expression or group identity is unstructured.
 What is notable is that each of these stratified layers represents a different 
layer of the web societies we introduced in the first chapter, thus serving as an 
illustration of the evolving social spheres of hate. One of the effects brought 
about by the Internet is that the visibility of hate has increased significantly. This 
then begs the question: have people become more hateful in general, or is it 
merely a question of having a wider- reaching public outlet for hate that has 
always existed? The new channels of communication facilitated by the evolution 
of the Internet have resulted in a growth in highly polarised environments for 
general discussion and debate, due to a high level of access to like- minded others 
and groups accessible for targeting, combined with a visible platform from 
which expression can be given the desired level of identifiability and visibility.
 Often, discussions can result in stronger negative messages than was perhaps 
originally intended, as the communication environment available today for 
public expression of opinion can create a spiralling, almost vacuum- like, sphere 
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where rapid escalation is possible. Here, a moment of reactionary expression can 
grow into something much more damaging. It can start from something as small 
as a careless tweet, like Justine Sacco’s infamous “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t 
get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” This quickly stirred social media into a 
frenzy. This misstep eventually resulted in her losing her job while drowning in 
a sea of tens of thousands of hate- filled messages from strangers around the 
world. Justine Sacco claimed her tweet was intended as an ironic statement of 
the existing class differences between the Western world and developing nations 
rather than as a racist remark. Regardless of initial intent, the pace and scale of 
escalation in this example represent a new phenomenon of relatively small 
actions taking hold online and creating significant consequences. Context rarely 
counts for much when things get out of control in social media, whether in a 
positive or a negative sense. Now, it would be easy to argue that this is simply 
the fundamental nature of the pace of interaction that exists in social media. 
However, it is possible that the online setting takes certain behaviours that 
already exist offline to a higher level by providing a platform, access and even 
relative safety that may not be available otherwise.
7.3 Evolution of online hate
The wider societal environment is continually influenced by a host of different 
factors and world events. In particular, major global crises such as the economic 
crisis of 2008, which was followed by major challenges in the economic market 
and employment sector throughout the world, or the continuous conflict in the 
Middle East which has ultimately resulted in mass migration to many parts of 
Europe, are examples of events that influence the societal dialogue of a very 
large community. However, there are also more targeted events, such as terrorist 
attacks, that have a similar impact. A common denominator of many of these 
events is that they result in increasingly polarised dialogue and communication 
within social media online.
 Events such as the Arab Spring in 2010 have been highly influenced by the 
tools of the online setting, and even dubbed “the social media revolution” due to 
the relatively visible role of different social media tools. Here, Twitter was espe-
cially active in broadcasting what was happening on the ground. Although the 
role of social media in actually mobilising the Arab Spring demonstrations has 
perhaps been overstated, the Internet, and social media specifically, do have a 
highly influential role in providing a rapid and visible outlet for information, 
whether from conflict zones, for example during the annexation of Crimea by 
the Russian Federation in 2014, or in the 2016 presidential election campaign in 
the US. In addition to simply sharing information, various social media tools 
have a significant role in shaping attitudes and the expression of different opin-
ions and narratives. Now, the challenge of this combination of high levels of 
data and visibility is that, in many cases, the audience remains ignorant as to 
whether the content provided is actually accurate and factual as it is being pro-
duced quickly in massive quantities.
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 One thing that has become increasingly evident is that biases are prominent in 
the flow of information in terms of determining content, its dissemination rate 
and level of visibility. Much of the content disseminated on social media that 
ends up being consumed globally cannot necessarily be separated from the 
views, background and experiences of the content producer due to the lack of an 
external filtering process. This freedom to express without external account-
ability can result in a cycle that entrenches personal viewpoints without a process 
of contrast involving perhaps beneficial counterpoints. This helps to explain the 
polarising communication environment where users insist on strengthening 
already held views during interaction or content production. Where the chances 
of encountering other points of view are limited, so too may be the potential for 
personal growth and development in processing information and other self- 
motivating content.
7.4 The online user experience and expression of hate
The social environment visible today in the global context in terms of social 
unrest and aggression tends to be mirrored increasingly in the online world. The 
online platforms available to all users, from those seeking different sources of 
entertainment to those motivated to target certain people or groups, are remark-
ably diverse. The tools available there can be used to hide one’s identity or to 
make it known to the world. The experience can be tailored by individual prefer-
ence in ways that were impossible only a few years ago. Unsurprisingly, this 
level of flexibility can be used for both harmful and beneficial purposes depend-
ing on the user in question. But how did we get here? What are the most relevant 
components of the online user experience that illustrate the immense shifts in the 
development of the Internet as a platform for expression?
 Figure 7.2 illustrates the steps that the online experience has taken. There 
have been a series of shifts involving changes in focus but past structures have 
been maintained. The framework of the Internet builds upon itself, adding fea-
tures and interactive possibilities along with the various tools that can be used in 
new ways. Not long ago, the Internet was primarily a convenient library of 
information. It was a place to find content from the comfort of one’s home. This 
represented a revolutionary shift in access to content. Yet, looking back, the 
amount of content available then would be considered minuscule by any standard 
when compared to what we have today. The early years of Internet use were 
focused on this content retrieval. Consumption of this content was passive, as 
one rarely had the possibility of interacting with it or with other users for that 
matter. Back then, self- expression online was minimal as access to content cre-
ation was so limited.
 Today, having an online identity is as normal as having a mobile phone. This 
is especially true of younger generations, born after the late 1980s. Many ques-
tions related to individuals’ identities were different during the information web 
stage, with the online world being more clearly separated from the offline self. 
An online self was an irrelevant concept due to the lack of interactive tools or 
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the possibility of identity creation in the setting. The Internet was a place to visit, 
explore and learn. It was not a place to connect with others, whether for destruc-
tive purposes or otherwise. However, this was about to change and that change 
brought an incredible array of social tools.
 The emergence of the social web was also revolutionary, building on the 
previous content retrieval functions while boosted by the technical developments 
of social media platforms. This combination of the possibility of content creation 
and the ability to create an online persona opened the floodgates to online 
expression. Here, consumption shifted from passive to active. Users were no 
longer bound to rigid one- way content interaction, as content could now be mod-
ified and created through any number of social platforms. Feedback loops 
between users and content shifted into a faster gear, as reactions could now be 
expressed online. From Wikipedia and YouTube to Facebook and online 
interest- based communities, the social and expressional aspects of the Internet 
exploded.
 Social networking sites allowed users to seamlessly extend their offline rela-
tionships and selves online, though still separated by a screen. This shift created 
a new dynamic, namely an overlapping of the online and offline self. Visibility 
online can carry significant risks, as one’s identifiable characteristics can be tar-
geted by others, whether known or strangers. As covered in previous chapters, 
the most common targets of online hate have to do with physical appearance, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity and religious background. If users present them-
selves with identifying characteristics online, they may potentially experience 
hate due to the visibility of those online personas in social media, for example. 
The global nature of the platform combined with heightened ease of access to 
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Figure 7.2 The evolution of online user experience.
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others has proved damaging to many users cross- nationally. Added to this, the 
platforms in question here do not require users to prove their identities. As such, 
the creation of an online self could be an exaggerated version of the self in any 
number of ways while aggressors are also protected from accountability. Appear-
ance, personal history, expressed interests and personality can now all be modi-
fied for the first time in a setting where others cannot be sure of their accuracy in 
the offline setting. This ability to customise self- presentation and one’s inter-
active network can be used for both positive and destructive goals. Increased 
access to others, the ability to create an alternate persona through a profile or 
username and the capacity for seeking out like- minded users from all over the 
world have created a user- generated content market on a scale never before seen 
and whose negative effects have been felt globally in terms of targeted hate 
content.
 Gradual shifts in both technology and online platforms available have since 
begun to take these developments of the social web even further. We have 
moved towards an integration of online and offline, where connection does not 
necessarily end but rather is modified into various modes of online self. Here 
online self and offline self, as identifying terms, become less relevant as the 
overlap between them grows. Furthermore, content creation is continual to a 
global audience. Expression can be effectively targeted and visibility can be 
heightened through numerous global content channels. Making a comfortable 
living from starting a video blog channel on YouTube would have been a strange 
concept just ten years ago. The market for content is accelerating towards satura-
tion; the ease of access and the availability of interactive partners giving feed-
back concerning content have changed the way media are consumed and 
delivered.
 A process began whereby the online experience was tailored to the individual 
user, instead of the other way around. Google, YouTube and a great host of other 
service providers work to ensure that advertising, entertainment content and 
search results match our past browsing and consumption patterns. The online 
environment has begun adapting itself to the needs, desires and past preferences 
of users in terms of content offered to meet the individual in the online setting. 
This is a case of developing bubbles of influence around our preferences in order 
to provide a more enjoyable experience online. However, with positive cycles 
comes the possibility of negative cycles as well. Those seeking validation for 
destructive causes and intentions will find it online, and the online environment 
can in turn reinforce these consumption patterns to match user preference.
 This evolution of the Internet has been one of significant change in terms of 
expression and scope of influence. We are at the point where personal views can 
be expressed to a global audience with a minimal filtering process. There are of 
course amazing benefits to such freedom of expression, but also serious costs. 
These costs, or risks, of the tools offered by the online setting when combined 
with users seeking to cause targeted harm, are enabled by the ease of content 
creation, the convenience of reaching a massive global audience and the poten-
tial to limit one’s identifiability throughout the process. These three components 
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of methods, scope and control of visibility are central to the creation of a useful 
model of the online hate dynamics prevalent today.
7.5 New theoretical tools for examining online hate
The online setting and expression within it function on the same principles as 
have been apparent in the offline setting for decades. The individual does not 
become someone entirely different when consuming and creating online content, 
despite significant variations in access to others, customisable self- presentation 
and high content availability. The Internet is popular in large part for the inter-
action it makes available, namely access to like- minded others in search of vali-
dation and acceptance (Allen, Szwedo & Mikami, 2012; Davidson & 
Martelozzo, 2013). Furthermore, the Internet as an interactive setting has certain 
risk factors built into the way interaction takes place. Three primary frameworks 
were implemented to illustrate the relevant frames of reference in the study of 
identity, the online setting and risk thus far. These frameworks were Social Iden-
tity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the social identity model of deindi-
viduation effects (SIDE) (Lea & Spears, 1991) derived from that theory, and 
Lifestyle Exposure Theory (LET) (Hindelang, Gottfredson & Garofalo, 1978) 
and Routine Activity Theory (RAT) (Cohen & Felson, 1979), involving risk pat-
terns and environmental factors related to them.
 As was noted, portions of each framework are highly relevant to the online 
setting. In the case of social identity theory, group formation through shared 
identity characteristics and the need for validation are clearly present in the 
online setting where all manner of social support and shared- interest groups 
abound. There, group formation becomes easier than ever, as finding a specific 
shared ideology or interest is conveniently searchable. Furthermore, the identity 
group prototype, or the generalised and idealised member of a given group, can 
hold sway online as well as in the setting of a standard of behaviour or attitude 
while also enhancing the strength of group bonds. Online, users have access to 
all manner of identity prototypes including details of their lives and ideologies. 
From sports, film and music stars to war heroes, politicians and founders of hate 
movements – everyone can find something that they would like to be inspired 
by, matching their intent with like- minded behaviour personified by prototypical 
examples.
 The phenomenon of depersonalisation is particularly relevant in the online 
setting in terms of identity theory. Creation of an identity group involves a 
process of perspective management where thinking moves from the individual 
self to the group self. In other words, when interacting online, users are more 
likely to represent a viewpoint or preferred characteristic. Here, individual com-
plexity is abandoned in favour of self- stereotyping to act as a representative of 
group norms, a process often strengthened by the example of an identity proto-
type. This framework helps to explain the intense and often aggressive interac-
tions involving race, politics or religion, for example, that take place in the 
comment sections of cat videos and entertainment news articles. Online, 
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entrenched views seem to clash more aggressively and escalate more quickly 
than is typical offline. There is an environmental factor built into the online 
setting that helps to account for this.
 These phenomena are active in all group identity formation situations as pre-
sented by social identity theory, but the SIDE model takes the discussion further 
by showing that the online setting provides an additional characteristic that may 
intensify the effect of depersonalisation. As the online setting involves a lower 
level of social presence, both identifiability and visibility can be altered. Online, 
a user can choose how easily he or she can be identified in addition to how 
visible he or she is physically. This carries significant effects in three primary 
areas, namely expression, self- presentation and exploration. In terms of expres-
sion, lessened social presence can encourage higher levels of disclosure and 
overall interaction (see, for example, Ferriter, 1993). This phenomenon is height-
ened online where visibility and identifiability can be controlled. Being physic-
ally removed from the interaction encourages users to say and do more in the 
online setting, opening up fuller communication. This tendency holds even in 
cases where interacting partners are already known to one another and thus 
easily identifiable (Joinson, 2001; Keipi & Oksanen, 2014).
 In terms of controlling identifiability, the ability to hide oneself online can 
encourage more openness due to the potential for remaining unknown to the 
interacting partner. This social invisibility can encourage users to express things 
they would otherwise be afraid to, as any judgement received will not be traced 
back to them offline. Online, users can express identity characteristics in ways 
relatively free from external norms and constraints as group norm enforcement 
is diminished in certain environments. Here, tough guys can enjoy modes of 
entertainment that would be mocked if their identity group peers were aware of 
them; members of political groupings can explore topics and discussions likely 
to be hindered by offline relationships (Keipi & Oksanen, 2014). This relative 
freedom from external constraints can of course be highly beneficial to both 
social development and identity reinforcement. However, the opposite may also 
be the case. Users harbouring latent racism or xenophobia, for example, may 
strengthen those views online by seeking out settings in which to produce tar-
geted content without fear of being found out.
 A second aspect of exploration is that of customising oneself in order to gain 
acceptance online. The online setting, combined with some level of lessened 
social presence, allows users to customise the way they are perceived. Namely, 
users can create profiles, avatars and usernames that reflect a desired version of 
the self that is more attractive to a sought- after group. Due to the possibility of 
customising one’s online self, the process of seeking validation from certain 
identity groups can be accelerated, especially when users are knowledgeable 
about group norms and identity prototype characteristics. Profiles, interests, 
attitudes and appearance can all be presented in a way that users feel would 
be most attractive to a desired identity group, thus assisting in the pursuit of 
group validation and acceptance (Anderson, Fagan, Woodnutt & Chamorro- 
Premuzic, 2012; Chew, LaRose, Steinfield & Velasquez, 2011). This customised 
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self- presentation facilitated by lessened social presence online allows for identity 
exploration that would otherwise be practically impossible. Online, gender roles, 
identity group affiliations, cultural attitudes, political views and all aspects of per-
sonal history and reputation can be manipulated or simply created in whatever 
way users want. This change of identity is something unique to the online setting 
where certain versions of the self can be explored through interaction and result-
ing reactions in order to form a more complete picture of one’s identity. Online, 
playing devil’s advocate is convenient and even easy. Exploring what it might be 
like to be of a different gender, sexual preference or religious tradition can have 
profound effects on users who are able to experience some small portion of those 
identities in the online setting while also gaining desired support in the process.
 These group identity dynamics and enhancements made possible in the online 
setting also apply for harmful communities. Hate online can be aggressive and 
identities tied to its forms can grow and even thrive where validation and group 
culture are actively maintained. As the Internet has developed into the social and 
expressional matrix it now is, so too has the creation of hate material and the 
formation of hate groups. Early on, hate material was indeed available to users 
in lesser quantities. Information can be dangerous in motivating aggression 
through, for example, making targets identifiable or providing group validation 
for destructive action. The scope of both access and content online allows for an 
interactive stage that can magnify these processes. Not only is that same 
information available in greater quantities with easier access, social reinforce-
ment of its norms abound, in addition to the availability of active identity proto-
types and similar social groups. Message boards, video content, social 
networking events and all manner of fan pages continually add to the damaging 
content and identity conceptions adopted by users seeking these characteristics 
and attitudes. The online environment has thus evolved into a place where risk is 
prevalent and threat prevention is difficult.
7.6 The interaction between aggressors and targets online
We can find examples of practically every type of person, interest and perception 
online. Often, those most visible are those most aggressive in giving expression 
that causes controversy or damage. These high- impact interactions occur con-
tinually in many ways online where targets of hate or other discrimination are 
easily accessible. When we think about a risky situation where an aggressor 
targets a potential victim, three primary components come into play in terms of 
how likely victimisation is to occur according to both LET and RAT, with the 
focus here on the latter. First, how easily can a victim be accessed by the aggres-
sor? If an individual is seeking a certain target for harassment or other abuse, a 
low cost of entry into that interaction will motivate that negative action. Second, 
how motivated is the offender? A number of factors play into the decision to 
cause harm that is easier to do online. Third, how well is the potential victim 
protected from harm? Good protection is more difficult to bypass and therefore 
diminishes the likelihood of damaging action.
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 Past theories have analysed these components in the offline setting in order to 
assess experiences of victimisation in daily life (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Hinde-
lang et al., 1978; Miethe & Meier, 1990; Reyns, Henson & Fisher, 2011). 
However, as we have seen, the social setting available online is vastly different 
from the offline setting in a number of significant ways: ways that can make 
aggression easier and therefore more likely, for example in terms of cyber-
bullying, malware attacks, identity theft and other forms of victimisation (e.g. 
Holt & Bossler, 2009; Holt, Bossler, Malinski & May, 2016; Kigerl, 2011; Leuk-
feldt & Yar, 2016; Näsi, Oksanen, Keipi & Räsänen, 2015; Pratt, Holtfreter & 
Reisig, 2010). Figure 7.3 provides a comparison of key areas relating to how this 
aggressor–victim dynamic has evolved through the tools available online. 
However, there exists little unifying theory on how the risk environment has 
changed given the unique characteristics of the online setting and so a great deal 
of room for interpretation exists.
 In the offline setting where most human interaction has taken place histori-
cally, reaching a suitable target carries a relatively high cost, which is made up 
of a number of factors. First, the offender is physically present. Voice and 
appearance are easily identified by the victim or by other witnesses of the inter-
action or attack. Therefore offender and victim converge in the same place at the 
same time. Second, in the offline setting, physical interaction brings the potential 
for physical protection by witnesses or other environmental factors. The inter-
action, occurring in a physical space, may be witnessed by unexpected sources 
of assistance. Furthermore, the likelihood of abuse may be apparent before the 
incident occurs, judged by situational awareness, physical surroundings and sus-
picious behaviour. There is the potential for many cues to be leveraged as 
warning signs by the suspecting victim. The offender makes decisions based on 
Offline setting Web 2.0 setting Web 3.0 setting
High cost to reach
suitable target 
Highly visible motivated offender 
High likelihood of
complete guardianship 
Low access to idealised hate
identity group prototype
 
Low externally driven identity
reinforcement 
Low cost to reach
suitable target
Moderately visible motivated offender 
Moderate likelihood of complete
guardianship 
Improved access to hate
identity group prototype
 
Moderate externally driven
identity reinforcement  
Low cost to reach many
suitable targets 
Less visible motivated offender 
Low likelihood of complete
guardianship 
Easy access to hate identity
group prototype
 
High externally driven
identity reinforcement  
Figure 7.3 The online routine activity risk spectrum.
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the various characteristics of a potential victim and the situation itself, while 
environmental characteristics also play a role. Is the goal of the targeting valu-
able? How able is the target to put up an effective defence or to deter harmful 
action? How accessible is the target to the offender and how easily can they be 
noticed? Finally, how accessible is an escape route for the offender? These ques-
tions are central to the determination of aggressor action.
 From the point of view of an aggressor, a lessening of these costs of the 
desired damaging behaviour makes the negative expression more likely. In the 
online setting, the physical nature of abuse is lessened due to the lack of physical 
interaction as a whole. This benefits the online aggressor. However, expression 
and communication are still very much alive and well online, enhanced to a 
degree impossible offline, and their damaging effects should not be underesti-
mated. Low cost of entry into abuse can widen the scope of negative action sig-
nificantly. Online abuse is thus an immense problem whose mechanisms are well 
known yet lack a complementary theoretical model to explain them. This is the 
starting point for the potential risks enabled by the online medium of interaction.
 Here, the costs of reaching a suitable target are minimal as the entire global 
web is accessible from one’s location. Furthermore, the available tools for self- 
presentation and identity creation can be used to minimise one’s identifiability 
and visibility. This lessening of accountability can be leveraged to motivate 
action that might otherwise be avoided due to external pressure or the effect on 
reputation (Keipi & Oksanen, 2014). If an individual has decided to seek out a 
target only if identifiability can be prevented, the online setting is ideal as it 
eliminates both concerns. Online, users can display themselves as they wish in 
order to interact with any number of known or unknown persons.
 When it comes to preventing victimisation, certain precautions can be taken 
online and offline. Offline, as mentioned, the physical nature of an offence may 
provide warning as to the likelihood of aggression may be. Online, however, 
cues are often unavailable due to the nature of interaction there. Furthermore, the 
nature of content online is different from in the offline world. Users can create 
all manner of offensive and otherwise damaging material in the form of texts, 
videos and images that can be posted and shared throughout all avenues of social 
media. Exposure to this material is difficult to prevent if users spend any signi-
ficant amount of time browsing online and interacting in spaces considered safe, 
as was reflected in the findings of previous chapters in terms of the high rate of 
hate targeting and content exposure. This potential for accidental exposure is a 
phenomenon that has really taken off in the online setting. In these cases, the ori-
ginal creator of content may or may not have had a specific target in mind. 
Whatever the original intent, the exposure of the damaging content can expand 
well beyond the social circles for which it was meant. As such, the level of 
damage from material may be best measured not by the intensity of the intent 
behind its creation but by the mechanisms by which it is spread and shared. This 
raises an interesting aspect of the online environment: namely, the like- minded 
advocates who are ready and willing to spread damaging targeted material 
without being asked to do so by the creator. Access to others sharing similar 
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hatreds or negative perceptions online is readily available and so the potential 
for widespread help in disseminating the sentiment is also there.
 Finally, the structural components of the online setting are most effective in 
modelling behaviour when they are matched to characteristics of interaction that 
we all share, namely social identity. Validation, acceptance, developing a sense 
of self and expressing sentiments are significant components of our functioning 
in a social identity space (Abrams & Hogg, 2004; Jenkins, 2004; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Thoits, Virshup, Lauren & Ashmore, 1997). All of this is also true 
of those active in targeted hate. Hate groups, focused communities, previously 
published material and personally created material are all accommodated by 
various forms of social media available today. Not only are the aforementioned 
identity prototypes for various identity groups readily available for study and 
inspiration, but the environment itself can actively reinforce the damaging per-
ceptions of hate. Both aggressors and victims associate themselves with certain 
social identities, from certain music styles to political affiliations and religious 
practices. This is all done through individual motivation. But with development 
comes change, often through contrasting views and perspectives. However, this 
change may be prevented and damaging perspectives reinforced if the social 
setting is tailored to cater to individuals’ current interests and past preferences. 
Here, individuals and groups they associate with can become immersed in self- 
reinforcing cycles online.
 Notably, as has been stressed throughout, the online social setting is global 
and as such many characteristics and dynamics of interaction are shared. 
However, the application and outcome of theory and modelling of these issues 
will naturally have different implications in different countries and cultural con-
texts. Here, we focus on what we consider universal characteristics whose more 
specific dynamics may differ depending on the individuals in question. As such, 
the frameworks of social identity online including implications of validation, 
depersonalisation, self- presentation, visibility and identifiability, in addition to 
risk factors of accessibility to others, potential for minimising accountability and 
capacity for defence against offenders are considered broadly applicable. Indeed, 
how and to what extent these components play out in the online context can vary 
a great deal.
7.7 Identity Bubble Reinforcement model (IBR model)
As we have noted above, we can use some of the existing theoretical frameworks 
applied generally in the offline context to try to understand hate in the online 
context as well. However, it is also evident due to recent developments in the 
online setting that a deeper understanding of the Internet and the interactions it 
facilitates would benefit from a lens calibrated for these new phenomena. One 
such lens that focuses on how the online environment can affect the individual 
user is what call as the Identity Bubble Reinforcement model (IBR model).
 At the core of this new IBR model are mechanisms of exposure to online 
content and identity dynamics. In order to understand better what we mean by 
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this we need to return to the beginning of this book. In the first chapter, we pro-
vided an overview of how the modern- day online information, or network, 
society, came to be. New markets have emerged, resulting in massive leveraging 
of information. The key revenue model of online giants such as Google and 
Facebook allows them to provide targeted ads based on users’ online behaviour. 
This type of business logic is based on the fact that companies such as Google 
and Facebook actively collect data on each Internet user’s online behaviour, 
including their particular interests, purchasing habits, specific content search pat-
terns, news provider preferences, categories of information interests, interacting 
partners, timeframes of high interaction, and so forth. What these companies are 
essentially doing is creating a consumption- based profile of each individual 
using their services. Based on this profile, users can be targeted with content that 
they may be interested in. From a sociological and social psychological per-
spective, a customised environment of this sort carries interesting implications in 
terms of how individuals develop socially.
 There are a number of different factors that contribute to the popularity of 
various social media platforms. On the one hand there is the chance to com-
municate and share important aspects of one’s life with others, while on the 
other hand social media provide useful tools for both social identity reflection 
and construction. From a theoretical perspective, our interest is focused on these 
social identity dynamics. By liking certain content or posting certain pictures, 
users promote a certain version of the self that is in the process of being 
developed or is already complete and ready to be presented to the online world 
as they see fit. Now, this social identity construction is a two- way street. Users 
are commonly influenced by the different content that they come across online, 
which in part also influences their own social identity formation. Therefore, the 
social identity displayed by users online can be customised to a high degree 
depending on user motivations. The Internet is thus a highly controlled environ-
ment in terms of how one wishes to be perceived, enabling a much more con-
structed self- projection than is possible in offline situations.
 A carefully constructed picture of your Sunday morning breakfast, including 
a bowl filled with fresh berries, a power smoothie made from kale, kiwis and 
bananas, and a freshly brewed cup of coffee, portrays an image of healthy living. 
Posting a picture on one’s Instagram account displaying views from a Sunday 
afternoon run carries a similar message. Sharing a picture on a night out with 
friends projects a message of social connections and of living an exciting and 
fun life. From projecting health, popularity, success or any number of other 
desired characteristics, social media can be used to advertise aspects of the self 
in new ways. These are just a few examples of how easy it has become to 
manage our self- image through convenient control of how users are experienced 
by a social network. When users interact, post pictures or thoughts, add links and 
share interests, a process of creating a version of themselves online takes shape 
perhaps in the hope of validation and socially desirability. In many ways, social 
media provide tools for cataloguing ourselves, often with the purpose of express-
ing who we are and to ensure that others know the things about us that we have 
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chosen that they should know. This is an interesting dynamic, as it involves a 
high level of control over the perceptions of others and can be a powerful tool 
indeed, both for meeting personal needs and for enjoying the company of others 
with similar interests.
 We tend to like those who like us and who also like the same things as we do; 
no surprise there. But what about cases where growth and personal development 
are dependent on contrast and even conflict between viewpoints that do not 
agree? Do we, as individuals, always know what is best for us in terms of what 
we choose to connect with others over? This high level of managing one’s own 
networks is of course a great and healthy resource if we are making healthy deci-
sions in terms of how we connect and what interests we invest in.
 Many aspects of ourselves, or our social identities, are harmless or carry a 
positive effect in terms of our wellbeing. We enjoy interacting and sharing things 
that are important to us, from hobbies to relationships and professions to habits. 
But what happens in instances where an individual is driven to aggressively 
target certain people, groups or individuals? How we present ourselves online 
affects who is attracted to our persona there. Communities form around a shared 
vision, and if that vision is one of causing harm, a great deal of risk to others can 
result. Tendencies to racist views, for example, can grow from occasional 
thoughts to damaging action when destructive identities are reinforced through 
accepted norms and prototypical examples among respected group members. 
Specific targeting of certain groups was also prominent in our data, as character-
istics of ethnic background, religious belief and physical appearance were all 
leading points of contact at which hate was targeted by users of opposing iden-
tity groups.
 Furthermore, it should be noted that less socially acceptable attitudes and per-
ceptions tend to be difficult to develop offline where such communities tend not 
to advertise. However, those seeking to connect over racism or other hate- based 
attitudes online are provided with any number of ways to validate beliefs, interact 
over experiences or connect through specific types of communication that would 
otherwise be problematic. In addition, in this setting one need not hide behind a 
majority to motivate hateful content against a weaker minority, as safety can be 
created by limiting visibility or identifiability and achieving similar results. 
Online, the broader social context does not filter content or regulate behaviour to 
the same extent as offline. Rather, identity groups online can regulate themselves, 
with shared norms and attitudes on which those norms are based. Thus, online, 
the user can filter out everything but the specifically motivated target towards 
which he or she wishes to move. The way the Internet is structured in terms of 
social possibilities allows for a huge variety of unique and even unusual groups 
and affiliations to form. In a sense, it can cater to everyone in the way they wish 
to be catered to while also allowing users to be as regulated by group norms as 
they wish, resulting in complex identity affiliations and memberships. Notably, as 
a social landscape, the Internet may even be more diverse than what is available 
offline due to the acceptance of like- minded users into communities that might 
not dare meet in a setting where they might be identified.
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 All of these components of the mechanisms of the online environment, indi-
vidual expression, identity exploration and seeking social validation, come 
together in the IBR model, illustrated in Figure 7.4.
 Here, the external frames represent the scope of the online environment 
within which the user can seek out, create and consume content. This model is 
concerned with the consumption patterns and resulting development of the user 
specifically, though this does link to content creation itself as well. Here, the 
various shapes represent interests that resonate with the identity landscape of 
the user. The bubble within the frame is the individual, with the thickness of the 
bubble representing the strength of a social identity. In the left- hand frame, the 
individual user holds already prevalent identity characteristics and is thus motiv-
ated to seek out similar sources of reinforcing content or interactions online. 
Notably, a mix of identity characteristics is already present within the individual. 
As such, no user is completely defined as having one lone identity. Even the 
most intense members of certain groups can be sons, fathers, mothers, sports 
fans or musicians, holding any number of other identity group affiliations.
 As user- driven identity reinforcement or exploration takes place, the user 
represents a version of the self at the point of departure into this new interactive 
framework. Some may be more certain than others of who he or she is as a 
person. Some go out determined to strengthen who they already feel they are 
while others may be driven by the desire to find out what is out there to be 
explored. The validation component of social identity processes is central here, 
as expression in the online setting tends to heighten identity group characteristics 
as described by the SIDE model (Lea & Spears, 1995). Here, self- stereotyping 
User identity-driven consumption
Environmental reaction:
identity bubble reinforcement
Figure 7.4 The Identity Bubble Reinforcement (IBR) model.
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from the aforementioned depersonalisation can motivate an intensified process 
of classifying oneself according to the contrasting material and interactions one 
faces. Furthermore, exploring online in order to connect on a certain identity 
may strengthen that identity through access to various identity prototypes on 
whom behaviour can be modelled.
 All of this has to do with patterns of online consumption driven by the rein-
forcing desires of the users themselves, each with unique motivations and needs. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the Internet today is more active than before. In 
the right- hand frame of the model the environment itself responds to the con-
sumption patterns registered by users. This adaptation in how the Internet func-
tions has significant implications in terms of how identity is reinforced. If the 
environment responds to the behaviours linked to who we were while seeking 
certain things in the past by providing more of the same, how is development 
affected? The fainter bubble in the right- hand frame represents how access to 
online content is adjusted. It is not that other content is impossible to reach, but 
rather that the various mechanisms inherent in popular online platforms begin to 
filter content according to what the user is likely to prefer based on past 
behaviour. This creates an interesting identity development environment where 
the users’ original intentions are, perhaps unknowingly, reinforced externally 
accentuate the identified affiliation. This strengthening is represented in the 
model with the thickening of the bubble as consumption patterns continue to be 
reinforced by both the individual and the environment itself.
 This inherently structured mechanism of reinforcing past behaviours online 
limits access to contrasting and other points of view that might contradict con-
sumption patterns of the past, often without the knowledge of the users themselves. 
This can be particularly convenient in terms of matching advertising and search 
results to things one enjoys. A tailored profile on which the online environment 
reacts to projected needs may be a good thing. However, socially damaging iden-
tity group affiliations and resulting behaviours are a different matter. Here, both 
the individual and the environment work together to reinforce negative concep-
tions. Reinforcement of online hate is particularly concerning due to the height-
ened potential for the effective dissemination of those sentiments.
 Furthermore, the issue of cognitive bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) comes 
into play in an environment that tailors itself to the user in question. Here, cogni-
tive bias refers to reinforcing patterns of norms or decision- making that move 
one away from a previous reasonable standard. As the online environment 
adjusts to the user, cognitive bias, or the subjective social reality of the user, can 
be enhanced further than might otherwise be possible. As input is fed to the user 
according to his or her points of view, the benefits of objective contrast become 
less likely. This can take various forms, from an ambiguity effect where certain 
possibilities are avoided due to lack of information through environmental filter-
ing (Frisch & Baron, 1988), to excessive anchoring, or relying too strongly on a 
limited set of information in decision- making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). 
Furthermore, in the identity group setting, an availability cascade can occur, 
where shared attitudes or beliefs come to seem increasingly reasonable through 
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shared repetition of norms, for example (Hasher, Goldstein & Toppino, 1977). 
This strengthening of biases by an environment can lead to both relational and 
individual damage as perception and decision- making move from being rational 
and balanced to being subjective and self- reinforcing in any number of ways. 
Online, active users are more likely to navigate within already established envir-
onmentally designated profiles based on past habits, representing a new frontier 
of bias creation and reinforcement. Although the environmental adjustment to 
user preference does not cause behaviour, it can certainly affect cycles of con-
sumption and the motivations behind them.
 Those seeking community, expression or simply information may be in a vul-
nerable state where content and interaction have a significant motivating effect 
whether in positive or negative terms. As users navigate the online setting, some 
are already motivated to target certain people or groups while others are more 
interested in seeking validation or identity development of some sort. However, 
in an environment that reinforces early inputs made by users there exists a 
unique risk. Namely, there exists the risk of reinforcing an identity bubble that is 
motivated by some level of user ignorance. Such a bubble can help to pave the 
way towards further negative behaviour that would have been less likely had the 
user continued to navigate without an environmental reaction to early patterns. 
For example, in the case of pro- anorexia content, a user seeking validation for 
negative processes has convenient access to like- minded others online. Groups 
encouraging unhealthy decisions reinforce patterns in the user that may have just 
begun to take root. As patterns of online input are repeated, the users’ online 
behavioural profile takes shape to accommodate those preferences. Here, 
pro- anorexia communities become even more easily accessible online, with 
positive feedback affecting the continuation of a negative cycle in the user 
(Oksanen et al., 2015).
 So how do all of these components, from online interactive tools to environ-
mental reactions to those interactions, in addition to social identity theory com-
bined with lifestyle and routine activity risks, fit together with the central theme 
of online hate? All of these components come together in the individual. The 
need for validation and development of a stronger self- concept for identity for-
mation drives users to seek out meaning and fulfilment in many ways, especially 
in the online setting. Many espouse hateful attitudes and perspectives, and there-
fore seek like- minded groups and content creators with whom to bond or find 
inspiration. Prototypical idols of various movements are easily accessible, in 
addition to the countless harmful actions taken by others with whom users may 
feel bonded. The social tools of customised self- presentation by way of tailored 
visibility or identifiability can also be leveraged to gain a higher level of accept-
ance than might otherwise be possible. Here, social needs and an enabling of 
self- fulfilment overlap with hate networks, leading to an enhancement of tools 
for identity development in terms of hate. Furthermore, ease of access to expres-
sional platforms combined with a global audience can motivate further activity.
 In targeting others with hate content, the cost/benefit calculation in the online 
setting is different from the offline one. Online, the value of action taken can be 
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maximised due to the ease of access to many potential suitable targets, the ability to 
control visibility and identifiability, and the high level of produced content exposure 
combined with a minimal capacity for prevention or defence by victims, and finally 
the possibility to quickly escape accountability for one’s targeting activity. As such, 
the setting online is well suited to the effective production and dissemination of hate 
content, while also lacking mechanisms to filter out damaging material whose expo-
sure negatively affects the wellbeing of a global audience.
 All of these dynamics are real factors for content producers and their victims in 
an environment whose immensely valuable tools for communication, expression 
and connectedness can be used for harmful purposes. But, as discussed, the environ-
ment itself also reacts to actions taken by its users. Thus, reinforcement of user pref-
erences is accentuated not only by sophisticated technological tools but also by the 
behavioural trends interpreted by the environment itself. In terms of hate, this two- 
pronged reinforcement can operate by both enabling action and limiting exposure to 
contrasting views, potentially increasingly damaging behavioural cycles.
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8 Transformation of social 
networks and interactions
8.1 Information, anonymity and social networks
Four primary elements make up the core of online societies, namely information, 
anonymity, social networks and entertainment. For the purpose of this book, 
entertainment is perhaps slightly less relevant and so it is not included here. On 
the other hand, we argue that information, anonymity and social networks 
provide a valuable basis for understanding why hate has become such an influ-
ential and visible element in modern- day society.
 The original premise of the Internet and its predecessors, such as the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), was to provide a 
means and platform for faster and more convenient information exchange. The 
emphasis here was mainly on scientific or military purposes. Thinking back to 
this early phase of the Internet, it is difficult to imagine a computer scientist then 
having the faintest idea of the immense evolution that technologies would enable 
in the decades to come. The notion of freely shared information on the Internet 
is really a reflection of the core premise of the sciences in general. Sharing of 
information is important not only for its potential societal impact; it is also an 
important part of the validation process for testing any potential findings. There-
fore the creation of a network, such as the early Internet, was done largely for 
the purposes of making this type of interaction more efficient.
 However, the notion of free sharing and exchange of information has not been 
limited to the earlier versions of the Internet; rather it has become the core prin-
ciple of what the Internet, even after its commercialisation, stands for. Sir Tim 
Berners- Lee, generally considered the father of the modern Internet, has often 
noted that the free exchange of information is the core value of the Internet, and 
that this core value should not be compromised (e.g. Mullin, 2012). However, 
while this is in many respects a desirable ideology, as the commercialisation of 
the Internet has continued to progress and billions of people have been intro-
duced as users, it is not particularly surprising that significant challenges have 
also emerged. From the perspective of information, the printed media have faced 
major problems due to declining readership since the turn of the millennium. 
New technology tends to displace previous avenues for products and services. 
The information available online is in many respects free of charge, directly 
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competing with physical media that require a fee from consumers. This new 
marketplace for information and interaction online has created an immense 
number of platforms from which to choose, within which both the benefits and 
costs of the online setting play out daily.
 Besides online content and access being free or significantly less expensive 
than offline alternatives, the Internet has long been synonymous with anonymity 
in various forms. Usernames, fake profiles and pseudonyms are all notable parts 
of online interaction with varying degrees of visibility or identifiability. The 
purpose of these veiled identities, sometimes varying a great deal from one’s 
more publicly known persona, can be to provide a type of self whose public per-
ception is more manageable. Online anonymity has affected social dynamics by 
allowing relative freedom from accountability while also encouraging high 
levels of disclosure and expression without social pressures that might otherwise 
be present. Some norms are thus less prominent online, where damaging or reac-
tionary behaviours are less subject to control. This new social sphere where rules 
can be bent through lessened control has also resulted in a mentality that treats 
online victimisation or targeted hate as less concrete or physical and therefore 
less significant than offline parallels.
 The boundaries between what is considered online and offline have become 
increasingly transparent with the advent of wide- scale social media and their 
continuous consumption. Yet, despite this increasing overlap and combining of 
the online with the offline, it often seems that the old perception of separation 
remains, as online abuse tends to be considered less serious an issue than offline 
abuse. One of the reasons for this may be the fact that social control is to an 
extent less feasible and therefore less evident in the online context. Research has 
also found, for instance, that lack of eye contact was related to uninhibited and 
negative behaviour in the online context (Lapidot- Lefler & Barak, 2012). This 
means that physical presence and identifiability are influential as enforcers of 
both social interaction and norm control. Indeed, what has come as a bit of a sur-
prise is the fact that even though most social media users interact through their 
personal profiles, the expected moderating effect of using one’s real name and 
identifiable profile has not been observed. Countless users continue to harass, 
insult and target others even while online using identities tied to their real names. 
Thus, even in the absence of anonymity lessened visibility in terms of live phys-
ical presence seems to be linked to more extreme levels of expression and dis-
closure. As such, disguise through anonymity is not a prerequisite to motivating 
polarising behaviours, although anonymity does seem to make it easier to be 
harsh and even offensive when those at the receiving end of the message are not 
actually physically present.
 The modern Internet serves as a platform for a countless number of different 
social networks. Much as in one’s “real life”, there are different layers to online 
social networks, some more closely knit than others. Social media have been 
particularly helpful in making these networks relatively concrete and visible 
through various linked profiles, with the possibility to socially compare and cat-
egorise Facebook friends or Twitter followers, for example. Relational intimacy 
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can be managed with an effectiveness not possible before as social interaction 
and relationships can be categorised online, and what content, interactions and 
aspects of the self are visible to different groups can be controlled. In the case of 
Facebook, for instance, public interactions can be visible to all friends, while 
capabilities are also available that allow more private connections to take place 
among a far more limited audience or one on one. As such, one’s social life can 
be visualised and continually updated through the tools provided by social 
media.
 There are also networks that are less concrete and only intersect occasionally. 
These include interactions stemming from commenting on a particular online 
news article, media post or video on platforms such as YouTube. Interacting 
users may not have had any previous connections outside this instance, but they 
are still linked together through their online actions. Often, these short- term 
interactions evoke the most extreme behaviour, as can be attested by reading any 
number of comment sections under otherwise reasonable news stories, personal 
content posts or videos. Furthermore, although most personal social networks 
tend traditionally to be based first and foremost on offline connections, the Inter-
net has substantially broadened the scale of social interactions. In the offline 
context, interaction among the different social networks generally means at least 
some level of active participation.
 However, it is possible to follow a number of different networks from a relat-
ively passive perspective within the online context. That is, one does not neces-
sarily need to engage in actual discussion in order to follow them. Here, we can 
be connected without being social, lurking and keeping track of who is doing 
what, whether close friends or merely acquaintances. All the while, users can 
maintain a high degree of control over how they are perceived through managing 
online profiles according to personal preferences. As a whole, social media 
provide an avenue for reinforcing strong relationships already existing offline, 
creating new ones online or exploring social opportunities through common 
interests that may not result in any meaningful relationship. This efficiency in 
interaction and effectiveness in managing and discovering networks offer a new 
level of both social and identity group development, validation seeking and 
desired interaction.
8.2 Bubbles and interaction challenges
One of the concepts that stems from research regarding these evolving social 
networks in the online context is that of bubbles. We briefly discussed some of 
the basic notions of bubbles in the first chapter of this book, before introducing 
the Identity Bubble Reinforcement (IBR) model in Chapter 7 in a discussion of 
social identity development online. In a broader sense, the notion of different 
online bubbles can be used to illustrate the nature of social interaction in general. 
Robert Putnam, in his well- known work Bowling alone: America’s declining 
social capital (1995), discusses a similar major social shift in the context of 
bowling. The premise of Putnam’s argument is that people have gradually 
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become less engaged in wider social and societal interaction and have instead 
delved deeper into individualised social space, resulting in a decline in tradi-
tional social networks.
 The online era has subsequently further extended the process of changing 
social interactions. While Putnam studied diminishing social connections and 
societal activity in the light of social evolution, it is evident that social media 
and their developmental consequences in terms of social networks have had the 
opposite effect, as they facilitate social connectivity at a potential scale imposs-
ible offline. This partial transition from offline to online social interaction is at 
the core of the current changing social landscape. Non- core social connections, 
such as those beyond family and close friends, are now occurring more in the 
online space, rather than through offline avenues. By following one’s Facebook 
newsfeed, all manner of detail is immediately available concerning the lives of 
the social network, each relationship consisting of varying degrees of closeness 
yet with similar levels of disclosure and exposure to daily occurrences. Whether 
old school friends, distant relatives or former colleagues, even distant acquaint-
ances are within reach and potentially part of one’s daily online life despite not 
having a prioritised role in the life of the social media user in question. On the 
other hand, new social connections constantly emerge as a result of one’s online 
activity. This has also meant that social connections have become more tailor- 
made. For many, less socially present methods of interaction may be preferred, 
in part because they tend to involve less social pressure and are based on indi-
viduals’ preferences and schedules. This type of social connection and inter-
action has become highly manageable online, depending on the disposition and 
desires of the interacting partners. This development of access and exposure to 
others has also changed many new social connections from being determined by 
physical proximity to being based on shared interests.
 Online bubbles function to reinforce one’s identity by positively affecting 
preferences and motivations that users display and express. It is important to 
note that this process is not necessarily a bad thing. Clearly, personalised content 
and connections as such do not automatically result in negative behaviour. 
Rather, in many cases the opposite is true. However, problems tend to lie in 
topics that are more emotionally charged in the general societal context, as they 
have a tendency to result in polarising behaviour in the online setting. This, in 
part, has resulted in a present- day social landscape where many traditional social 
cues have been replaced by aggravated interactions between both individuals and 
larger social collectives through various facets of social media.
 Problems associated with aggravated and even hateful social interactions in 
the online context have been foregrounded as a notable social issue. What used 
to be considered a minor negative side- effect of online navigation has now been 
identified as an illness of its own due to its widespread nature. For instance, the 
European Commission has recently taken a strong stance against online hate 
speech and content (European Commission, 2016). The Commission’s intention 
is to make social media companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and 
YouTube, process complaints regarding hateful content within twenty- four 
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hours. These companies are not only required to act according to their internal 
policies regarding hate content, but they must also take into consideration 
national- level legal frameworks. Furthermore, companies are also required to 
train their staff to counter hate speech and hate content (European Commission, 
2016). Indeed, it seems that anti- social behaviour is becoming increasingly regu-
lated in certain markets online.
 Given the scope of online content, expression and flexibility, trying to control 
any of these presents a variety of challenges. To begin with, the core premise of 
the Internet is strongly resistant to excessive external control that might act to 
limit expression. Furthermore, in terms of responsibility, there are challenges in 
motivating companies to invest significant resources in controlling their users, 
who may in fact leave the service if new, tighter measures of control are imple-
mented. Thus, liability is balanced against profit margins. The case of Edward 
Snowden revealed wide- scale disapproval of efforts to track online behaviour in 
the interests of security. The balance of control will be a further challenge in 
addition to the definition of boundaries. Who will dictate what content is inap-
propriate and what is not? Who has the final say? Will there be a new punish-
ment system for online violations? These are all questions that need to be 
addressed when control intensifies.
8.3 Bringing it all together
In the earlier parts of this book we introduced the notion of cumulating online 
content. One of our premises was that content, or information, of any type pro-
duced or added into the online context tends to cumulate rather than disappear. 
With billions of worldwide users, this content adds up quickly. One could argue 
that, in the name of transparency, this is clearly a good thing that keeps every-
thing “out in the open”. After all, as mentioned, the central premise of the Inter-
net, the free sharing of information, is based on the notion of transparency. 
However, there are downsides to storing user content indefinitely. A college 
student posting drunken content from a house party, a young couple sharing bor-
derline inappropriate and racy pictures from their summer holiday, or an 
employee abusing his or her boss and the company they work for, all constitute 
thoughtless actions taken in an instant that result in long- term consequences. In 
the past, such things may have been remembered for a time, fading away as the 
content itself was no longer available. Some might carry consequences while 
others could be hidden or forgotten quickly.
 However, what if this content remains accessible, even publicly? What effects 
would such a possibility carry if, for example, a potential employer in the distant 
future has access to all of this information? Yes, users can always delete social 
media posts, or even request that Google delete previous online history if they 
live in the EU. However, the problem is that these actions alone do not neces-
sarily make all unwanted past content disappear. When the damage is done, and 
when it is deemed significant enough, the Internet often makes forgetting a diffi-
cult and complicated ordeal.
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 The core ideology behind the early Internet was the free exchange of informa-
tion in order to maximise benefits to as large a user base as possible. However, 
behind the novel core ideology was the presumption that this information would 
actually be factual and somewhat constructively presented. Thus the resulting 
interaction would be a reflection of these principles. The cumulating nature of 
the Internet combined with the massive influx of user- generated data has created 
a body of content made up of, in large part, personal perceptions, opinions and 
views, often lacking in facts and structure. Thus, much factual information or 
discussion can disappear somewhere in the sea of less constructive content. A 
significant portion of the Internet has become a space fostering misinformation 
rather than reputable sources. At the heart of the leveraging of misinformation 
are often those users already entrenched in opposing social identities. This has 
created a sort of melting pot of different opinions among very different types of 
people. Continually adding to the undignified nature of much of Internet debate, 
often not unlike the unfiltered nature of intoxicated interaction, can create a chal-
lenging social environment in which navigating between reasonable and highly 
biased becomes a struggle. Where social norms, physical cues, feedback detec-
tion and self- censorship are minimised, so too can be civility and responsible 
discourse. Here we get to the heart of the problem. In the sea of an endless 
number of Internet users, in order to be heard, one often has to speak the loudest. 
In the online context, this tends to mean that those presenting exaggerated 
content grab attention more effectively than those users who choose to take more 
constructive or reasonable approaches. The result of all this can be a bias 
towards polarised views whose proponents are self- selected through the volume 
they project on the online space.
 As stated in Chapter 2 above and our discussion of Social Identity Theory (e.g. 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals tend to seek positive self- image through their 
group memberships. As a result, however, they also tend to view their own group as 
superior to other groups. This becomes more of an issue in the context of emotion-
ally charged topics as the role of these groups becomes more intensified. Sunstein 
and Hastie (2015), for instance, have noted that the combination of group member-
ship and an emotionally charged topic has polarised even those with moderate 
views on the issues in question. Online, where group identities are particularly 
prominent as a basis for interaction due to depersonalisation (Lea, Spears & de 
Groot, 2001), there is a great deal of potential for damaging polarisation as norms 
of civility or mutual respect are disregarded. These social networks act as places of 
opportunity: opportunity for finding validation, acceptance, new points of view or 
strengthening self- concept. As these aspects of the self evolve online, affected by 
both individual needs and environmental reaction to those needs, the global nature 
of the online space makes conflict and victimisation all the more likely. From the 
perspective of everyday hate, social networks play a central role. Namely, they can 
provide users with connections that can in turn be used to help create an illusion of 
a justified cause, even when based on hate and intolerance. Thus, online tools can 
act as reinforcing mechanisms that may, in the often polarising environment, result 
in rapid escalation in negative sentiment or behaviour.
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 One of the core necessities of a healthy and functioning society is a proper 
waste management system. Now if we consider waste management not from the 
perspective of city infrastructure but from the perspective of the Internet, hate- 
related content could be categorised as the worst kind of waste, namely toxic 
waste, due to its harmful nature. As most of us know, the problem with toxic 
waste is that not only is it extremely hazardous to public health, it is also very 
difficult and costly to dispose of. Therefore, much like nuclear waste, hate and 
hate content have the potential to remain toxic for years to come due to the diffi-
culty of completely removing past online content.
 Looking back to our main findings in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the effects of 
this toxicity can be far- reaching, with significant consequences affecting 
users. Online hate content can have second- and third- degree effects, causing 
harm to users far beyond the intended scope of the offender. Throughout our 
findings, those exposed to hate content, whether accidentally or by specific 
targeting said that the effect on their perceived wellbeing had been clearly 
negative. Our data naturally show differences between young people in the 
four countries surveyed, but shared features of the findings are likely the most 
relevant when thinking of effects on the global scale. Here, hate content does 
not carry diminishing returns in terms of harm, as the initial negative experi-
ence does not lessen the negative experience of others exposed later to the 
same targeted content.
 Thus, if the quantity of online hate content continues to grow, so too will the 
amount of toxic content that has the potential to further fuel negative interactions 
and content production. History shows that once highly polarised opinions 
become the new norm, particularly through the main channels of popular inter-
action, whether a Speakers’ Corner, a political rally or social media, the results 
are rarely constructive. This is not to say that polarisation automatically results 
in extreme behaviour, but rather that context and compromise do matter in social 
discourse and identity development. We are no strangers to polarised views and 
expressions of hate, having witnessed several massive demonstrations in 
response to the wave of refugees and mass immigration in Europe, hate- filled 
dialogue attacking the Muslim community in the current round of the US pres-
idential election, or any number of debates about global warming, feminism, 
nutrition, vaccinations, and the list goes on. All of these issues which arouse 
entrenched views are saturating the online setting.
 Both hate and toxicity have therefore gained what could be called an everyday 
presence. What we mean by this is that the expression of hate, targeted disap-
proval and anti- social behaviour have become so common that they are con-
stantly present in our online landscape. The combination of increasing online 
interaction and a perceived level of anonymity has led to more extreme and more 
polarised social debate that is as visible as it is toxic. Our findings show that 
exposure to hate content has become common, yet only a relatively small 
number of users admit to having produced such material. What may explain this 
is that very few users actually perceive themselves as having produced hate 
content, and simultaneously consider abrasive interaction a normal part of online 
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culture. Nonetheless, even if only a small number individuals are active 
producers of hate content, the Internet provides them with a potentially global 
audience and far- reaching negative influence.
8.4  Final reflections
What makes the increased presence of hate in the online landscape perplexing 
is that hate as such is damaging to both victims and offenders. Research shows 
that feelings of anger and hate have various negative consequences, ranging 
from personal and interpersonal problems to stress and physical health prob-
lems (Johnson, 1990; Martin, Coyier, VanSistine & Schroeder, 2013; Suls & 
Bunde, 2005). Therefore, any effort to tackle the presence of hateful online 
content is a service to both victims and offenders. In the spring of 2016 the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published an extensive 
policy recommendation report for the purposes of combating online hate 
(ECRI, 2016). The report includes an extensive terminology and definition of 
hate speech, perhaps the most detailed of its kind to date. The purpose of the 
policy report is to define official boundaries for what actually constitutes 
online hate speech, and also to provide a kind of manual for member states 
tackling these issues.
 Lately, we have also seen evidence of increasing moderation, or attempted 
waste management if you will, in particular from news media outlets that have 
allowed comments and discussion on their platforms. A number of these outlets 
have either limited or disabled comments and discussion altogether on some of 
their news stories due to excessive amounts of negative, and in many cases 
hateful, comments (e.g. Gross, 2014; Kantomaa, 2015; Pullinen, 2015). What 
makes this interesting is that the highly valued ideology of the free sharing of 
opinions, ideas and (mis)information online may soon be subject to a more 
reserved and regulated approach. At what point do the costs of damaging online 
content outweigh the benefits of uninhibited expression? At what point is it 
appropriate for legislation to limit rights previously assumed to be necessary and 
natural? This may have fundamental implications for the future if such restric-
tive policies become the new norm governing social media expression. Whether 
this would be an effective solution is another matter. However, as can be noted 
from a study by Kiesler and colleagues (1984) three decades ago, there has been 
relatively little progress in regard to online behaviour: “People in computer- 
mediated groups were more uninhibited than they were in face- to-face groups as 
measured by uninhibited verbal behaviour, defined as frequency of remarks con-
taining swearing, insults, name calling, and hostile comments” (Kiesler, Siegel 
& McGuire, 1984, p. 1129).
 In the most extreme cases, this reversion to more controlled civility could 
mean a return from a Web 3.0 to a Web 1.0 type online society, with a limited 
number of users having power over content production for mass consumption. 
Now, this seems like an unlikely scenario, given the extent to which various 
tools for connectivity and online consumption and expression have become 
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intertwined with the daily life of the global population. Given this interplay 
between high levels of online consumption and the desire to protect users from 
serious harm through targeted content, the future of social media is sure to be an 
interesting one. At the moment, Facebook and YouTube, the two most popular 
social media platforms used by hundreds of millions daily, are also the sites 
where exposure to hate, and the consequent harm to wellbeing, are most 
common. Short tweets on the highly popular Twitter can also result in similar 
consequences for many online users (e.g. Oksanen, Hawdon, Holkeri, Näsi & 
Räsänen, 2014; see also Chapter 4 above). Therefore, the future policies of social 
media platforms will have a significant impact on the future culture of online 
hate, as high levels of use and high levels of harm seem to go hand in hand 
online. These policies will determine the reasonable limits of discussion in terms 
of what levels of extremism and forms of expression are acceptable given public 
health concerns.
 Furthermore, the homogenising effect of the Internet can result in reinforcing 
the early behavioural patterns found most attractive by a particular individual, as 
like- minded people come together to form various types of personalised bubbles. 
Together, these may serve to further intensify the polarisation effect by reinforc-
ing social identity bubbles as contrasting opinions are filtered out to facilitate 
content determined as most likely to match past behaviour. This may result in 
ever more people moving into smaller and more specific networks where inter-
action is focused on those who are already familiar to one another and/or share 
similar ideologies. This limitation on the mixing of opinions, facts, social norms 
and points of view may encourage harmful behaviours or attitudes.
 Depending on control, the role of anonymity may also become less signi-
ficant. If interactions are limited in terms of content or expression, the role of 
alternate versions of the self will also evolve. Social media are currently expand-
ing, with services such as Instagram or Periscope and tools for image- and 
video- sharing becoming increasingly popular. These methods for wide- scale 
self- presentation through customising how others view the user are growing 
faster than many prominent social networking sites based on interaction. Rather 
than being a tool for communication, social media appear to have become more 
of a tool for developing self- identity through more calculated methods of image 
building. These new tools offer much more control in terms of what one’s iden-
tity actually represents. From the perspective of hate, if social media become 
more visual and less verbal, will the result be more moderate social interaction? 
Furthermore, wide- scale effects are also influenced by concentrations of high- 
consumption groups; different demographics tend to use social media for dif-
ferent purposes and consequently group online behavioural characteristics in 
terms of age, for example, are important factors when considering what plat-
forms or services are most significant in the setting.
 In dealing with hate online, information, anonymity and social networks play 
a highly influential role. The irony is that the same three elements are also at 
the heart of what makes the Internet great for so many of its users. This brings 
into focus the often fine line that users tread in terms of whether the positives 
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outweigh the negatives in online interaction, though the positives seem to be 
winning given the immense user base of various social media platforms. 
However, certain trends discussed do represent a cause for concern due to the 
wide- scale potential effect of users targeting others. But how do we prevent 
damaging content without limiting the numerous benefits that rely on those same 
avenues of expression?
 Looking to the future, a few key areas are worthy of further development. First, 
online literacy can become a tool for clarifying the online content environment. 
This involves, first, achieving a better understanding of and distinguishing between 
information and misinformation, extreme bias and reasonable opinion. Second, an 
improved understanding of the value of anonymity and its role in privacy rather 
than as a disguise for deviance may also be helpful in determining who is planning 
harm and who is simply seeking new avenues for neutral or beneficial expression 
and exploration. And, third, developing a more complete view of dangerous 
pockets in social networks and how they are reinforced by the pattern recognition 
of the online environment can lend itself to more effective methods of meeting 
identity and expressional needs without nurturing cycles of hate and social harm.
 If the risks associated with consumption of the social Internet in terms of 
widespread negative effects on wellbeing continue to grow, fundamental changes 
in how we experience the online world may follow. In such a scenario, tighter 
control of what is allowed online might become the new norm. This would be 
the very opposite of the original premise that motivated the development of the 
Internet in the first place. Moving forward in the study of how best to balance 
widely perceived opportunities and risks that tend to grow together, the key 
seems to lie in determining how much of a good thing is too much, and why that 
too much can make the good thing go bad.
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